Opinion
Record No. 1019-93-4
December 21, 1993
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY RICHARD J. JAMBORSKY, JUDGE.
(Charles Carroll, pro se, on briefs).
(Stephen D. Rosenthal, Attorney General; Paul S. Stahl, Assistant Attorney General; Lisa J. Rowley, Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for Virginia Employment Commission.
No brief for appellee Lohr Systems Solutions Corporation.
Present: Judges Baker, Elder and Fitzpatrick.
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication.
Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the trial court. Rule 5A:27.
Charles Carroll (Carroll) appeals the decision of the circuit court affirming the determination of the Virginia Employment Commission (VEC). The VEC found that Carroll was not eligible for Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC) benefits because he did not comply with the requirement that he appear in person to first file a new claim for standard unemployment benefits as directed by the VEC. Code §§ 60.2-610 and -612(6); Reg. VR 300-01-3.1(C)(1).
On appeal, Carroll raises four issues: (1) whether the VEC complied with its governing statutes and regulations in finding him ineligible for EUC benefits; (2) whether the VEC addressed his entire claim; (3) whether the circuit court denied him due process of law; and (4) whether the VEC officer who made the initial determination that Carroll was ineligible for EUC benefits was impartial.
Under Code § 60.2-625(A), "the findings of the [VEC] as to the facts, if supported by evidence and in the absence of fraud, shall be conclusive, and the jurisdiction of the court shall be confined to questions of law." See Shifflett v. Virginia Employment Comm'n, 14 Va. App. 96, 97, 414 S.E.2d 865, 865 (1992). "The VEC's findings may be rejected only if, in considering the record as a whole, a reasonable mind wouldnecessarily come to a different conclusion." Craft v. Virginia Employment Comm'n, 8 Va. App. 607, 609, 383 S.E.2d 271, 273 (1989) (emphasis in original). As there are no allegations of fraud and evidence supports the VEC findings, we confine our review to questions of law.
I.
Carroll contends that the VEC did not comply with its governing rules when it found him ineligible to receive EUC benefits. The core of Carroll's argument is that he disagrees with the VEC determination that he was required to appear in person to apply for standard unemployment benefits before he could be eligible for EUC benefits. Carroll was living in Europe and travel to Virginia or a location with a reciprocal agreement was an expense he did not want to incur.
Eligibility for unemployment benefits or extended benefits through the VEC, including EUC, is determined under the provisions of Title 60.2 of the Virginia Code. See, e.g., Code § 60.2-611. By statute, an applicant is eligible only if he or she has made a claim for benefits in accordance with VEC regulations. Code § 60.2-612(6).
Regulation VR-300-01-3.1.1(C)(1) requires a claimant to appear personally to file a claim for benefits. The regulation is intended to diminish the risk of fraudulent claims.
Carroll appeared to be eligible for standard Virginia unemployment benefits for the period for which he sought EUC benefits. VEC found that it was necessary for Carroll to file a claim for the standard benefits before his eligibility for EUC benefits could be determined. In other words, under Code § 60.2-611(B)(1), Carroll may not have been an "exhaustee," creating a risk that he would be allowed to "double-dip" for benefits.
The EUC notification of possible EUC benefits states that "[m]ost claims can be handled by mail." Carroll relies on this language in an attempt to demonstrate that the VEC did not follow its own rules. Carroll's case raised special concerns due to his potential eligibility for standard unemployment benefits. The notice in no way waived the authority of the VEC to require Carroll to appear in person to establish his eligibility for EUC benefits.
Carroll also contends that, as his address in Luxembourg was the only address provided on the VEC Claimant Notice of Predetermination Fact-Finding Interview and he was at home on the appointed day and time, the VEC failed to follow its own rules regarding the in-person interview. However, Carroll wrote to the VEC and indicated that he would not be able to appear in person in Virginia on the appointed day. It is apparent that he was aware that he was to appear in Virginia rather than at his home in Luxembourg. Carroll therefore has no grounds for asserting mistake or confusion on his part or a violation of VEC rules regarding where the interview was to be conducted.
We conclude that the VEC complied with its governing statutes and regulations when it determined Carroll was ineligible for EUC benefits because he had failed to appear for an in-person interview.
II.
Carroll contends that he was entitled to EUC benefits for the period of December 29, 1991 through February 23, 1992. Because we have concluded that the circuit court and the VEC correctly held that Carroll was ineligible for EUC benefits, this issue is now moot.
III.
The decision of the circuit court indicates that it "came to be heard upon a Petition for Judicial Review" which was filed by Carroll and that the decision was based upon the entire record. Carroll's contention that the court did not review his filings and that he was denied due process of law is without merit.
IV.
The record contains no evidence supporting Carroll's contention that the VEC officer who initially determined Carroll was ineligible for EUC benefits was not impartial.
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the circuit court.
Affirmed.