Section 5 of the Executive Order No. 6260 above referred to provides that after thirty days from August 28, 1933, no person shall hold or retain any interest, legal or equitable, in any gold coin, gold bullion, or gold certificates situated in the United States and owned by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, except under license therefor issued pursuant to this Executive Order. The special plea did not state that the plaintiff did not have a license. `To constitute a good plea in bar, the matter pleaded, must, if true, afford a full and complete answer to the action and show that there is no right of recovery.' Glenn v. Williams, 60 Md. 93; Carroll v. Bowen, 113 Md. 150, at page 154, 77 A. 128. Section 3 of the Act of March 9, 1933, supra, 12 U.S.C.A. § 248(m), also directs that the Secretary of the Treasury shall pay therefor an equivalent amount of any other form of coin or currency issued under the laws of the United States, and although the gold certificates in this case were held after thirty days from August 28, 1933, in order for confiscation to take place, it appears that intent to violate the act must be shown. United States v. 98 $20 United States Gold Coins et al., D.C.E.D.Pa., August 17, 1937, 20 F. Supp. 354. The case of Schmidt v. Twin City State Bank, April 6, 1940, 151 Kan. 667, 100 P.2d 652, 653, is cited by the appellant, but in that case, at the conclusion of the plaintiff's case the defendant filed a motion to strike from the record all evidence concerning gold coins.
`To constitute a good plea in bar, the matter pleaded, must, if true, afford a full and complete answer to the action and show that there is no right of recovery.' Glenn v. Williams, 60 Md. 93; Carroll v. Bowen, 113 Md. 150, at page 154, 77 A. 128. Section 3 of the Act of March 9, 1933, supra, 12 U.S.C.A. § 248(n), also directs that the Secretary of the Treasury shall pay therefor an equivalent amount of any other form of coin or currency issued under the laws of the United States, and although the gold certificates in this case were held after thirty days from August 28, 1933, in order for confiscation to take place, it appears that intent to violate the act must be shown.
"To constitute a good plea in bar, the matter pleaded, must, if true, afford a full and complete answer to the action and show that there is no right of recovery." Glenn v. Williams, 60 Md. 93; Carroll v. Bowen, 113 Md. 150 at page 154, 77 A. 128. Section 3 of the Act of March 9th, 1933, supra, also directs that the Secretary of the Treasury shall pay therefor an equivalent amount of any other form of coin or currency issued under the laws of the United States, and although the gold certificates in this case were held after thirty days from August 28th, 1933, in order for confiscation to take place, it appears that intent to violate the Act must be shown. United States v. 98 $20 United States Gold Coins et al., 20 F. Supp. 354. The case of Schmidt v. Twin City State Bank, 151 Kan. 667, 100 P. 2nd 653, is cited by the appellant but in that case, at the conclusion of the plaintiff's case, the defendant filed a motion to strike from the record all evidence concerning gold coins.
The record does not disclose the ruling of the court on the demurrer to the plea to the jurisdiction, and we assume this plea was abandoned. It could not properly be considered, for several reasons: First, because, being a plea in abatement or dilatory plea, it cannot be joined with the general issue plea or plea to the merits; and, second, because it was not verified by affidavit. 1 Poe's Pl. Pr., sec. 600; Chapman v. Davis, 4 Gill, 176; Cruzen v. McKaig, 57 Md. 459; Spencer v. Patten, 84 Md. 421, 35 A. 1097; Waggaman v. Nutt, 88 Md. 275, 41 A. 154; Sheppard v. Graves, 14 How. 505, 14 L.Ed. 518; Balto. O.R. Co. v. Harris, 12 Wall. 65, 20 L.Ed. 354; Glenn v. Williams, 60 Md. 93; Carroll v. Bowen, 113 Md. 154, 77 A. 128; Code, art. 75, sec. 28, subsec. 84.
If, by the terms of the instrument, he imposes a personal liability upon himself it is his own covenant, and he is personally liable upon it. This is the Maryland rule and is supported by a practically unanimous current of authority. Stewart v. Katz, 30 Md. 334; Carroll v. Bowen, 113 Md. 150; Lutz v. Linthicum, 8 Peters, 165; Stewart v. Griffith, 217 U.S. 323; Stobie v. Dills, 62 Ill. 432; Hall v. Cockrell, 28 Ala. 507; Dayton v. Warne, 43 N.J.L. 659; Damon v. Granby, 2 Pick. 345; Huntington v. Knox, 7 Cush. 371. It is undoubtedly true that in simple contracts where the principal is disclosed upon the face of the writing the agent is not bound, "unless it manifestly appears by the terms of the instrument that the agent intended to superadd or substitute his own responsibility for that of the principal."