Opinion
24A-CR-1236
12-18-2024
Christina Riquel Carrol, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
Attorney for Appellant Joel M. Schumm Appellate Clinic Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law Indianapolis, Indiana Attorneys for Appellee Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Michelle Hawk Kazmierczak Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable William J. Nelson, Judge The Honorable Mark F. Renner, Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 49D18-2108-F6-26030
Attorney for Appellant Joel M. Schumm Appellate Clinic Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law Indianapolis, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana
Michelle Hawk Kazmierczak Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
TAVITAS, JUDGE
Case Summary
[¶1] Following a jury trial, Christina Carrol was convicted of domestic battery in the presence of a child, a Level 6 felony. Carrol appeals and argues that insufficient evidence supports her conviction. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm.
Issue
[¶2] Carrol raises one issue, which we restate as whether sufficient evidence supports Carrol's conviction for domestic battery in the presence of a child.
Facts
[¶3] On August 20, 2021, D.T. and her three children were living in an apartment in Indianapolis with D.T.'s girlfriend, Carrol. D.T.'s daughter was thirteen, and her sons were fifteen and seventeen. That evening, all five individuals were in the apartment when D.T. and Carrol got into a verbal argument regarding child support.
[¶4] D.T. went to take a shower, and Carrol called her names as she showered. After showering, D.T. went to lie down on her bed, but Carrol continued to argue with her. At one point, Carrol stood up on the bed and punched D.T. in the face, causing D.T. to bleed from the nose. Carrol then pinned D.T. against the wall by her neck, and D.T. cried for help. D.T. knew the children were in the house and able to "hear what was going on[.]" Tr. Vol. II p. 109.
[¶5] D.T.'s daughter came into D.T.'s bedroom and saw that Carrol was holding D.T. in a headlock. The daughter told Carrol, "[Y]ou hit my mom," and Carrol threatened the daughter. Id. As D.T. and Carrol continued to fight, D.T.'s sons entered the room, and D.T. then contacted 911. Carrol fled the apartment, although she later returned and was arrested.
[¶6] The State ultimately charged Carrol with five counts: Count II, strangulation, a Level 6 felony; Count III, criminal confinement, a Level 6 felony; Count IV domestic battery in the presence of a child, a Level 6 felony; Count V, domestic battery, a Class A misdemeanor; and Count VI, domestic battery, a Class A misdemeanor. Count IV alleged that Carrol "did knowingly touch [D.T.], a family or household member, in a rude, insolent, or angry manner" and that Carrol "committed said offense in the presence of a child less than 16 years of age, knowing that the child was present and might be able to see or hear the offense[.]" Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 23.
The State initially charged Carrol with Count I, pointing a firearm, a Level 6 felony; however, the State later dismissed this count.
[¶7] A jury trial took place in February 2024. D.T. testified regarding the events underlying the charges, and Carrol testified in her own defense. The jury found Carrol guilty of domestic battery in the presence of a child as a Level 6 felony and both counts of domestic battery as Class A misdemeanors. The jury found Carrol not guilty of strangulation and criminal confinement.
[¶8] The trial court held a sentencing hearing on April 29, 2024. Due to double jeopardy concerns, the trial court entered judgment of conviction only on Count IV, domestic battery in the presence of a child, and did not enter judgment of conviction on the other domestic battery guilty findings. The trial court sentenced Carrol to one year, with 361 days suspended and 180 days of probation. Carrol now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[¶9] Carrol argues that insufficient evidence supports her conviction for domestic battery in the presence of a child. We disagree.
[¶10] Sufficiency of the evidence claims warrant a deferential standard of review in which we "neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility, instead reserving those matters to the province of the jury." Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024). A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if "there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. In conducting this review, we consider only the evidence that supports the jury's determination, not evidence that might undermine it. Id. We affirm the conviction "'unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict.'" Sutton v. State, 167 N.E.3d 800, 801 (Ind.Ct.App. 2021) (quoting Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind. 2007)).
[¶11] Carrol was convicted of domestic battery in the presence of a child. This offense is governed by Indiana Code Section 35-42-2-1.3, which provides, in relevant part:
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) through (f), a person who knowingly or intentionally:
(1) touches a family or household member in a rude, insolent, or angry manner; or
(2) in a rude, insolent, or angry manner places any bodily fluid or waste on a family or household member;
commits domestic battery, a Class A misdemeanor.
(b) The offense under subsection (a)(1) or (a)(2) is a Level 6 felony if one (1) or more of the following apply:
(2) The person who committed the offense is at least eighteen (18) years of age and committed the offense against a family or household member in the physical presence of a child less than sixteen (16) years of age, knowing that the child was present and might be able to see or hear the offense.
[¶12] Accordingly, to convict Carrol of domestic battery in the presence of a child, the State was required to prove that she: (1) knowingly or intentionally; (2) touched D.T.; (3) in a rude, insolent, or angry manner; (4) Carrol was at least eighteen years old when she committed the offense; (5) Carrol committed the offense in the presence of a child, who was under the age of sixteen years old; and (6) Carrol knew that the child was physically present and might be able to see or hear the offense.
[¶13] Carrol only argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to prove that the offense was committed in the physical presence of a child. According to Carrol, the phrase "physical presence" in the battery statute requires that the offense occur in the same room as the child. This Court, however, rejected a similar argument in Manuel v. State, 971 N.E.2d 1262, 1269 (Ind.Ct.App. 2012). In Manuel, the defendant argued that he did not commit battery in the children's presence because the children were in a separate room. We rejected this argument, explaining that "the critical question in determining whether a child is 'present' for purposes of the statute is whether a reasonable person would conclude that the child might see or hear the offense; not whether the child is in the same room as where the offense is taking place." Id. at 1270 (citing Boyd v. State, 889 N.E.2d 321 (Ind.Ct.App. 2008), trans. denied; True v. State, 954 N.E.2d 1105 (Ind.Ct.App. 2011)).
[¶14] Manuel relied on previous cases holding that the child need not "actually sense the battery; there only needed to be the possibility that they 'might' see or hear it." True, 954 N.E.2d at 1111. An interpretation of the statute that requires the child to hear or see the battery "would make the word 'physical' in the phrase 'physical presence' and the phrase 'might be able to see or hear the offense'" in the domestic battery statute "meaningless." Boyd, 889 N.E.2d at 325.
[¶15] Here, the evidence showed that Carrol punched D.T. in the face in the bedroom. No children were present at this moment. But Carrol then pinned D.T. against the wall by her neck, and, knowing that her children were able to "hear what was going on," D.T. cried for help. Tr. Vol. II p. 109. D.T.'s thirteen-year-old daughter then entered the bedroom and saw Carrol holding D.T. in a headlock. We conclude that this evidence-Carrol punching D.T., pinning her against the wall, and putting her in a headlock, all within earshot of the children-sufficiently demonstrates that the offense occurred in a place where a child could have seen or heard it. In other words, the offense occurred in the "physical presence" of a child, as this Court has interpreted that phrase.
[¶16] Moreover, even if Carrol were correct that "physical presence" means that the child must have been in the same room in which the offense occurred, the evidence shows that D.T.'s daughter witnessed Carrol holding D.T. in a headlock. This conduct alone constitutes domestic battery. See Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(a) (defining domestic battery as the knowing or intentional "rude, insolent, or angry" touching of a family or household member"); Moore v. State, 634 N.E.2d 825, 826 (Ind.Ct.App. 1994) (affirming battery conviction based on defendant holding victim in a headlock).
[¶17] Carrol argues that the headlock evidence is insufficient because the jury found her not guilty on the strangulation and criminal confinement counts. In other words, she argues that it would be inconsistent for the jury to find Carrol guilty of domestic battery in the presence of a child based on Carrol putting D.T. in a headlock but also find Carrol not guilty of strangulation and criminal confinement. This argument ignores the fact that the jury found Carrol guilty of three domestic battery offenses. Moreover, we find no inconsistency in the jury's verdicts. The charging information did not limit the domestic battery in the presence of a child allegation to any specific touching. The jury, thus, was free to find that Carrol committed the offense by putting D.T. in a headlock without finding that Carrol strangled or confined D.T.
The charging information provides, in relevant part:
COUNT II
On or about August 21, 2021, CHRISTINA CARROL in a rude, insolent or angry manner, did knowingly apply pressure to the throat or neck of [D.T.] in a manner that impeded normal breathing or blood circulation of [D.T.];
COUNT III
On or about August 21, 2021, CHRISTINA CARROL did knowingly confine [D.T.] without the consent of said [D.T.];
COUNT IV
On or about August 21, 2021, CHRISTINA CARROL, being at least eighteen (18) years of age, did knowingly touch [D.T.], a family or household member, in a rude, insolent, or angry manner and CHRISTINA CARROL committed said offense in the presence of a child less than 16 years of age, knowing that the child was present and might be able to see or hear the offense;
COUNT V
On or about August 21, 2021, CHRISTINA CARROL did knowingly touch [D.T.], a family or household member, in a rude, insolent or angry manner;
COUNT VI
On or about August 21, 2021, CHRISTINA CARROL did knowingly touch [D.T.] in a rude, insolent, or angry manner resulting in bodily injury, that is: pain and/or bleeding.Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 22-23.
[¶18] Even if the jury's verdicts were inconsistent, "[t]he evaluation of whether a conviction is supported by sufficient evidence is independent from and irrelevant to the assessment of whether two verdicts are contradictory and irreconcilable[,]" and "[j]ury verdicts in criminal cases are not subject to appellate review on grounds that they are inconsistent, contradictory, or irreconcilable." Beattie v. State, 924 N.E.2d 643, 648-49 (Ind. 2010). We, therefore, conclude that sufficient evidence supports Carrol's conviction for domestic battery in the presence of a child.
Conclusion
[¶19] Sufficient evidence supports Carrol's conviction for domestic battery in the presence of a child. Accordingly, we affirm.
[¶20] Affirmed.
May, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.