Summary
noting that equitable tolling "appl[ies] only after a claim has accrued" (interna! quotation marks and citation omitted)
Summary of this case from Torres v. U.S. & Lutheran Med. Ctr.Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:05-cv-1720 (JCH).
December 1, 2006
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [Doc. No. 13]
The plaintiff, Jason Carrion, has asserted three claims against his former employer, Coca-Cola Bottling Company of New England ("Coca-Cola"), the defendant. Count I alleges discrimination on the basis of race and national origin in violation of the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Count II alleges the same types of discrimination in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-60. Count III asserts a claim for malicious prosecution under Connecticut state law.
The defendant has filed a partial Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 13] pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the following reasons, the defendants' motion is GRANTED.
In its Motion for Summary Judgment, the defendant does not address plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In a motion for summary judgement, the burden is on the moving party to establish that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and that it is entitled to judgement as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986); White v. ABCO Engineering Corp., 221 F.3d 293, 300 (2d Cir. 2000). Once the moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party must "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial," Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and present such evidence as would allow a jury to find in his favor in order to defeat the motion. Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2000).
In assessing the record, the trial court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgement is sought. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255;Graham, 230 F.3d at 38. "This remedy that precludes a trial is properly granted only when no rational finder of fact could find in favor of the non-moving party." Carlton v. Mystic Transp., Inc., 202 F.3d 129, 134 (2d Cir. 2000). "When reasonable persons, applying the proper legal standards, could differ in their responses to the question" raised on the basis of the evidence presented, the question must be left to the jury. Sologub v. City of New York, 202 F.3d 175, 178 (2d Cir. 2000).
For the purposes of the instant motion, the court accepts facts undisputed by the parties as true and resolves disputed facts in favor of the non-moving plaintiff, where there is evidence to support his allegations.
Carrion worked as a Full Service Director for Coca-Cola, where he was responsible for loading products in vending machines and removing cash from these machines. See Complaint at ¶¶ 8-9 [Doc. No. 1]. After almost five years of employment with Coca-Cola, Carrion was terminated on April 25, 2003. See Plf.'s Loc.R.Civ.P. 56(a)2 Statement ("Plf.'s Stat.") at Ex. A [Doc. No. 16]. His termination was as a result of being accused of "theft of embezzlement" after Coca-Cola found his money bag short by $112.75. Complaint at ¶¶ 11-12. Subsequently, Carrion was prosecuted for four counts of larceny; in April 2004, he was acquitted of all charges. Id. at ¶¶ 13, 16-17. According to the plaintiff, Coca-Cola had never before and never since requested that an employee be prosecuted for a shortage of cash in that employee's money bag. Id. at ¶ 15.
Carrion initially filed a complaint of disability discrimination with the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities ("CHRO") and the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on December 24, 2003. See Plf.'s Stat. at Ex. A. The CHRO dismissed that complaint as untimely because it was filed more than 180 days from the date of his termination. See id. at Ex. B. In March 2004, Carrion learned that a similarly-situated white employee had a greater money shortage than Carrion did, but was neither arrested nor terminated for the shortage. See id. at ¶ 7. Thus on May 14, 2004, Carrion filed a second complaint with the CHRO and EEOC, alleging discrimination based on race and national origin. Id. at ¶¶ 8-9. On November 2, 2005, the CHRO issued a Release of Jurisdiction and the EEOC issued a Notice of Right to Sue. Id. at Ex. E-F.
III. DISCUSSION
A plaintiff must raise claims of discrimination at the applicable administrative agency before pursuing those claims in federal court. There are two conditions a plaintiff under Title VII must satisfy:
First, the complainant must file timely administrative charges with the EEOC. If the complainant has instituted state or local proceedings with an agency that is empowered "to grant or seek relief from [a discriminatory employment] practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto," the complainant has 300 days from the occurrence of an adverse employment action to file charges with the EEOC. . . . Second, the complainant must await dismissal of the administrative charge (or a failure to act) . . . Such notification is called a "right-to-sue" letter because the notification is a prerequisite to suit (even though the notification does not indicate that all of the statutory prerequisites for suit have been met, and therefore does not bespeak a "right").McPherson v. New York City Dept. of Educ., 457 F.3d 211, 213-14 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5; NAACP v. Town of E. Haven, 259 F.3d 113, 115 n. 4 (2d Cir. 2001)).
The Second Circuit has stated that Title Vll's timeliness requirement "is analogous to a statute of limitations." Id. at 214 (citing Van Zant v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 80 F.3d 708, 712 (2d Cir. 1996)). Its purpose is "to `put the adversary on notice to defend within a specified period' and to promote `the right to be free of stale claims.'" Id. (citing United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (discussing statutes of limitation generally) (citations omitted))).
The parties dispute the extent to which the second complaint with the EEOC should be considered an "amended" charge rather than a new charge of discrimination. See Def.'s Reply at n. 1. The court need not resolve this question, however, for even if it were considered an "amended" complaint, the court finds that the new charges of race and national origin discrimination do not "relate back" to Carrion's initial timely-filed EEOC charge of disability discrimination. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b) ("A charge may be amended to cure technical defects or omissions, including failure to verify the charge, or to clarify and amplify allegations made therein. Such amendments and amendments alleging additional acts which constitute unlawful employment practices related to or growing out of the subject matter of the original charge will relate back to the date the charge was first received."). Thus, the only issue for the court to resolve is whether Carrion's later charge is timely because of the newly-discovered evidence.
There is no dispute that Carrion's May 2004 charge of discrimination was filed with the EEOC and CHRO more than 300 days following the date of his termination in April 2003. However, Carrion claims his complaint is timely because he did not become aware of the alleged discriminatory reason for being terminated until March 2004. Thus, he argues that the statute of limitations should be tolled until the date of his discovery.
"`[F]iling a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court, but a requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.'" Downey v. Runyon, 160 F.3d 139, 145 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982)). Although the statute of limitations law is "less than straightforward," Heins v. Potter, 271 F. Supp. 2d 545, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), the courts have noted a distinction between the law of accrual, equitable tolling, and equitable estoppel. See id. The law of accrual, or the "discovery rule," states that a cause of action accrues on the date of discovery of the injury. Id.; see also Singleton v. City of New York, 632 F.2d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 1980) (explaining that federal law "establishes as the time of accrual that point in time when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action"). Equitable tolling and equitable estoppel, on the other hand, "apply only after a claim has accrued." Id. According to the Second Circuit: "Unlike equitable tolling, which is invoked in cases where the plaintiff is ignorant of his cause of action because of the defendant's fraudulent concealment, equitable estoppel is invoked in cases where the plaintiff knew of the existence of his cause of action but the defendant's conduct caused him to delay in bringing his lawsuit."Cerbone v. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, 768 F.2d 45, 49-50 (2d Cir. 1985).
Regarding the discovery rule, the court in Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1386 n. 5 (3d Cir. 1994), explained its origins in products liability and medical malpractice cases. It stated that "the `polestar' of the discovery rule is not the plaintiff's actual knowledge of injury, but rather whether the knowledge was known, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence, knowable to the plaintiff." Id. at 1386 (citations omitted).
The Third Circuit cites Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258 (1980), a case relied on by the plaintiff in the present action, as implicitly applying the discovery rule when it held that "the statute of limitations began to run `at the time the [alleged discriminatory] tenure decision was made and communicated to Ricks.'" Oshiver, 38 F.3d at 1386 (emphasis supplied).
As to the precise date of discovery that would trigger the statutory period, the Oshiver court held that "a claim accrues in a federal cause of action upon awareness of actual injury, not upon awareness that this injury constitutes a legal wrong." Id. (emphasis added); see also Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 450 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating statute of limitations would be tolled if plaintiff "did not discover that he had been injured, i.e., that a decision to terminate him had been made");Merrill v. Southern Methodist Univ., 806 F.2d 600, 605 (5th Cir. 1986) (rejecting plaintiff's argument that "in determining whether a particular claim is time-barred, a court should focus on the date the victim first perceives that a discriminatory motive caused the act, rather than the actual date of the act itself"). Similarly, the Second Circuit has held that the statutory time periods "commence upon the employer's commission of the discriminatory act and are not tolled or delayed pending the employee's realization that the conduct was discriminatory unless the employee was actively misled by his employer, he was prevented in some extraordinary way from exercising his rights, or he asserted his rights in the wrong forum, in which event tolling of the time bar might be permitted as a matter of fairness." Miller v. Int'l Telephone and Telegraph Corp., 755 F.2d 20, 24 (2d Cir. 1985).
In this case, the discovery rule does not save Carrion's otherwise untimely charge. Agreeing with the Oshiver court, this court similarly finds that, for purposes of the discovery rule, Carrion "discovered" the injury on the date he was terminated,i.e., April 25, 2003. At the moment this termination was "communicated to" him, see Ricks 449 U.S. at 258, Carrion became aware: "(1) that [he] had been injured, i.e., discharged, and (2) that this injury had been caused by another party's conduct."Oshiver, 38 F.3d at 1391. Thus, the discovery rule does not apply to this case.
As for the other equitable doctrines, "[s]uch doctrines . . . are to be applied `sparingly.'" Bendik v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 2004 WL 736852, at *4 (S.D.N.Y., 2004). The Second Circuit has stated that equitable tolling, which is appropriate when a plaintiff "is ignorant of his cause of action because of the defendant's fraudulent concealment," Cerbone, 768 F.2d at 49-50, will be applied when an employer's conduct is "extraordinary" enough to justify resorting to the equitable rule. See Dillman v. Combustion Engineering, Inc., 784 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1986). For example, it is appropriate in cases "where an employer's misleading conduct is responsible for the employee's unawareness of his cause of action." Id. In the present action, however, Carrion has not presented any evidence that he was unaware of having a cause of action under Title VII. On the contrary, considering his filing of a charge of disability discrimination, it appears that he was aware of his statutory rights. Moreover, Carrion has presented no evidence that Coca-Cola in any way misled him regarding his rights under Title VII.
The equitable estoppel doctrine also does not apply in this context. This doctrine "may be properly invoked in a case in which the employer has misrepresented the length of the limitations period or in some other way has `lulled the plaintiff into believing that it was not necessary for him to commence litigation.'" Id. at 61 (citing Cerbone, 768 F.2d at 50). The Second Circuit has refused to apply the doctrine where "the alleged conduct does not amount to the type of bad faith, dilatory actions that require equity to step in and estop a statute of limitations defense." Dillman, 784 F.2d at 61. In this case, too, Carrion has presented no such evidence.
Even if Coca-Cola used Carrion's supposed theft as an excuse for a discriminatory termination, which the court does not decide, this does not amount to improper delaying or misleading by Coca-Cola to trigger these equitable doctrines. Thus, on the instant record the court cannot excuse Carrion's untimely filing of his discrimination charge, and he is therefore barred from bringing this action in federal court. Moreover, Carrion's state law claims of discrimination are necessarily untimely, as even the first of Carrion's two charges was filed outside the 180-day statute of limitations.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 13] is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.
Dated at Bridgeport, Connecticut.