In this action for strict foreclosure, the named defendant has appealed from the trial court's denial of his second "motion to reopen judgment and extend law day." By way of this motion, the named defendant sought to obtain a six month extension in the law day set for March 1, 1980. A motion to open a judgment of strict foreclosure is addressed to the discretion of the trial court; see General Statutes 49-15; and "`unless that discretion was abused or was based upon some error in law, the denial of the motion must stand.' Carrington v. Muhlfeld, 122 Conn. 334, 337, 189 A.2d 184." Sebastiano v. Corde, 171 Conn. 324, 325-26, 370 A.2d 946 (1976).

Wilusz v. Ives, 152 Conn. 352, 354, 206 A.2d 841; Maltbie, Conn. App. Proc. 126. The denial of a motion to open judgment of strict foreclosure is a matter resting within the discretion of the trial court; General Statutes 49-15; and "unless that discretion was abused or was based upon some error in law, the denial of the motion must stand." Carrington v. Muhlfeld, 122 Conn. 334, 337, 189 A.2d 184. On the record before us there is no such evidence of abuse of discretion.

Cichy v. Kostyk, 143 Conn. 688, 697, 125 A.2d 483; McCulloch v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 107 Conn. 164, 167, 140 A. 114. The denial of the defendant's motion to revoke the order of reference must stand unless the court abused its legal discretion or its action was otherwise based on some error in law. Carrington v. Muhlfeld, 122 Conn. 334, 337, 189 A. 184. The basis of the motion to revoke the order of reference is that the order was made despite the fact that the defendant had filed an answer denying certain allegations of the petition and the issues framed by the answer had not been determined.

Cronin v. Gager-Crawford Co., 128 Conn. 401, 404, 23 A.2d 149; Conn. App. Proc., 5. In Carrington v. Muhlfeld, 122 Conn. 334, 337, 189 A. 184, we stated that we had, in that case, no occasion to consider whether an appeal may be taken from the refusal of a trial court to open a judgment of foreclosure. If an appeal would lie from such a ruling, it would be because the grounds upon which relief was claimed arose after the time to appeal from the original judgment of foreclosure had passed. Whether or not a judgment is final is to be determined upon the face of the record.

In her brief the plaintiff includes a discussion, under the eighth assignment of error, of the denial of the motion to reopen the judgment. The denial of the motion was within the discretion of the trial court; Carrington v. Muhlfeld, 122 Conn. 334, 337, 189 A. 184; and there is nothing in the record to show an abuse of that discretion. The facts are as follows: The parties were married in 1901.

General Statutes, 5649; Paiwich v. Krieswalis, 97 Conn. 123, 125, 115 A. 720. As the trial court stated in its conclusion, an application to open a judgment by default, unless at least it is based on a pure error of law, is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and we cannot hold that the trial court in this instance did not exercise a proper discretion in denying the motion. Jartman v. Pacific Fire Ins. Co., 69 Conn. 355, 362, 37 A. 970; White's Appeal, 75 Conn. 314, 319, 53 A. 582; Carrington v. Muhlfeld, 122 Conn. 334, 337, 189 A. 184. It is true that the State has an interest in every action where a divorce is sought "to make sure that the attempt will not prevail without sufficient and lawful cause shown by the real facts of the case."

"A motion to open a judgment of strict foreclosure is addressed to the discretion of the trial court; see General Statutes 49-15; and `"unless that discretion was abused or was based upon some error in law, the denial of the motion must stand." Carrington v. Muhlfeld, 122 Conn. 334, 337, 189 A.2d 184.' Sebastiano v. Corde, 171 Conn. 324, 325-26, 370 A.2d 946 (1976)." Melillo v. Spiro, 187 Conn. 333, 334, 445 A.2d 921 (1982).

Practice Book § 280; General Statutes § 52-212. In view of the defendants' own negligence in relying on the advice of the assistant clerk's statement, in disregard of a court order, the defendants' motion to open should not be granted, and the court did not abuse its discretion since no reasonable cause for relief was shown by the defendants. Testa v. Carrolls Hamburger System, Inc., 154 Conn. 294, 300; Carrington v. Muhlfeld, 122 Conn. 334, 337; Schoonmaker v. Albertson Douglass Machine Co., 51 Conn. 387, 392. The failure of the defendants to comply with the court's order was cause for entering a default and proceeding forthwith to a hearing in damages.