Carrier v. Robbins

13 Citing cases

  1. Walker v. Los Angeles County

    55 Cal.2d 626 (Cal. 1961)   Cited 76 times
    In Walker v. County of Los Angeles (1961) 55 Cal.2d 626, 632 [ 12 Cal.Rptr. 671], the court declared that the board of supervisors failed to perform its duty, but found only that the board has "a quasi-judicial, non-legislative, fact-finding function preceding the performance of the indicated legislative act."

    Petitioners, on the other hand, contend that reasonable inferences from the undisputed evidence support the findings and judgment in their favor; that the board's preliminary ascertainment of a "prevailing wage" was a mandatory prerequisite to enactment of a valid salary ordinance, and the issuance of a writ of mandate to compel the board's performance of its prescribed duty would not constitute an invasion of legislative discretion. [1] The concept embodied in section 47 is known as the "prevailing wage" doctrine, and is found in substantially similar terms in the charters of many other California cities and counties: e.g., San Diego County Charter, section 40 ( Carrier v. Robbins, 112 Cal.App.2d 32 [ 245 P.2d 676]); Sacramento City Charter, section 52 ( Leftridge v. City ofSacramento, 59 Cal.App.2d 516 [ 139 P.2d 112]); Los Angeles City Charter, section 425 ( Parker v. Bowron, 40 Cal.2d 344 [ 254 P.2d 6]); San Francisco City and County Charter, section 151 ( City County of San Francisco v. Boyd, 22 Cal.2d 685 [ 140 P.2d 666]). A similar statutory provision is applicable to employees of the State of California. (Gov. Code, § 18850.)

  2. San Bernardino Fire v. City of San Bernardino

    199 Cal.App.2d 401 (Cal. Ct. App. 1962)   Cited 19 times

    As a consequence, the steps to be undertaken, the method selected, and the decision reached in the course thereof, in the absence of fraudulent or arbitrary action, would not be interfered with by the courts. ( California Drive-In Restaurant Assn. v. Clark, supra, 22 Cal.2d 287, 302-303; Ray v. Parker, 15 Cal.2d 275, 307-310 [ 101 P.2d 665]; Child v. Warne, 194 Cal.App.2d 623, 634 [ 15 Cal.Rptr. 437]; Carrier v. Robbins, 112 Cal.App.2d 32, 35 [ 245 P.2d 676]; Monahan v. Department of Water Power, 48 Cal.App.2d 746, 753 [ 120 P.2d 730].) [3] The plaintiffs contend that Paragraph SECOND of the charter section requires the council to fix their salaries at the average of the monthly salaries respectively paid by the five enumerated cities to their employees who hold positions like or most nearly comparable to the positions of patrolman and fireman; that the term "Position" as used in that part of the charter section prescribing the standard in question refers to the position of patrolman and fireman; and strenuously object to the consideration given by the defendant city to the position of parking control officer.

  3. Walker v. County of Los Angeles

    6 Cal. Rptr. 787 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960)

    It is firmly established, and by respondents conceded, that the fixing of salaries or wages is a strictly legislative prerogative and duty. City & County of San Francisco v. Boyd, 22 Cal.2d 685, 689, 692, 140 P.2d 666; Allen v. Bowron, 64 Cal.App.2d 311, 313, 148 P.2d 673; Carrier v. Robbins, 112 Cal.App.2d 32, 35, 245 P.2d 676; Banks v. Civil Service Commission, 10 Cal.2d 435, 442, 74 P.2d 741; Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 127, 60 S.Ct. 869, 84 L.Ed. 1108, 1114; Collins v. City & Co. of S. F., 112 Cal.App.2d 719, 729-730, 247 P.2d 362. It is equally clear that the determination of the question of what are prevailing wages as an incident to fixing compensation of employees is also quasi-legislative, not judicial or quasi-judicial.

  4. Alameda County Employees' Assn. v. County of Alameda

    30 Cal.App.3d 518 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973)   Cited 22 times

    (4) The fixing of compensation for public employees is a legislative function. ( Banks v. Civil Service Commission, 10 Cal.2d 435, 442 [ 74 P.2d 741]; City and County of San Francisco v. Boyd, 22 Cal.2d 685, 689 [ 140 P.2d 666]; Carrier v. Robbins, 112 Cal.App.2d 32, 35 [ 245 P.2d 676]; Anderson v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 229 Cal.App.2d 796, 798.) However, it is established that prevailing wage provisions constitute a positive limitation on the governing body's discretionary power to determine the rate of compensation.

  5. Anderson v. Board of Supervisors

    229 Cal.App.2d 796 (Cal. Ct. App. 1964)   Cited 9 times

    [2] It is not for the court to determine the prevailing wage, but this is a matter for the respondent board of supervisors. It was so held in Carrier v. Robbins, 112 Cal.App.2d 32 [ 245 P.2d 676]. In the charter of the respondent county of San Diego there is a requirement for the classification, standardization of employment and compensation.

  6. Walker v. Munro

    178 Cal.App.2d 67 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960)   Cited 26 times
    In Walker v. Munro (1960) 178 Cal.App.2d 67 [ 2 Cal.Rptr. 737], the Court of Appeal suggested that an administrative agency may declare a statute unconstitutional; but Walker was indirectly criticized and implicitly disapproved in State of California v. SuperiorCourt (1974) 12 Cal.3d 237, 250-251 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 497, 524 P.2d 1281].

    [2b] The doctrine of exhaustion of remedies has been applied to actions for declaratory relief involving statutes administered by governmental agencies. ( Imperial Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Caminetti (1943), 59 Cal.App.2d 501, 505 [ 139 P.2d 691]; Chapman v. Division of Real Estate (1957), 153 Cal.App.2d 421, 430-432 [ 314 P.2d 773]; Carrier v. Robbins (1952), 112 Cal.App.2d 32, 36 [ 245 P.2d 676]; Louis Eckert B. Co. v. Unemployment R. Com. (1941), 47 Cal.App.2d 844, 847-848 [ 119 P.2d 227].) Plaintiffs cite no cases which hold the exhaustion doctrine inapplicable where the party seeking relief in the courts did not initiate the administrative proceedings.

  7. San Ysidro Irr. Dist. v. Superior Court

    56 Cal.2d 708 (Cal. 1961)   Cited 19 times
    In San Ysidro Irr. Dist. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 708 [ 16 Cal.Rptr. 609, 365 P.2d 753], [this] court held that, absent constitutional or statutory regulations providing otherwise, quo warranto is the only proper remedy in cases in which it is available.

    . . . Such statutes are intended to provide an additional procedure for utilizing the existing jurisdiction of the courts." ( Hoyt v. Board of Civil ServiceCommrs., 21 Cal.2d 399, 403 [ 132 P.2d 804]; also 15 Cal.Jur.2d 105, § 6; Carrier v. Robbins, 112 Cal.App.2d 32, 36 [ 245 P.2d 676]; Independent Laundry v. Railroad Com., 70 Cal.App.2d 816, 821 [ 161 P.2d 827]; Imperial Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Caminetti, 59 Cal.App.2d 501, 505 [ 139 P.2d 691].) [4] Under section 803 of the Code of Civil Procedure, respondent court would not have jurisdiction of an action attacking the validity of the district unless brought by the Attorney General at the instance of the city; and therefore the present declaratory relief action would not be proper under that section.

  8. Citizens for Planning Responsibly v. County of San Luis Obispo

    176 Cal.App.4th 357 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009)   Cited 8 times
    Construing initiative's language is subject to de novo review

    We cannot usurp that authority. (See, e.g., 20th Century Ins. Co. v. Garamendi (1994) 8 Cal.4th 216, 278 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 807, 878 P.2d 566] [factfinding is a quasi-legislative function]; Carrier v. Robbins (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d 32, 35-36 [ 245 P.2d 676] [the courts will not interfere with the exercise of a factfinding function by the board of supervisors].) D. Remaining Arguments

  9. County of Sonoma v. Superior Court (Sonoma County Law Enforcement Assn.)

    173 Cal.App.4th 322 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009)   Cited 33 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Concluding that where one offensive word was the subject of much debate before enactment, that word “could not be severed from the remainder of the legislation”

    The fixing of the salaries of county employees is unquestionably a legislative function. ( Carrier v. Robbins (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d 32, 35 [ 245 P.2d 676]; see Alameda County Employees' Assn. v. County of Alameda (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 518, 531 [ 106 Cal.Rptr. 441].) It is equally clear that "[t]he fixing of the number of employees, the salaries and employee benefits is an integral part of the statutory procedure for the adoption of the county budget. . . ."

  10. S.F. Chamber of Commerce v. City Etc. of S.F

    275 Cal.App.2d 499 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969)   Cited 2 times

    But these cases did not have to do with the legislative discretion itself. We do find several cases in which the courts have expressed the principle that the determining of prevailing wage rates is primarily for the legislative branch; Collins v. City County of San Francisco, 112 Cal.App.2d 719, 730 [ 247 P.2d 362]; City County of San Francisco v. Boyd, 22 Cal.2d 685, 689 [ 140 P.2d 666]; Carrier v. Robbins, 112 Cal.App.2d 32, 35 [ 245 P.2d 676]; Spencer v. City of Alhambra, 44 Cal.App.2d 75, 77 [ 111 P.2d 910]; Banks v. Civil Service Com., 10 Cal.2d 435 [ 74 P.2d 741]; Anderson v. Board of Supervisors, 229 Cal.App.2d 796 [ 40 Cal.Rptr. 541]. Appellants state that although they cannot say at just what percentage the wage becomes so arbitrarily excessive as to amount to an abuse of discretion, such as was suggested would warrant judicial intervention in the Boyd case, surely the point has been reached by a large number of classifications.