Opinion
Supreme Court Nos. S-13344, S-13362.
October 28, 2009.
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Palmer, Eric Smith, Judge, Superior Court Nos. 3PA-07-72/73 CN.
Appearances: Angela Greene, Assistant Public Defender, and Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for Appellant Carrie K. Abigail E. Sheldon, Wasilla, for Appellant Jake H. Megan R. Webb, Assistant Attorney General, Anchorage, and Richard A. Svobodny, Acting Attorney General, Juneau, for Appellee.
Before: Carpeneti, Chief Justice, Eastaugh, Fabe, Winfree, and Christen, Justices.
NOTICE
Memorandum decisions of this court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d). Accordingly, this memorandum decision may not be cited for any proposition of law or as an example of the proper resolution of any issue.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT
Entered pursuant to Appellate Rule 214.
I. INTRODUCTION
A mother and father challenge a superior court order finding her son and their daughter to be children in need of aid and terminating the mother and father's parental rights. The mother challenges only the superior court's finding that she failed to remedy her conduct. The father challenges the superior court's findings that he failed to remedy his conduct, that the state made reasonable efforts to reunify the family, and that termination was in his daughter's best interests. We conclude that the record contains sufficient evidence to support the challenged findings. We therefore affirm the superior court's order terminating the parental rights of both parents.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Michael K. was born in October 1998; Beth H. was born in March 2003. Carrie K. is Michael and Beth's biological mother; Jake H. is Beth's biological father. Neither Michael nor Beth is an Indian child within the definition of the Indian Child Welfare Act. Carrie and Jake never married.
Pseudonyms have been used to protect the privacy of the family members.
In June 2008 the superior court granted the Office of Children's Services's petition to terminate the parental rights of Michael's unknown father. Carrie has a third child who lives with his father; the third child was no longer involved in this termination case at trial.
See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (2006).
The Office of Children's Services (OCS) first removed Michael and Beth from Carrie and Jake's care on August 31, 2005. OCS social workers were concerned Carrie was abusing drugs and prescription medications after they learned she was seen repeatedly nodding off at McDonald's while Michael and another child were in her care. Carrie later reported that she had taken either two or four Soma tablets.
After OCS filed an emergency child in need of aid (CINA) petition, the superior court granted OCS temporary legal custody of Michael and Beth, but ordered the children returned to Carrie's physical custody. OCS and Carrie entered into a service agreement. Carrie and the children were residing at Carrie's mother's house, a placement about which OCS was concerned because of reports of crime, drug activity, violence, and child neglect in the home. It is unclear whether Jake was in jail or out with an ankle monitor.
On September 15, 2005, after receiving from Michael and the other children in the home reports of neglect and domestic violence and hearing allegations of substance abuse and neglect, OCS removed the children for the second time. OCS returned the children to Carrie's physical care on October 4, 2005, after a contested removal hearing, on the condition they not live at Carrie's mother's home. Carrie found safe alternative housing. OCS prepared a new case plan that identified the permanency goal as remaining in the home and required Carrie to participate in substance abuse treatment, maintain safe and stable housing, and participate in home-based services.
Between October and December 2005 the social worker could not locate Carrie, received messages from the home-based services staff that they were having trouble contacting and working with the family, and learned that Carrie and the children had moved back into Carrie's mother's home. On December 28, 2005, police arrested Carrie in her mother's home on an outstanding warrant and OCS removed the children from Carrie's care for a third time.
In January 2006 OCS prepared a case plan for Carrie and Jake, who was then out of custody with an ankle monitor; the plan required both parents to complete a substance abuse assessment and treatment, participate in urinalysis, complete parenting education, and participate in supervised visitation. The permanency goal was reunification with both parents. The children remained in foster care.
In March 2006 Carrie completed a substance abuse assessment at Alaska Family Services (AFS), but she was not recommended for inpatient treatment after submitting a positive urinalysis screen but denying use; she was recommended for outpatient treatment. In April 2006 Jake completed a parenting class and participated in a substance abuse assessment at AFS; he was recommended for treatment. At an April 2006 home visit OCS observed that both parents appeared motivated, were willing to participate in their case plans, were engaged in treatment, and were doing well. After refusing numerous urinalysis tests and testing positive once, Carrie was recommended for and began treatment at AFS in June 2006. Carrie also completed a recommended parenting class.
In July 2006 OCS learned that the foster parents had left the children with Carrie and Jake. Although the social worker had planned to wait longer before attempting a trial home visit, she let the children remain in the home, increased services for the family, and revised the case plan.
On July 19, 2006, Carrie and Jake stipulated to adjudicating the children as children in need of aid under AS 47.10.011(10) because of the parents' substance abuse.
Jake began substance abuse treatment at AFS in July 2006. He was involuntarily discharged from treatment in October 2006 "due to nonparticipation," having missed nine of eleven group sessions and one of three individual sessions. Although his urinalysis screens were negative, his discharge summary stated that he was at elevated risk for relapse because of his history of substance use, level of denial, and lack of participation in treatment.
In October 2006 Carrie was discharged from treatment due to noncompliance, having missed nine of fourteen group sessions. Although all but one of her urinalysis screens were negative, over the course of her involvement with OCS Carrie missed many random urinalysis screens and had at least one diluted sample.
In October 2006, after receiving a report that Michael had "excessive school absences," the OCS social worker met with Carrie and Jake to discuss their noncompliance with treatment and give them contact information for another treatment program. OCS created and Carrie signed a contract for a trial home visit. Carrie testified that she and Jake both called the treatment program several times and left messages, but no one responded. She later learned that the program was having trouble with its phone lines, but she did not again attempt to contact the program.
In October or November 2006 Jake began serving his criminal sentence; his anticipated release date was August 2008.
In late November 2006 OCS found the children in the care of Carrie's sister, who was not supposed to have contact with Michael and Beth because she had a child-protection case with OCS. The social worker later learned that Carrie, without alerting OCS, had sent then-three-year-old Beth to an unknown caregiver in Beluga for an indeterminate period of time. On November 29 the social worker found several adults with criminal histories and child protection issues in Carrie's home, and later heard from Michael that they had been there for several days and that there had been an incident involving a gun. On November 30 OCS removed Michael from Carrie's care. The social worker located Beth and assumed custody of her when she returned from Beluga on December 4. This was the fourth and final removal.
In January and February 2007 OCS prepared a series of case plans for Carrie and Jake; the agency required both parents to complete new substance abuse assessments and treatment and participate in parenting classes, and required Carrie to participate in urinalysis and supervised visitation, as well as maintain safe and stable housing. The plans identified the permanency goal as adoption with a concurrent goal of reunification.
In February 2007 an OCS social worker sent the case plan and OCS contact information to Jake, who was then in custody. While incarcerated, Jake participated in parenting classes, random urinalysis screens, and Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) and Narcotics Anonymous (NA) meetings. He did not participate in substance abuse treatment because the Department of Corrections (DOC) did not offer it.
Carrie testified that she could not participate in recommended services because she did not have enough money, but she did not find employment or apply for public assistance. She missed some supervised visits with the children.
In February 2007 Carrie began dating Tim C. In August 2007 they married and moved to Anchorage without informing OCS. OCS located Carrie through her attorney, conducted a background check on Tim, and met with both Carrie and Tim. In early 2008 OCS again lost contact with Carrie. In February 2008 Carrie and Tim began having problems with a roommate with whom they were living in a trailer in Anchorage, and the situation deteriorated into a "rental emergency" in which they needed a police escort to remove their belongings. At trial Tim testified that he was employed, he submitted to random urinalysis screens for work, and he had asked OCS if he could be part of Carrie's case plan for reunification.
On March 3, 2008, OCS filed a petition to terminate Carrie's parental rights to Michael and Beth, and to terminate Jake's parental rights to Beth.
After his release to a halfway house in May 2008, Jake obtained a new substance abuse assessment and planned to begin the recommended outpatient treatment when he received his first paycheck.
At the time of the 2008 termination trial Carrie and Tim informed OCS about where they had been living since early 2008. Tim testified that he had rented a home big enough to accommodate the children and had offered his home for inspection by social workers.
In May 2008, after a two-day trial, Superior Court Judge Eric Smith made the required findings and terminated Carrie's parental rights. In July 2008 the superior court held a termination trial on Jake's parental rights, made most of the required findings on the record, and requested that the parties file supplemental briefing on reasonable efforts. The superior court later issued a written order finding that the state made reasonable efforts.
Various witnesses testified at the termination trials about the effects of Carrie and Jake's alleged parenting failures on the children. When the foster parents first took custody of the children, both children had nightmares, disordered eating behaviors, and post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of witnessing domestic violence and living with a lack of routine and structure; Michael had severe tooth decay and was behind in school; Beth was not potty-trained. The foster parents addressed all of these issues and the children substantially improved. After visits with Carrie the children's behavior regressed, but generally improved a couple of days after each visit. The children appeared not to enjoy or look forward to the visits, and the children's therapist recommended that the visits be reduced to once a month. The foster parents wanted to adopt both children, Michael told the foster parents he wanted them to adopt him, and Beth had begun telling the foster parents she loved them.
On November 3, 2008, the superior court issued a written order terminating Carrie's parental rights to Michael and both parents' rights to Beth.
Carrie and Jake separately appeal termination of their parental rights.
III. DISCUSSION
Before terminating parental rights to a non-Indian child under the CINA statutes and rules, a superior court must find by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) the child is in need of aid because "the child has been subjected to conduct or conditions described in AS 47.10.011"; (2) the parent "has not remedied the conduct or conditions in the home that place the child at substantial risk of harm" or "has failed, within a reasonable time, to remedy the conduct or conditions in the home that place the child in substantial risk so that returning the child to the parent would place the child at substantial risk of physical or mental injury"; and (3) the state has made "timely, reasonable efforts" to provide services to the parent and the child to keep the family together or reunify the family, including identifying services, actively offering and referring the parent to the services, and documenting the actions taken. The court must find by a preponderance of the evidence that "termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child." The superior court found against the parents on requirements (1), (2), and (3), as well as the best interests requirement. Carrie challenges the second finding; Jake challenges findings two and three, and the best interests finding.
See AS 47.10.088; CINA Rule 18.
AS 47.10.088(a)(1); CINA Rule 18(c)(1)(A). Neither parent appeals this finding.
AS 47.10.088(a)(2); CINA Rule 18(c)(1)(A)(i).
AS 47.10.086(a), .088(a)(3); CINA Rule 18(c)(2)(A).
CINA Rule 18(c)(3); see also AS 47.10.088(c).
A. Standard of Review
We review de novo the legal question whether the superior court's factual findings satisfy the CINA statutes and rules. "We review factual findings for clear error, reversing only if, after `a review of the entire record in the light most favorable to the party prevailing below,' we are left `with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.'" We "bear in mind at all times that terminating parental rights is a drastic measure." B. Whether the Superior Court Erred in Terminating Carrie's Parental Rights to Michael and Beth
Jon S v. State, Dep't of Health Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 212 P.3d 756, 761 (Alaska 2009); Audrey H v. State, Office of Children's Servs., 188 P.3d 668, 672-73 (Alaska 2008) (quoting Brynna B. v. State, Dep't of Health Soc. Servs., Div. of Family Youth Servs., 88 P.3d 527, 529 (Alaska 2004)); Rick P. v. State, Office of Children's Servs., 109 P.3d 950, 954-55 (Alaska 2005).
Jon S., 212 P.3d at 761 (quoting Audrey H., 188 P.3d at 672).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Karrie B. ex rel. Reep v. Catherine J, 181 P.3d 177, 184 (Alaska 2008)).
Carrie argues that the superior court erred in terminating her parental rights because it clearly erred in finding that she "failed, within a reasonable time, to remedy the conduct or conditions" that put the children at risk. She argues that her sobriety and marriage to Tim demonstrated improvement, and that the children were not at substantial risk of harm if returned to her.
AS 47.10.088(a)(2); CINA Rule 18(c)(1)(A)(i).
The superior court found a failure to remedy because Carrie had missed urinalysis testing and had not gotten a second assessment or completed treatment; the children regressed after seeing her; and it would take a "considerable amount of work" before the children could be returned to Carrie, which was "unlikely [to happen] in the reasonably foreseeable future." The court stated that
[Carrie] has offered evidence to indicate that she is clean and sober. I've accepted as credible her husband's testimony. But the problem is that I don't have any objective evidence to demonstrate that this is a lasting condition. And absent that objective evidence, [Carrie's] history, sadly, indicates that there could be ongoing problems. If your marriage falls apart, we could have real problems here. And I can't predict the future. I absolutely can't predict the future. I can only work on the basis of the past.
The superior court did not clearly err in finding that Carrie failed within a reasonable time to remedy her conduct. Despite the ostensible improvements in Carrie's personal life after she met and married Tim, the superior court's findings are amply supported by evidence. Throughout much of her case Carrie failed to comply with her case plan requirements, including substance abuse treatment. The only service in which Carrie consistently participated was supervised visitation, after which the children typically regressed, demonstrating renewed mental injury. Although there was evidence that at the time of trial Carrie had been sober for at least nine months, she had not completed treatment, demonstrating a failure to remedy her conduct. Carrie and Tim did not notify OCS of their recently acquired stable housing until trial. Because Carrie challenges only the failure-to-remedy finding, and that finding was not clearly erroneous, we hold that the superior court did not err in terminating Carrie's parental rights. C. Whether the Superior Court Erred in Terminating Jake's Parental Rights to Beth 1. Whether the superior court clearly erred in finding that Jake failed to timely remedy his conduct
See Seth D. v. State, Dep't of Health Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 175 P.3d 1222, 1232-33 (Alaska 2008) (holding that unremediated substance abuse is sufficient to support failure-to-remedy finding); Sherry R. v. State, Dep't of Health Soc. Servs., Div. of Family Youth Servs., 74 P.3d 896, 902-03 (Alaska 2003).
Carrie also argues that OCS's move towards termination was "hasty." OCS correctly notes that AS 47.10.088(d)(1) required OCS to file a termination petition because the children had been in "foster care for at least 15 of the most recent 22 months."
Jake argues that because he was trying to comply with his case plan but was hampered by his incarceration, the superior court erred in finding that he failed to remedy the conduct or conditions that put Beth at risk of harm.
See AS 47.10.088(a)(2); CINA Rule 18(c)(1)(A)(i).
The superior court found that Jake had not remedied his conduct, stating that
[Jake] still hasn't completed treatment. He still has not tried to communicate with the child. He's still incarcerated. The fact that he's incarcerated doesn't undercut anything he — any opportunities he had because his actions put him in jail. And finally, the child is unlikely to be returned to [Jake] in the reasonably foreseeable future. He's got 30-odd days left before he gets out; he's got [to] complete treatment; and then there would have to be a reunification process, which is going to take quite a while, because [Beth] hasn't seen her dad in about two years, from what I can calculate. He was incarcerated in October, this is July. So it's probably just two months shy maybe, three months shy of two years. It's a long time for a five-year-old child.
The superior court did not clearly err in finding that Jake failed within a reasonable time to remedy his conduct. First, we have held that participation in services is insufficient to demonstrate remedy, and that even if a parent has "made strides towards remedying" conduct that puts the children at risk, a recent history of substance abuse or incarceration may be sufficient for the superior court to find failure toremedy. Here, Jake had a history of substance abuse and incarceration, was still in a halfway house at the time of trial, and had been unsuccessful at completing treatment for his substance abuse issues.
See V.S.B. v. State, Dep't of Health Soc. Servs., Div. of Family Youth Servs., 45 P.3d 1198, 1208 (Alaska 2002) (holding, in relation to failure to remedy, that "[c]ompliance with treatment plans does not guarantee that parental rights will not be terminated because it cannot guarantee that adequate parenting skills will be acquired from the treatment regimen").
Thomas H. v. State, Dep't of Health Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 184 P.3d 9, 14-16 (Alaska 2008) (quoting Sherry R., 74 P.3d at 902-03) (holding that evidence of untreated substance abuse and recent incarceration was sufficient to justify superior court's failure-to-remedy finding); see also Seth D., 175 P.3d at 1232-33.
Second, Beth's age and mental health issues heightened the importance of permanency in this case. There was evidence that Jake and Beth could not be reunified in less than six months because Jake would need to complete treatment, be released from the halfway house, complete other case-plan requirements, and get to know Beth again before a trial home visit could be attempted.
See, e.g., Debbie G. v. State, Dep't of Health Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 132 P.3d 1168, 1170-71 (Alaska 2006) (explaining that AS 47.10.088(a) permits termination of parental rights to achieve "permanent placement" because moving children can be disruptive and unhealthy (citing Stanley B. v. State, Div. of Family Youth Servs., 93 P.3d 403, 408 (Alaska 2004) (emphasizing children's "immediate need for permanency and stability" and risk of long-term harm if permanent placement is not made immediately))).
Third, as discussed below, there was considerable evidence that it was in Beth's best interests to remain in her current placement with her foster parents.
See infra Part III.C.3.
See AS 47.10.088(b) (stating that child's best interests are relevant to failure-to-remedy determination).
Finally, then-five-year-old Beth was at risk of mental injury if returned to Jake because she had had no contact with him for nearly two years before the termination trial and had lived with him for only three and a half months in the year preceding his October 2006incarceration. 2. Whether the superior court clearly erred in finding that OCS made reasonable efforts to reunify Jake and Beth
See Rick P. v. State, Office of Children's Servs., 109 P.3d 950, 958 (Alaska 2005) (holding fact that young child has lived without parent for significant period of time may itself be sufficient evidence of substantial risk of mental injury).
Jake argues that the superior court clearly erred in finding that OCS made reasonable efforts to reunify Jake and Beth because, although he appears to concede that the state made reasonable efforts before his incarceration, OCS did "little or nothing for [him] after his incarceration."
See AS 47.10.086(a), .088(a)(3); CINA Rule 18(c)(2)(A).
The superior court found that OCS made "active efforts" before Jake was incarcerated, and that although its efforts after Jake's incarceration were "relatively minimal," Jake was afforded services by DOC and was made aware of the expectations of his case plan and the progress of the court case. (Emphasis in original.) The court found that the "significant psychological issues" Beth was having "precluded letting the child visit him while he was incarcerated." Per AS 47.10.086(f), the superior court also considered the fact that termination was in Beth's best interests.
As a preliminary matter, we note that this is not an ICWA case; therefore the reasonable efforts standard, not the higher active efforts standard, applies.
See AS 47.10.086(a), .088(a)(3); CINA Rule 18(c)(2)(A).
See 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (2006); CINA Rule 18(c)(2)(B).
Compare Jon S. v. State, Dep't of Health Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 212 P.3d 756, 763 (Alaska 2009) (applying active efforts standard to case involving Indian child) with Audrey H. v. State, Office of Children's Servs., 188 P.3d 668, 678 (Alaska 2008) (applying reasonable efforts standard to case not involving Indian child).
We evaluate the reasonableness of the state's efforts "in the context of the full history of its involvement" with the parent. The state may meet its reasonable efforts burden even if it fails to make reasonable efforts during a portion of the time it works with theparent. Efforts provided by other state agencies or entities, such as DOC, are attributed to the state for the purposes of reasonable efforts analysis. While a parent is in prison, DOC "has primary responsibility for providing services."
Audrey H., 188 P.3d at 679 (citing Erica A. v. State, Dep't of Health Soc. Servs., Div. of Family Youth Servs., 66 P.3d 1, 7-8 (Alaska 2003)).
Id. at 678-79 (citing Frank E. v. State, 77 P.3d 715, 720-21 (Alaska 2003)).
Cf. T.F. v. State, Dep't of Health Soc. Servs., Div. of Family Youth Servs., 26 P.3d 1089, 1096 (Alaska 2001) (holding that DOC efforts may be considered part of the state's efforts for the purpose of fulfilling ICWA's active efforts requirement).
Stanley B. v. State, Div. of Family Youth Servs., 93 P.3d 403, 408 (Alaska 2004); Martin N. v. State, Dep't of Health Soc. Servs., Div. of Family Youth Servs., 79 P.3d 50, 56 (Alaska 2003).
We hold that the superior court did not clearly err in finding that OCS made reasonable efforts to reunify the family. The appellate record contains facts that amply support the superior court's findings. Although OCS made only minimal efforts after Jake was incarcerated, it made at least reasonable efforts before Jake's incarceration, and these efforts coupled with the services available through DOC support the finding that the state as a whole made reasonable efforts even during Jake's incarceration.
Before Jake was incarcerated, OCS made the following efforts: placing the children back in the family home three times; developing case plans and contracts that identified problems, steps Jake needed to take, and specific service providers; arranging for home-based services to provide parenting assistance and education for Jake; conducting extensive home visits; and meeting with Jake to discuss his case-plan requirements. Jake appears to concede that these efforts were not just reasonable, but "active."
After Jake was incarcerated, OCS made the following efforts: updating Jake's case plan, faxing it to him in custody, and giving Jake contact information for the social worker and her supervisor. Although OCS did not contact Jake after that time, Jake participated in services offered by DOC, including parenting classes, urinalysis screens, and AA and NA meetings. After his release to a halfway house, Jake participated in a new substance abuse assessment and made arrangements to begin treatment.
We have held that "the requirement that the state offer reunification services is fulfilled by setting out the types of services that a parent should avail himself or herself of in a manner that allows the parent to utilize the services." Jake was aware of the services of which he should avail himself, some of which were available through DOC, and he participated in some services during and after his incarceration. Because we consider the state's efforts over the entire course of the case, including efforts made by state offices other than OCS, we hold that the superior court did not clearly err in finding that the state made reasonable efforts to reunify Jake and Beth.
Frank E., 77 P.3d at 720 (holding that state fulfilled its reasonable efforts requirement because case plan identified required services in manner that allowed father to attend appropriate AA and NA meetings and to apply to at least two inpatient substance abuse programs).
T.F., 26 P.3d at 1096.
3. Whether the superior court clearly erred in finding that termination was in Beth's best interests
Jake argues that the superior court erred in finding that termination was in Beth's best interests. The superior court found that termination was in Beth's best interests because
See CINA Rule 18(c)(3); see also AS 47.10.088(c); Tessa M. v. State, Dep't of Health Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 182 P.3d 1110, 1116 (Alaska 2008) (citing AS 47.10.088(c); CINA Rule 18(c)(3); A.A. v. State, Dep't of Family Youth Servs., 982 P.2d 256, 260 (Alaska 1999)); Frank E., 77 P.3d at 721.
the psychological issues facing [Beth] are significant, critical, and are going to take a long time to work through. Those psychological issues mean that permanency is an extremely important thing for her. She's in a very — she's in an excellent foster home. She's firmly attached to her foster parent. The evidence at the trials indicated that her posttraumatic stress disorder is due in substantial part to the conditions she faced at home.
At this point, the evidence indicates that she doesn't really know her dad at all, because she hasn't seen him in almost two years, and the present placement is the proposed permanent placement. So I find the department's met its burden on that one.
The superior court did not clearly err in finding that termination was in Beth's best interests. Beth was removed from Carrie and Jake's home because of substance abuse, domestic violence, other criminal activity, and neglect involving both parents. Her life with Carrie and Jake lacked structure such as routine bed and meal times. As a result, Beth suffered mental injury; had attachment, boundary, and behavioral issues; and was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder.
We have held that termination is in a child's best interests if, as here, a child has been involved with OCS for much of her life and there will be further delays before reunification can occur. Since Beth's first removal in August 2005, when she was two years old, she has lived with Jake for only a few months; they appear to have had no contact since October 2006. It appears that Beth's knowledge of Jake is limited to his name and the fact that he is in jail. There was evidence that reunification could not occur for at least six months.
Seth D. v. State, Dep't of Health Soc. Servs., Office of Children's Servs., 175 P.3d 1222, 1233 (Alaska 2008) (holding that even though father was at times "loving and devoted," child's involvement with OCS for most of her life and father's need to complete substance abuse treatment and be released from electronic monitoring before he could parent child was sufficient to support superior court's finding termination was in child's best interests).
We have also held that "the fact that a child has bonded with her foster parent can be a factor in considering whether it is in the child's best interests to terminate a parent's rights." At the time of termination, Beth had developed a strong bond with her foster parents and had made progress as a result of the structure and care her foster parents provided. The foster parents wished to adopt both Beth and Michael.
Karrie B. ex rel. Reep v. Catherine J., 181 P.3d 177, 185 (Alaska 2008) (citing M.W. v. State, Dep't of Health Soc. Servs., 20 P.3d 1141, 1147 (Alaska 2001); A.H. v. State, Dep't of Health Soc. Servs., 10 P.3d 1156, 1166 (Alaska 2000)).
The superior court did not clearly err in finding that termination was in Beth's best interests. Because the superior court's factual findings were not clearly erroneous, we hold that it did not err in terminating Jake's parental rights to Beth.
IV. CONCLUSION
We therefore AFFIRM the superior court's order terminating Carrie's parental rights to Michael and Beth, and Jake's parental rights to Beth.