Opinion
CASE NO. 14cv1645-WQH-DHB
03-06-2015
JORGE ANTHONY CARRASCO aka TONY CARRASCO MOTORS; and NANCY JEAN CARRASCO, an individual, Plaintiff, v. STANLEY IVAN HORWITZ, an individual; ANITA HORWITZ, an individual; THE SPRING STAR TRUST, a Trust; KENNETH G. ADAMS REVOCABLE TRUST dtd 05/14/93; and ALAN G. HORWITZ, individually and as trustee of the Star Spring Trust and Kenneth G. Adams Revocable Trust; and DOES 1 through 50, Defendant.
ORDER OF REMAND
:
On January 29, 2013, Plaintiffs Jorge Anthony Carrasco and Nancy Jean Carrasco commenced this action by filing a Complaint in San Diego County Superior Court. (ECF No. 1 at 2). On June 14, 2014, Plaintiffs filed the Second Amended Complaint ("SAC"), which is the operative pleading. Id. The SAC asserted two claims for violations of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") and various state-law claims. On July 11, 2014, Defendants Alan Horwitz, the Star Spring Trust, and the Kenneth G. Adams Revocable Trust removed the action to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. (ECF No. 1). On July 22, 2014, Defendants Alan Horwitz, Kenneth G. Adams Revocable Trust, and The Star Spring Trust filed the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 8). On July 25, 2014, Defendants Stanley Horwitz and Anita Horwitz filed the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 9). Both motions requested dismissal of Plaintiffs' RICO claims.
On January 7, 2015, the Court issued an Order granting the motions to dismiss. (ECF No. 37). The Court dismissed Plaintiffs' RICO claims without prejudice. The Court stated: "No later than thirty (30) days from the date this Order is filed, Plaintiffs may file a motion for leave to file a first amended complaint. If no motion for leave to file a first amended complaint is filed, Defendants shall show cause as to why this case should not be remanded to state court within twenty (20) days of the expiration of the thirty-day period." Id. at 15. The docket reflects that Plaintiffs did not file a motion for leave to file a first amended complaint within thirty days of the Court's January 7, 2015 Order. The docket further reflects that Defendants have not filed a response to the Court's order to show cause within twenty days of the expiration of the thirty-day period.
"[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). "The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if ... the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). A district court has discretionary authority to remand under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell & Reed Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 966 (9th Cir. 2004). "[I]n the usual case in which federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors ... will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims." Schneider v. TRW, Inc., 938 F.2d 986, 993 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1970)) (emphasis in original). "Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent teaches us that the district court is in the best position to judge the extent of resources invested in a case and that, therefore, the district court's discretion ought not be lightly disturbed." Id. at 993-94. "Depending on a host of factors, then—including the circumstances of the particular case, the nature of the state law claims, the character of the governing state law, and the relationship between the state and federal claims—district courts may decline to exercise jurisdiction over supplemental state law claims." Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997). "While discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims is triggered by the presence of one of the conditions in § 1367(c), it is informed by the [United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966)] values 'of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.'" Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1001 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). "[A] district court has discretion to remand to state court a removed case involving pendent claims upon a proper determination that retaining jurisdiction over the case would be inappropriate." Cohill, 484 U.S. at 357; see also Williams v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 471 F.3d 975, 977 (9th Cir. 2006) ("Dismissal of the federal claim would ... ordinarily ... have authorized the district court to remand the pendent state law claims.").
In this case, Defendants removed the action on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. (ECF No. 1). The notice of removal does not assert diversity of citizenship. The notice of removal asserts that the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' state-law claims. This action was pending in San Diego County Superior Court for over seventeen months before it was removed to this Court, and the Court has not addressed the merits of Plaintiffs' state-law claims. Taking into consideration the values of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' state-law claims.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this action is REMANDED to the Superior Court of California for the County of San Diego, where it was originally filed and assigned case number 37-2013-00032434-CU-BC-CTL. DATED: March 6, 2015
/s/_________
WILLIAM Q. HAYES
United States District Judge