Opinion
F081940
03-24-2022
ELIZABETH CARRANZA, a Minor, etc., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. PREMIER ANESTHESIA MEDICAL GROUP, Defendant and Respondent.
Mitchell Leeds and Nathaniel Leeds for Plaintiff and Appellant. Hall, Hieatt & Connely and Mark B. Connely for Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. No. BCV-16-102319 David R. Lampe, Judge.
Mitchell Leeds and Nathaniel Leeds for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Hall, Hieatt & Connely and Mark B. Connely for Defendant and Respondent.
OPINION
SMITH, J.
Elizabeth Carranza, the plaintiff in this medical malpractice action, sought to hold an anesthesiology practice group vicariously liable for the alleged negligence of an anesthesiologist hired by the group. The anesthesiologist had provided anesthesia care to Carranza during a prior surgical procedure, in the course of which Carranza suffered cardiac arrest. The question in the proceeding below was whether the anesthesiologist was an employee of the anesthesiology practice group, whereby vicarious liability would attach, or an independent contractor, whereby vicarious liability would be precluded. After the issue was tried in a bifurcated bench trial, the trial court ruled the anesthesiologist was an independent contractor. The court's ruling resulted in judgment for the anesthesiology practice group. Carranza appealed. We affirm.
PROCEEDURAL HISTORY
On October 14, 2015, Carranza underwent an endoscopic procedure, under anesthesia, at Mercy Hospital, in Bakersfield. Carranza suffered cardiac arrest during the procedure with attendant injuries. Dr. Jonathan Weeks, M.D., was the anesthesiologist who administered anesthesia to Carranza for the procedure. Dr. Weeks had privileges at Mercy Hospital and a contract with Premier Anesthesia Medical Group (Premier), the defendant in this matter. Carranza brought the instant medical malpractice action against various defendants, including Mercy Hospital, Dr. Weeks, and Premier.
Mercy Hospital and Dr. Weeks settled with Carranza; another defendant was dismissed. Only Carranza's action against Premier-Carranza alleged Premier was vicariously liable for Dr. Weeks's negligence-proceeded to trial. Carranza and Premier agreed, by stipulation, to bifurcate the trial. Pursuant to the stipulation, the first phase of the trial proceeded as a bifurcated bench trial on the question whether Dr. Weeks was an employee or agent of Premier-rather than an independent contractor-such that Premier would be vicariously liable for any negligence on the part of Dr. Weeks.
A one-day bench trial was held on this issue on June 8, 2020. Carranza called two witnesses, namely, Dr. Weeks and Bruce Peters (President and CEO of Mercy Hospitals of Bakersfield). Premier did not call any witnesses. The parties jointly admitted into evidence, by stipulation, three exhibits: a contract between Premier and Mercy Hospitals; a contract between Premier and Dr. Weeks; and excerpts from the deposition of Dr. Freddie McClendon, M.D. (who was produced for deposition as the person most knowledgeable on behalf of Premier). (Exhibits A, B, C.)
The trial court issued its statement of decision on September 30, 2020. The court noted, in the statement of decision: "[T]he common law test [of employment status] as described by [S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 341] and set forth at CACI 3704 applies in this case, and … plaintiff has the burden of proof to establish that Dr. Weeks was an employee of Premier and was not an independent contractor." The court further stated: "In the end analysis, as there is no vicarious liability for an independent contractor [citations], a finding that Dr. Weeks was an independent contractor rather than an employee will therefore justify a judgment in favor of Premier." The court concluded: "The court finds that Dr. Weeks was not an employee of Premier, but was an independent contractor with Premier. Therefore Dr. Weeks was not an agent of Premier for purposes of establishing vicarious liability, and Premier is entitled to judgment."
FACTS
Bruce Peters, President and CEO of Mercy Hospitals of Bakersfield, testified about a written contract between Premier and Dignity Health (which conducted business as Mercy Hospital and Mercy Southwest Hospital, collectively Mercy Hospitals), for the provision of anesthesia services by Premier to Mercy Hospitals. The contract, entitled "Exclusive Anesthesia Services Agreement," was admitted into evidence. (Unnecessary capitalization omitted.) The contract, which was periodically renegotiated, was in effect at the time of Carranza's endoscopic procedure on October 14, 2015, at Mercy Hospital. The contract specified that Premier was an "independent contractor with respect to [Mercy Hospitals] in the performance of its obligations."
Under the contract, Premier was the exclusive provider of professional anesthesia services to the two Mercy hospitals in Bakersfield. In this capacity, Premier was required to provide an adequate number of anesthesiologists or certified registered nurse anesthetists (CRNAs) to cover anesthesia services for both hospitals' operating rooms from 7:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m. on weekdays, and one anesthesiologist/CRNA to cover Mercy Southwest's Labor and Delivery Suites around the clock. Under the contract, all anesthesia providers furnished by Premier were required to obtain clinical privileges at the hospitals, and to comply with the hospitals' rules and medical staff bylaws.
Under the contract, the hospitals were responsible for providing the space, utilities, equipment, and supplies required for the provision of anesthesia services to the hospitals' patients. Anesthesia providers were required to complete proper paperwork with respect to the services and treatment provided to hospital patients. Premier would bill for professional anesthesia services provided, while the hospitals would bill for services provided by the hospitals.
In addition to Bruce Peters of Mercy Hospitals, Dr. Jonathan Weeks testified in the first phase of the bifurcated trial. He confirmed he was a Board-certified anesthesiologist and had provided anesthesia care to Carranza on October 14, 2015, at Mercy Hospital. Dr. Weeks attended to Carranza pursuant to a written contract between him and Premier, entitled "Professional Services Independent Contractor Agreement" (as noted, the contract was admitted into evidence).
Dr. Weeks and Premier had entered into this "Professional Services Independent Contractor Agreement," in October 2009. The agreement or contract, which was automatically renewed every two years, was in effect when Dr. Weeks provided professional anesthesia services to Carranza. Under the contract, before providing anesthesia services at Mercy Hospital pursuant thereto, Dr. Weeks was required to apply for, obtain, and maintain medical staff membership and clinical privileges; he was also required to comply with hospital rules and medical staff bylaws. In addition, Dr. Weeks was required to obtain and maintain his own professional liability insurance for malpractice claims, with limits of not less than $2 million per claim and $4 million for annual aggregate claims.
Dr. Weeks's contract with Premier specified that his relationship with Premier, in performing services under the contract, would be that of an "independent contractor." In this regard, the contract provided: "[I]t is mutually understood and agreed that Contractor is at all times acting and performing as an independent contractor with Group and that Contractor is not an employee, joint venturer, partner or lessee of Group." The contract further provided: "Group has no control over the manner, means and methods by which Contractor performs services pursuant to this Agreement." The contract also noted that Dr. Weeks was "not restricted in the conduct of any outside practice of anesthesia," and was "free to perform services for other parties" outside the scope of his duties under the contract.
The contract between Dr. Weeks and Premier clarified that Dr. Weeks was responsible, in his capacity as an independent contractor, for payment of all taxes and discharge of related obligations, including making federal and state estimated and annual income tax payments and social security tax payments. Under the contract, Premier was not responsible for Dr. Weeks's health insurance, disability insurance, malpractice insurance, medical staff dues, business travel expenses, continuing education expenses, retirement or pension plan, or any other benefits. Either party was permitted to terminate the contract without cause on 60 days' written notice to the other party. Finally, the contract specified the hours that Dr. Weeks would work, as well as a daily rate or shift rate that he would be paid. The contract further specified that vacation time would be "non-paid."
Dr. Weeks testified he was paid $1,350 per day by Premier to be at the hospitals from 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m., Monday through Thursday, to provide anesthesia services for operating rooms (the rate of pay and work hours reflected in his testimony were consistent with those specified in the contract). Dr. Weeks's compensation did not change during the years he worked under the contract with Premier. He did not bill for his services, and he did not know how Premier billed for his services. He did not select any patients, or provide any equipment, medications, or anesthetics, all of which were supplied by the hospital. As for an office, he "had [his] own office at home," for "recordkeeping purposes." At the end of the year, Premier would issue an IRS Form 1099 document to him.
Dr. Weeks testified that Premier did not direct him, or ever try to direct him, in the provision of anesthesia care; on the contrary, Dr. Weeks always exercised his independent judgment in providing his services. Had Premier ever tried to direct him in this regard, as a board-certified, licensed anesthesiologist he would regardless have administered anesthesia based on his own "professional opinion."
Dr. Weeks testified to his understanding of his contract with Premier. He stated he understood he was an independent contractor, "not an employee" of Premier; he was to "pay for [his] own malpractice insurance" and disability insurance; and he was to "provide services under [his] own direction." He concluded: "Basically, I'm a doctor who works for himself." Dr. Weeks also observed that "nobody could interfere with" his vacation, although he chose not to take vacation. He also noted that "Premier did not restrict [him] from working anywhere else." With regard to times outside his Monday through Thursday shift, he added: "I could work anywhere I wanted, but I never sought privileges anywhere else."
Dr. Weeks testified he was asked by Premier whether he would like to become a partner, but he rejected the offer as he preferred working as an independent contractor. Partners at Premier were required to take "a lot of call," and had to be available far more than was required under the terms of Dr. Weeks's independent contractor agreement. Partners worked much longer hours than Dr. Weeks's contracted schedule and were on call for very long stretches; "12 hours would be a light day" for a partner. Partners were also compensated based on their partnership stakes, rather than a per diem or per shift basis.
As noted above, the deposition testimony of Dr. Freddie McClendon was admitted into evidence. Dr. McClendon, who testified as the person most knowledgeable with reference to Premier's operations, was a partner at Premier. He stated that Premier did not have any employees; rather, Premier contracted with anesthesiologists who worked as independent contractors initially and were typically offered a partnership interest after one year-some, however, chose to continue as independent contractors. In 2015, when Dr. Weeks provided care to Carranza, Premier had 20 anesthesiologists, 17 of whom were partners. Over the years, three anesthesiologists remained independent contractors for more than five years, including Dr. Weeks.
Premier also contracted with a number of CRNAs.
Dr. McClendon testified that Premier's business was to provide anesthesia services to Mercy Hospitals, along with another hospital, and that all the medications, equipment, and supplies necessary to anesthetize patients were provided by the hospitals. Dr. McClendon understood that Dr. Weeks was an independent contractor, as reflected in his contract with Premier. Premier could not compel Dr. Weeks to serve on hospital committees, did not share with him any incentives or profits at the end of the year, and paid him a per diem rate without benefits. Dr. Weeks was required to fill out a form as to patients he attended; the form, supplied by the hospital, was used for billing purposes.
DISCUSSION
I. Trial Court's Ruling that Dr. Weeks was an Independent Contractor
The trial court ruled that Dr. Weeks was not Premier's employee but was an independent contractor. Therefore, Premier could not be held vicariously liable for any negligence committed by Dr. Weeks in providing anesthesia care to Carranza. Judgment for Premier was, in turn, warranted.
Carranza challenges the trial court's ruling. She argues the trial court erred in holding she had the burden of proof to show that Dr. Weeks was an employee or agent of Premier. She further contends the trial court's determination that Dr. Weeks was an independent contractor with respect to Premier, was erroneous. We reject these contentions and affirm.
A. Applicable Law
"' "Under the theory of respondeat superior, employers are vicariously liable for tortious acts committed by employees during the course and scope of their employment." '" (Blackwell v. Vasilas (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 160, 165, fn. 6 (Blackwell).) Civil Code section 2338 essentially codifies the respondeat superior doctrine. (Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital (1995) 12 Cal.4th 291, 296, fn. 2.) Civil Code section 2338 "is not limited to employer and employee but speaks more broadly of agent and principal; it makes the principal liable for negligent and 'wrongful' acts committed by the agent 'in and as part of the transaction of such [agency] business.'" (Ibid.) "The doctrine is a departure from the general tort principle that liability is based on fault. [Citation.] It is' "a rule of policy, a deliberate allocation of risk." '" (Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 54 Cal.3d 202, 208-209; see Haning et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Personal Injury (The Rutter Group 2009) ¶ 2:611 [the doctrine of respondeat superior "imputes the employee's fault to the employer and thus makes the employer responsible in damages just as if the employer personally committed the tortious act"].)
"Where respondeat superior is an issue, an initial determination is often whether the alleged tortfeasor is an independent contractor or employee of the hirer." (Blackwell, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 168.]; 3 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (11th ed. 2021) Agency, § 25 ["Where liability in tort is sought to be imposed on a person for the wrongful act of another under the doctrine of respondeat superior, it must be shown that the wrongdoer was an agent or employee of the defendant."]; Haning et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Personal Injury (The Rutter Group 2009) ¶ 2:636 ["Plaintiff must first show the tortfeasor was actually employed by defendant, or that plaintiff was an agent or 'ostensible employee.' "].) As a general rule, an employer of an independent contractor is not liable for physical harm caused to another by the contractor. (Benson v. Superior Court (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1188, fn. 5, citing McCarty v. Department of Transportation (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 955, 970; Malloy v. Fong (1951) 37 Cal.2d 356, 370 [generally, employers are not liable for the torts of independent contractors]; see Haning et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Personal Injury (The Rutter Group 2009) ¶ 2:637 ["Subject to a few public policy exceptions [citation], hirers cannot be held vicariously liable for the wrongdoing of their independent contractors."].)
"The principal test of an employment relationship is whether the person to whom the service is rendered has the right to control the manner and means of accomplishing the desired result." (Angelotti v. Walt Disney Co. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1404 (Angelotti), citing S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations (1989) 48 Cal.3d 341, 350 (Borello).) Stated differently, in determining a hiree's employment status, the most important factor courts must consider is "whether the hirer had the right to control the detailed manner and means by which the work was to be performed." (Blackwell, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 168.)" 'Under this rule, the [employer's] right to exercise complete or authoritative control must be shown, rather than mere suggestion as to detail. A worker is an independent contractor when he or she follows the employer's desires only in the result of the work, and not the means by which it is achieved.'" (Id. at pp. 168-169.) "A secondary factor also constituting strong evidence in support of an employment relationship is the right to discharge at will without cause." (Angelotti, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 1404, citing Borello, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 350.)
As our Supreme Court has explained, "In the vicarious liability context, the hirer's right to supervise and control the details of the worker's actions was reasonably viewed as crucial, because' "[t]he extent to which the employer had a right to control [the details of the service] activities was … highly relevant to the question whether the employer ought to be legally liable for them." '" (Dynamex Operations W. v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 903, 927.) "For this reason, the question whether the hirer controlled the details of the worker's activities became the primary common law standard for determining whether a worker was considered to be an employee or an independent contractor." (Ibid.)
There is no dispute as to the trial court's decision in this matter to analyze the issue of Dr. Weeks's employment status with reference to the Borello factors.
"Other secondary factors to consider in determining whether an employment relationship exists include whether the person performing services is engaged in a distinct occupation or business; whether the work is usually done under the direction of the principal or by a specialist without supervision; whether the work requires a particular skill; whether the principal or the worker supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and place of work; whether the worker has an opportunity for profit or loss depending on his or her managerial skill; the duration of the work; whether payment is by time or by the job; whether the work is part of the regular business of the principal; and whether the parties believe they are creating an employment relationship." (Angelotti, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 1404, citing Borello, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 351, 355.)
" 'Generally, … the individual factors cannot be applied mechanically as separate tests; they are intertwined and their weight depends often on particular combinations.'" (Borello, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 351, 354 ["[e]ach service arrangement must be evaluated on its facts, and the dispositive circumstances may vary from case to case"]; Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 522, 539 (Ayala) ["the significance of any one factor and its role in the overall calculus may vary from case to case depending on the nature of the work and the evidence"].) The label used by the parties is not dispositive. (Angelotti, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 1404.) Instead, the" '[n]ature of the work, and the overall arrangement between the parties, must be examined.'" (Ibid.)
Whether a person is an employee or an independent contractor is ordinarily a question of fact; but if from all the facts only one inference may be drawn, it is a question of law. (Angelotti, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 1404 ["The existence of an employment relationship is a question for the trier of fact, but can be decided by the court as a matter of law if the evidence supports only one reasonable conclusion."]; Michael v. Denbeste Transportation, Inc. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1093, fn. 5; see Beaumont-Jacques v. Farmers Group, Inc. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1138, 1142-1143 (Beaumont-Jacques); see also Haning et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Personal Injury (The Rutter Group 2009) ¶ 2:639.)
Thus, in general," '[t]he existence of an agency is a factual question within the province of the trier of fact whose determination may not be disturbed on appeal if supported by substantial evidence.'" (Michelson v. Hamada (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1566, 1576; Estrada v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1, 4, 11 (Estrada) [upholding trial court's finding that certain delivery personnel were employees, as supported by substantial evidence]; Air Couriers Internat. v. Employment Development Dept. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 923, 937 (Air Couriers) [upholding trial court's finding that drivers were employees, as supported by substantial evidence].) We may not second-guess the trial court's conclusion; rather, the court's "determination (employee or independent contractor) is one of fact and thus must be affirmed if supported by substantial evidence." (Estrada, supra, at p. 11.)
As for the burden of proof, the law is that the burden is on the party asserting the employee or agent relationship. (See Oswald Machine & Equipment, Inc. v. Yip (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1247 ["the burden of proof rests on the party asserting the relationship"]; Burbank v. National Cas. Co. (1941) 43 Cal.App.2d 773, 781 [" 'Agency is a fact, the burden of proving which rests upon the party affirming its existence.' "]; Evid. Code, § 500 ["a party has the burden of proof as to each fact the existence or nonexistence of which is essential to the claim … that he is asserting"]; Haning et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Personal Injury (The Rutter Group 2009) ¶ 2:636 ["Plaintiff must first show the tortfeasor was actually employed by defendant."]; CACI No. 3704, Sources and Authority ["The burden of proving the existence of an agency rests on the one affirming its existence."].)
B. Analysis
Preliminarily, in light of the authorities cited above, we reject Carranza's contention that the trial court erred in ruling Carranza had the burden of proof to establish that Dr. Weeks was an employee of Premier-rather than an independent contractor.
Next, we reject the contention that the trial court's determination that Dr. Weeks was an independent contractor with respect to Premier was erroneous. On the contrary, we conclude the trial court's determination that Dr. Weeks was an independent contractor is supported by substantial evidence and affirm it.
The substantial evidence standard of review is well settled. In reviewing the evidence on appeal, we resolve all conflicts in favor of the prevailing party, and we indulge in all legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the finding if possible. Our power begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, that will support the finding. When two or more inferences can be reasonably deduced from the facts, we cannot substitute our own deductions for those of the trial court. (Air Couriers, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 937.)
Here, the trial court correctly noted, in making its determination, that "the 'most important factor is whether [Premier] had the right to control how [Dr. Weeks] performed' his work." The court concluded that as an anesthesiologist, Dr. Weeks relied, without interference, on his independent judgment in performing his duties; moreover, he provided highly skilled, professional services that were not even amenable to supervision and control by a principal. While we recognize that a measure of freedom is inherent in the nature of the services provided, here the structure of the arrangement between Premier and Dr. Weeks also contemplated that Dr. Weeks would render anesthesia services in an independent manner. For example, Premier did not require Dr. Weeks to participate in group-directed trainings regarding the substance of his work or to follow group-instituted protocols in performing it. Indeed, Dr. Weeks testified that Premier had never attempted to direct him in the performance of his work.
To the extent Dr. Weeks was required to fill out forms for billing purposes, this does not by itself indicate he was an employee rather than an independent contractor. (See Millsap v. Federal Express Corp. (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 425, 432 (Millsap) [" 'Even one who is interested primarily in the result to be accomplished by certain work is ordinarily permitted to retain some interest in the manner in which the work is done without rendering himself subject to the peculiar liabilities which are imposed by law upon an employer.' "].) The Millsap court held that the fact that a package delivery company required a delivery driver to submit confirmation forms to show that he in fact delivered the packages entrusted to him, did not indicate that the company exercised the type of control over the driver's actions as to make him its employee. (Id. at p. 431.)
Nor did Premier have a unilateral and unlimited right to discharge Dr. Weeks at will. (See Ayala, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 531 ["Perhaps the strongest evidence of the right to control is whether the hirer can discharge the worker without cause, because '[t]he power of the principal to terminate the services of the agent gives him the means of controlling the agent's activities.' "].) Indeed, the contract between Premier and Dr. Weeks precluded immediate termination and provided that either party could end the agreement without cause upon giving notice of 60 days to the other party. (See Arnold v. Mutual of Omaha, Ins. Co. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 580, 589 ["[A] termination at-will clause for both parties may properly be included in an independent contractor agreement, and is not by itself a basis for changing that relationship to one of an employee."]; Beaumont-Jacques, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 1147 [same]; Ayala, at p. 531, fn. 2 ["The worker's corresponding right to leave is similarly relevant:' "An employee may quit, but an independent contractor is legally obligated to complete his contract."' "]; Mountain Meadow Creameries v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1938) 25 Cal.App.2d 123, 127 [provision in contract giving either party a right to terminate on notice was not indicative of employment].)
The trial court further found that all "the tools and equipment," and "materials and drugs" utilized by Dr. Weeks in his work, were "supplied or provided" by the hospitals. We recognize that Premier's contract with Dignity Health/Mercy Hospitals specified that the latter would furnish equipment and other supplies, as well as space, to facilitate the provision of anesthesia services at the hospitals. However, the trial court correctly concluded that, in light of the need for specialized equipment and pharmaceuticals, and operating rooms, only the hospitals could supply the necessary equipment, supplies, and space. Premier's contract with Mercy Hospitals, and in turn its work arrangement with Dr. Weeks, reflected this reality, and the provision of equipment and supplies by the hospitals did not, in this instance, suggest that Premier controlled Dr. Weeks's work by virtue of the provision of equipment and supplies. (See Ayala, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 539 [factors "such as the 'ownership of the instrumentalities and tools' of the job, may be of 'only evidential value,' relevant to support an inference that the hiree is, or is not, subject to the hirer's direction and control"].)
The trial court also properly considered the contract between Dr. Weeks and Premier that specified that Dr. Weeks was hired in the capacity of an independent contractor, as well as the fact that both Dr. Weeks and Premier understood and believed that Dr. Weeks was working as an independent contractor for Premier. (See Empire Star Mines Co. v. California Employment Com. (1946) 28 Cal.2d 33, 45 [contract in form of typical mining lease was significant factor showing independent contractor status of lessee], overruled on other grounds by People v. Sims (1982) 32 Cal.3d 468, 479, fn. 8; see also Mission Ins. Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 211, 226 (Mission) ["a lawful agreement between the parties expressly stating that the relationship created is that of independent contractor should not be lightly disregarded when both parties have performed under the contract and relied on its provisions, for example by not insuring against risks assumed by the other party"].)
Here, the contract between Dr. Weeks and Premier permitted a favorable schedule for Dr. Weeks, exempted him from "on call" duties that Premier's partners were required to perform, and permitted Dr. Weeks to work elsewhere outside of his schedule with Premier. The express language of the contract, along with many of its terms, reflected that Dr. Weeks was an independent contractor. "When, as here, the parties have entered into a written agreement setting forth the details of their relationship and, indeed, expressly stating the legal relationship they intended to create, such agreement is a significant factor for consideration." (Mission, supra, 123 Cal.App.3d at p. 226 ["The conduct of business and commerce requires that persons be able to act on their reasonable expectations. Indeed that is what the law of contracts is all about."].)
We are mindful, however, that a written agreement specifying employment status is not conclusive or dispositive. (See Burlingham v. Gray (1943) 22 Cal.2d 87, 94.)
Finally, in scrutinizing the work arrangement between Dr. Weeks and Premier, the court further observed: "Dr. Weeks was required to pay his own taxes. He was to obtain his own insurance, provide for his own business expenses, staff dues, license fees, health and disability insurance and disability and retirement benefits." (See Millsap, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d at pp. 431-432 [fact that delivery driver furnished his own liability insurance, received no employee benefits, and no taxes were withheld from his paychecks was indication, along with other factors, that he was independent contractor].)
Dr. Weeks also did not get paid vacation time as a benefit.
Some of the remaining factors militate in favor of Dr. Weeks being an employee or have a neutral effect. We conclude, in view of all the evidence, that the trial court's determination that Dr. Weeks was an independent contractor with respect to Premier is supported by substantial evidence.
To the extent Carranza raises additional, tangential arguments, we detect no merit in them and find it unnecessary to address them further.
The judgment is affirmed. Premier is awarded its costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR: LEVY, Acting P. J. MEEHAN, J.