Opinion
7:03-CV-084-R.
June 3, 2004
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Came on this day to be considered Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff's response thereto and the Court finds and orders as follows:
This is an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by an inmate confined in the Allred Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice in Iowa Park, Texas. Defendant is an officer at the Allred Unit. On May 30, 2003, questions were issued to Plaintiff to obtain additional factual information for screening purposes. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915. His answers to the Court's questions were filed on June 9, 2003. Thereafter, process was issued, an answer was filed by Defendant and the case was set for trial.
Plaintiff claims that, on December 6, 2002, Defendant Newman used excessive force against him by slamming his head into a wall. Complaint ¶ V. Carranza claims that, as a result of the force, he suffered a large bump on his head, persistent headaches and blurred vision in his left eye. Plaintiff's Answer to the Court's Question No. 6. Defendant argues that, after he escorted Plaintiff to the medical department for a blood test, Plaintiff refused to have his blood drawn and then became disruptive and belligerent. Brief in Support of Defendant Newman's Motion for Summary Judgment p. 8. Newman states that he stood Carranza against a wall but that no force was used. After calling for a supervisor, Sergeant Milbern, Newman escorted Carranza back to his cell. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Appendix 1, pp. 1-2 (hereinafter "Appendix ___, p. ___."). Newman further argues, assuming arguendo that force had been used in placing Carranza against the wall, such force would have been objectively reasonable in light of Plaintiff's disruptive behavior which would entitle Defendant to qualified immunity from suit. Brief in Support of Defendant Newman's Motion for Summary Judgment pp. 8-9. Moreover, Newman asserts that Carranza did not suffer any injury as a result of the alleged use of force. Id. at pp. 5-6.
The Court notes that a disciplinary case no. 20030096825 was filed against Carranza for use of profane and vulgar language while in the medical department. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Appendix 1, pp. 2 6.
Plaintiff's medical records reflect that, on December 6, 2002, he was escorted to the medical department for a fasting blood sample. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Appendix 2, p. 8. The record states that he was very agitated and belligerent with officers, that he refused the lab work and that he was escorted back to his cell. Id. Plaintiff disputes that he behaved in this manner. Plaintiff's Affidavit in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment p. 2.
"To prevail on an eighth amendment excessive force claim, a plaintiff must establish that force was not `applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, [but] maliciously and sadistically to cause harm' and that he suffered an injury." Eason v. Holt, 73 F.3d 600, 601-02 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7, 112 S.Ct. 995, 999 (1992)). Additionally, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) provides that:
No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.
Review of the summary judgment evidence reflects that, on December 18, 2002, Plaintiff complained of a rash, a bump on his head and he wanted his nails clipped. Appendix 2, p. 8; Appendix 3, p. 1. He was seen by a nurse on December 20, 2002 at which time Carranza stated that the bump on his head went away. Appendix 2, p. 6. He then complained of blurred vision and, through a visual acuity test, the nurse found that his vision was 20/30 in each eye. Appendix 2, p. 6; Appendix 3, p. 1. On January 8, 2003, Plaintiff's vision was checked and the results were negative for any vision problem. Appendix 2, pp. 5 34; Appendix 3, pp. 1-2. Carranza was then scheduled for an x-ray evaluation of his skull which was completed on January 21, 2003. Id. The result of the x-ray was "NO DEMONSTRABLE ABNORMALITY OF THE SKULL." Appendix 2, p. 34. Plaintiff concedes that, by the time x-rays were taken, there had been "plenty of time for [the] bump on [his] head to go down." Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Summary Judgment p. 4.
Plaintiff states that his first medical request was sent on December 8, 2002, two days after the alleged use of force. Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Summary Judgment p. 3 and attached exhibits. Defendant directs the Court to Plaintiff's medical records which indicate that he complained of his alleged injuries on December 18, 2002. The Court finds that the date of the first complaint of injury by Plaintiff is immaterial to the disposition of this case.
The medical records submitted by Defendant run through July 17, 2003. Appendix 2, p. 1. After Plaintiff's x-ray in January 2003, there is no further indication that Carranza complained about headaches or blurry vision. Id. at pp. 1-5. Thus, the evidence before this Court reflects that Plaintiff suffered no injury as a result of the alleged use of force. Assuming arguendo that Carranza suffered a bump on his head when Newman placed him against the wall, a temporary bump on the head is insufficient to state a physical injury for purposes of liability under the Civil Rights Act. See Siglar v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193-94 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that a sore bruised ear lasting for three days did not constitute a physical injury as required to state a claim for excessive force); Luong v. Hatt, 979 F. Supp. 481, 486 (N.D. Tex 1997) (holding that sore muscles, scratches, abrasions and bruises do not constitute a "physical injury" within the meaning of § 1997e(e)). Therefore, Plaintiff's excessive force claim against Defendant Newman must fail.
Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings and evidence illustrate that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56©); Slaughter v. Southern Talc Co., 949 F.2d 167, 170 (5th Cir. 1991). Disputes concerning material facts are genuine if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1429 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986)). Substantive law provides that an issue is "material" if it involves a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510; Burgos v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 20 F.3d 633, 635 (5th Cir. 1994). The nonmovant is not required to respond to the motion until the movant properly supports his motion with competent evidence. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553 (1986); Tubacex, Inc. v. M/V Risan, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1995). However, once the movant has carried his burden of proof, the nonmovant may not sit idly by and wait for trial. Page v. DeLaune, 837 F.2d 233, 239 (5th Cir. 1988).
When a movant carries his initial burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to show that the entry of summary judgment is inappropriate. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-24, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53; Duckett v. City of Cedar Park, 950 F.2d 272, 276 (5th Cir. 1992). Although the nonmovant may satisfy this burden by tendering depositions, affidavits, and other competent evidence, "conclusory allegations, speculation, and unsubstantiated assertions are inadequate to satisfy the nonmovant's burden," Douglass, 79 F.3d at 1429, as "the adverse party's response . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Merely colorable evidence or evidence not significantly probative, however, will not defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. at 2510-11. Furthermore, a mere scintilla of evidence will not defeat a motion for summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512; Davis v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 14 F.3d 1082, 1086 (5th Cir. 1994).
Summary judgment evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd., v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986); Rosado v. Deters, 5 F.3d 119, 123 (5th Cir. 1993). In addition, factual controversies are resolved in favor of the nonmovant, but only when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts, thus creating an actual controversy. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). In the absence of any proof, however, the Court does not assume that the nonmovant could or would prove the necessary facts. Id.
In making its determination on the motion, the Court looks at the full record including the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56©); Williams v. Adams, 836 F.2d 958, 961 (5th Cir. 1988). However, "the [Court's] function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. at 2511. The movant's motion for summary judgment will be granted if he meets his burden and the nonmovant fails to make the requisite showing that a genuine issue exists as to any material fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56©); Campbell v. Sonat Offshore Drilling, Inc., 979 F.2d 1115, 1119 (5th Cir. 1992).
The summary judgment evidence presented in this case establishes that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that Defendant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and Plaintiff's complaint is hereby dismissed with prejudice as frivolous.
Title 28, United States Code, Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) mandates dismissal of any action filed in forma pauperis if the court determines that the claims raised therein are frivolous. An action is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1831 (1989); Henson-El v. Rogers, 923 F.2d 51, 52 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1235, 111 S.Ct. 2863 (1991). In this case, Plaintiff's claims lack an arguable basis in law and are, therefore, frivolous.
A copy of this order shall be transmitted to Plaintiff and to Counsel for Defendants.
SO ORDERED.