Carr v. Strode

78 Citing cases

  1. Ngo v. Queen's Med. Ctr.

    136 Haw. 54 (Haw. 2015)   Cited 1 times

    , 79 Hawai'i 475 , 485 n. 6, 904 P.2d 489 , 499 n. 6 (1995).

  2. Cuc Thi Ngo v. Queen's Med. Ctr.

    136 Haw. 54 (Haw. 2015)   Cited 1 times

    , 79 Hawai'i 475, 485 n. 6, 904 P.2d 489, 499 n. 6 (1995).

  3. Barcai v. Betwee

    98 Haw. 470 (Haw. 2002)   Cited 32 times
    Reaffirming the five elements re*65 quired to establish a claim of negligent failure to obtain informed consent under Hawai'i law

    At the conference to settle jury instructions, the defense objected to Plaintiffs' proposed instructions concerning negligent failure to obtain informed consent, essentially arguing that, because Plaintiffs did not present any testimony that Dr. Betwee had breached a standard of care in failing to disclose the risk of NMS, there was no evidence to support an informed consent claim and that the jury should not be allowed to consider it. Relying on Carr v. Strode, 79 Hawai`i 475, 904 P.2d 489 (1995), discussed infra, the trial court initially determined that sufficient evidence had been presented to allow the jury to decide whether a reasonable person would have wanted to be informed of the risk of NMS. However, the court subsequently accepted the defense's argument that Dr. Betwee had justified his nondisclosure of the risk of NMS on the basis of the "therapeutic privilege exception," discussed infra, i.e., that it would have been harmful to Barcai to disclose the risk of NMS. Relying on Bernard v. Char, 79 Hawai`i 371, 383, 903 P.2d 676, 688 (App. 1995) [hereinafter, Bernard I], the trial court ruled that expert testimony was required to rebut Dr. Betwee's therapeutic privilege justification, and, because Plaintiffs had presented no such testimony, there was insufficient evidence to send the issue of informed consent to the jury.

  4. Fisher v. Grove Farm Co., Inc.

    123 Haw. 82 (Haw. Ct. App. 2009)   Cited 40 times
    Stating the elements of a fraud claim

    IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT [Cross-Appellants] will have the burden at trial of showing that they were adequately informed in recommending the sale of [Grove Farm] to [ALPS LLC]. On August 7, 2006, Cross-Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration of the 7/26/06 Order. Based in large part on Carr v. Strode, 79 Hawai'i 475, 904 P.2d 489 (1995), Cross-Appellants argued that the circuit court did not have authority to order summary judgment because the Business Judgment Rule Motion improperly sought "piecemeal adjudication of a claim," i.e., a factual determination that Former Directors failed to exercise informed judgment, which "would advance, but not entirely dispose of Count III. The circuit court held a hearing on the motion for reconsideration, and on September 13, 2006, the court filed its Amended Order, which provided in relevant part:

  5. Cuc Thi Ngo v. Queen's Med. Ctr.

    NO. 30172 (Haw. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2013)   Cited 2 times

    Further, to maintain an informed consent claim, "a plaintiff . . . is required to prove by expert medical evidence the materiality of the risk of harm to which the plaintiff was subjected." Carr v. Strode, 79 Hawai'i 475, 487, 904 P.2d 489, 501 (1995) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs must prove the "materiality of the risk" by "adducing expert medical testimony to establish the nature of risks inherent in a particular treatment, the probabilities of therapeutic success, the frequency of the occurrence of particular risks, and the nature of available alternatives to treatment."

  6. State v. Bringas

    149 Haw. 435 (Haw. 2021)   Cited 1 times
    Explaining "[t]he requirement that an appellate court search for any reasonable way to reconcile a jury's verdicts serves to avoid speculation into the jury's confidential deliberations and to safeguard the result of those deliberations, if at all possible."

    This standard comes from Carr v. Strode, in which this court held, "A conflict in the jury's answers to questions in a special verdict will warrant a new trial only if those answers are irreconcilably inconsistent, and the verdict will not be disturbed if the answers can be reconciled under any theory." 79 Hawai‘i 475, 489, 904 P.2d 489, 503 (1995) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Thus, the court must first "search for a reasonable way to read the verdicts as expressing a coherent view of the case, and must exhaust this effort" before it vacates the jury's verdict and remands the case for a new trial.

  7. Roberts v. Jayswal

    NO. CAAP-15-0000933 (Haw. Ct. App. Jun. 7, 2019)

    Under this inquiry, "the jury must determine that the risk of harm posed by a procedure was material enough that the doctor disclose the risk to a patient and that harm eventually occurs." McElvaney, 2010 WL 665422, at *2 (emphasis added) (citing Carr v. Strode, 79 Hawai'i 475, 486, 492, 904 P.2d 489, 500, 506 (1995)). Although Roberts references Hawaii Revised Statutes ("HRS") section 671-3(b), which governs negligent failure to obtain informed consent claims for "health care providers," as defined under HRS section 671-1, Hawai'i appellate courts have applied common law principles to negligent failure to obtain informed consent claims involving non-physicians, such as dentists and chiropractors.

  8. Ray v. Kapiolani Medical Specialists

    125 Haw. 253 (Haw. 2011)   Cited 2 times
    Holding that, under the patient-oriented standard, a physician is required to disclose information that "a reasonable person objectively needs to hear" in order for that person to consent to a medical procedure

    "The theory, however, must be supported by the trial court's instructions to the jury." Carr v. Strode, 79 Hawai'i 475, 489, 904 P.2d 489, 503 (1995) (citing Toner v. Lederle Laboratories, 828 F.2d 510, 512 (9th Cir. 1987)). First, KMS asserts that the verdict is not irreconcilable because the jury was analyzing distinct causation issues.

  9. Ray v. Kapiolani Med. Specialists

    125 Haw. 253 (Haw. 2011)

    Id. (quoting 9A C. Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure : Civil 2d § 2510, at 203 (1995)). “The theory, however, must be supported by the trial court's instructions to the jury.” Carr v. Strode, 79 Hawai‘i 475, 489, 904 P.2d 489, 503 (1995) (citing Toner v. Lederle Laboratories, 828 F.2d 510, 512 (9th Cir.1987)). First, KMS asserts that the verdict is not irreconcilable because the jury was analyzing distinct causation issues.

  10. Miyamoto v. Lum

    104 Haw. 1 (Haw. 2004)   Cited 84 times
    Recognizing that plaintiff must provide probability testimony on causation because it “is well-settled that, in any negligence action, the plaintiff—not the defendant—has the burden of proving the requisite elements, including legal causation”

    "Both the grant and the denial of a motion for new trial is within the trial court's discretion, and we will not reverse that decision absent a clear abuse of discretion." Carr v. Strode, 79 Haw. 475, 488, 904 P.2d 489, 502 (1995) (citing Richardson v. Sport Shinko (Waikk Corp.), 76 Haw. 494, 503, 880 P.2d 169, 178 (1994); Stahl v. Balsara, 60 Haw. 144, 152, 587 P.2d 1210, 1215 (1978)). "An abuse of discretion occurs `where the trial court has clearly exceeded the bounds of reason or disregarded rules or principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment of a party litigant.'"