Opinion
NO. 2017 CA 1499
04-06-2018
TOWANA CARR v. SANDERSON FARMS, INC. AND KEVIN WEBB
Thomas J. Hogan Jr. Hammond, Louisiana Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant, Towana Carr Jeffrey I. Mandel Metairie, Louisiana Attorney for Defendant/Appellee, Sanderson Farms, Inc.
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION On Appeal from The 21st Judicial District Court, Parish of Tangipahoa, State of Louisiana
Trial Court No. 2014-0002929
The Honorable Brenda Bedsole Ricks, Judge Presiding Thomas J. Hogan Jr.
Hammond, Louisiana Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant,
Towana Carr Jeffrey I. Mandel
Metairie, Louisiana Attorney for Defendant/Appellee,
Sanderson Farms, Inc. BEFORE: GUIDRY, PETTIGREW, AND CRAIN, JJ. CRAIN, J.
Towana Carr appeals a judgment sustaining an exception of no cause of action and dismissing one of her claims against Sanderson Farms, Inc. Finding the trial court erred in designating the partial judgment as final and appealable, we dismiss the appeal.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This tort suit, before this court for a third time, arises out of an altercation between two employees, Carr and Kevin Michael Webb, that occurred on their employer's premises during working hours. Carr alleges Webb deliberately struck and injured her with a piece of equipment known as a "pallet jack." Carr sued Webb and their employer, Sanderson Farms, alleging Sanderson Farms was (1) vicariously liable for Webb's intentional conduct, and (2) independently negligent for failing to prevent Webb from injuring Carr. In the first appeal, this court affirmed a judgment sustaining an exception of no cause of action filed by Sanderson Farms. Carr v. Sanderson Farm, Inc., 15-0953 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/17/16), 189 So. 3d 450, 458. The trial court's dismissal of the claims, however, was reversed, and the matter was remanded to allow Carr an opportunity to amend her petition to remove, if possible, the grounds for the exception. Carr, 189 So. 3d at 457-58.
Carr amended her petition, and Sanderson Farms again responded with an exception of no cause of action, which, after a contradictory hearing, the trial court sustained. On appeal, this court found the amended petition stated a negligence claim against Sanderson Farms, and, in light of that finding, we pretermitted any determination of whether the amended petition supported a claim for vicarious liability. See Carr v. Sanderson Farms, Inc., 16-1064 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/17/17), 215 So. 3d 437, 441 n.1. The trial court's judgment was reversed and the matter remanded. Carr, 215 So. 3d at 442.
On remand, Sanderson Farms filed another exception of no cause of action, this time directed only at the claim for vicarious liability. The trial court sustained the exception. In a judgment signed on August 9, 2017, the trial court dismissed with prejudice Carr's "cause of action for vicarious liability" against Sanderson Farms. The trial court designated the judgment as a "FINAL JUDGMENT." Carr appeals.
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is the legal power and authority of a court to hear and determine an action or proceeding involving the legal relations of the parties, and to grant the relief to which they are entitled. La. Code Civ. Pro. art. 1. Appellate courts have a duty to examine their subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte, even if the litigants do not raise the issue. Succession of Matthews, 16-0289 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1/5/17), 212 So. 3d 547, 551, writs denied, 17-0230 (La. 3/31/17), 217 So. 3d 361.
This court's appellate jurisdiction extends to final judgments. La. Code Civ. Pro. art. 2083; Malus v. Adair Asset Management, LLC, 16-0610 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/22/16), 209 So. 3d 1055, 1059. A final judgment determines the merits of a controversy in whole or in part. La. Code Civ. Pro. art. 1841. A judgment that sustains an exception as to one or more, but less than all, of the claims against a party is a partial judgment and can be immediately appealed only if it is properly designated as a final judgment. See La. Code Civ. Pro. arts. 1911B and 1915B; Malus, 209 So. 3d at 1059; City of Baton Rouge v. American Home Assurance Company, 06-0522 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/28/06), 951 So. 2d 1113, 1116-17.
The August 9, 2017 judgment, which dismisses only the vicarious liability claim against Sanderson Farms, is a partial judgment. As such, this court's appellate jurisdiction depends upon the propriety of the trial court's designation of the judgment as final pursuant to Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1915B(1). Because the trial court gave no explicit reasons for the designation, we review that determination de novo. See R.J. Messinger, Inc. v. Rosenblum, 04-1664 (La. 3/2/05), 894 So. 2d 1113, 1122; Malus, 209 So. 3d at 1061.
In conducting our review, we consider the "overriding inquiry" of "whether there is no just reason for delay," as well as the other nonexclusive criteria trial courts should use in making the determination of whether certification is appropriate, which include: (1) the relationship between the adjudicated and the unadjudicated claims, (2) the possibility the need for review might or might not be mooted by future developments in the trial court, (3) the possibility that the reviewing court might be obliged to consider the same issue a second time, and (4) miscellaneous facts such as delay, economic and solvency considerations, shortening the time of trial, frivolity of competing claims, expense, and the like. See R.J. Messinger, Inc., 894 So. 2d at 1122-23; Malus, 209 So. 3d at 1061. Article 1915 attempts to strike a balance between the undesirability of piecemeal appeals and the need for making review available at a time that best serves the needs of the parties. R.J. Messinger, Inc., 894 So. 2d at 1122.
The relationship between the adjudicated and unadjudicated claims in this case does not support the need for an immediate appeal of the partial judgment. Appellate review of the vicarious liability claim now, regardless of which party prevails, will not facilitate a more efficient disposition of the remaining claims. A full trial will still be necessary for those claims, which arise out of the same operative facts, and essentially the same evidence will have to be produced to adjudicate them. Consequently, the length and expense of the trial will not be materially reduced by deciding this appeal. We are aware of no other factors, such as delay, economic and solvency considerations, or frivolity of competing claims, suggesting that the undesirability of piecemeal appeals is overcome in this instance by some need to have the judgment reviewed at this time. See R.J. Messinger, Inc., 894 So. 2d at 1122; Malus, 209 So. 3d at 1061; State, Department of Transportation and Development v. Henderson, 09-2212 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/7/10), 39 So. 3d 739, 742. The trial court erred in designating the August 9, 2017 judgment as a final judgment. As a result, this court lacks jurisdiction, and the subject appeal must be dismissed. See La. Code Civ. Pro. arts. 1911B, 2083, and 2162.
Although this court has discretion to convert an appeal to an application for supervisory writs, it may only do so if the appeal would have been timely if filed as a supervisory writ application. Succession of Jaga, 16-1291 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/15/17), 227 So. 3d 325, 328 n.2. A party intending to apply for a supervisory writ shall give notice of such intention by requesting a return date to be set by the trial court, which shall not exceed thirty days from the date of the notice of judgment. See Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rules 4-2 and 4-3. The present appeal was not filed within thirty days of the notice of judgment; therefore, the motion for appeal cannot be considered a timely filed application for supervisory writs. --------
CONCLUSION
This appeal is dismissed. Assessment of appeal costs shall await final disposition of this matter.
APPEAL DISMISSED.