Opinion
Case No. A1-04-18.
November 12, 2004
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Before the Court is the Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed on August 10, 2004. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants the motion.
On August 13, 2004, Defendant IBEW Local 1593 joined in the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Defendant IBEW.
I. BACKGROUND
The plaintiff, Michael Carr, is an employee of the Dakota Gasification Company ("Dakota Gasification") in Beulah, North Dakota. Carr is part of a bargaining unit represented by the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local Union 1593 ("Local 1593") and is covered by a collective bargaining agreement. Carr also named the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers ("IBEW") as a defendant. For simplicity sake, the Court will refer to both Local 1593 and IBEW as the "Union."
Carr also named the American Federation of Labor — Congress of Industrial Organizations (ALF-CIO) as a defendant. The ALF-CIO was dismissed from the suit on June 17, 2004.
In February 2002, Carr was working in the Oxygen Unit at Dakota Gasification. He was classified as a Tech V. Carr applied for a transfer to the Wastewater Unit within Dakota Gasification. The Wastewater Unit position was classified as a Tech I. Carr believed he would retain his Tech V classification after the transfer because this had been the practice at Dakota Gasification. Carr accepted the transfer. However, on February 12, 2002, Dakota Gasification posted a memorandum changing the transfer policy effective immediately. The memorandum stated that when a grade and/or pay rates appear on a job posting, any applicant whose grade and pay rate is above those listed in the job posting will be subject to a two-grade reduction. On March 11, 2002, when Carr transferred to the Wastewater Unit his wages were reduced to a Tech III classification. On March 28, 2002, Carr filed a grievance with the Union. The grievance was denied in Steps One, Two, and Three. Carr then requested an arbitration hearing and a hearing was held on March 5, 2003. On April 25, 2003, the grievance was denied.
In the meantime, Carr was told that if he did not test to the Tech III level by March 10, 2003, he would be reduced to a Tech I. On March 10, 2003, Carr was reduced to a Tech I. Carr filed another grievance on March 24, 2003. The outcome of this grievance is unclear.
On February 14, 2004, Carr served a summons and complaint on the Union. In his complaint, Carr set forth four claims (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of the duty of fair representation; (3) misrepresentation and reliance; and (4) violations of the North Dakota Labor-Management Relations Act. On April 28, 2004, the Union moved for judgment on the pleadings with respect to Carr's third and fourth claims. On July 22, 2004, the Court granted the motion in part. The Court held that while Carr was precluded from proceeding on a theory that the Union violated tort principles of misrepresentation or reliance under state law, he could proceed on a claim that the Union, through its alleged misrepresentations, violated its duty of fair representation as recognized by federal law. In addition, the Court held the National Labor Relations Act preempted Carr's claim under the North Dakota Labor-Management Relations Act.
Defendant IBEW filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on April 28, 2004, and two days later, on April 30, 2004, Defendant IBEW Local 1593 filed its own Motion for Partial Summary Judgment adopting the brief submitted by IBEW.
On August 10, 2004, the Defendants filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. They contend that Carr cannot maintain a breach of contract claim because he has not identified what, if any contractual provision was breached by the Union. In response, Carr contends that the Union failed to fulfill duties spelled out in the preamble and in Articles VI, XV, XVI, XVII, XX, and XXV of its Constitution.
Defendant IBEW filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on August 10, 2004, and three days later, on August 13, 2004, Defendant IBEW Local 1593 filed its own Motion for Partial Summary Judgment adopting the brief submitted by IBEW.
II. LEGAL DISCUSSION A. STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
It is well-established that summary judgment is appropriate when, viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Graning v. Sherburne County, 172 F.3d 611, 614 (8th Cir. 1999). A fact is "material" if it might effect the outcome of the case and a factual dispute is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
The basic inquiry for purposes of summary judgment is whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. Quick v. Donaldson Co., Inc., 90 F.3d 1372, 1376 (8th Cir. 1996). The moving party has the initial burden of demonstrating to the Court that there are no genuine issues of material fact. If the moving party has met this burden, the non-moving party cannot simply rest on the mere denials or allegations in the pleadings. Instead, the non-moving party must set forth specific facts showing that there are genuine issues for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). A mere trace of evidence supporting the non-movant's position is insufficient. Instead, the facts must generate evidence from which a jury could reasonably find for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986).
B. BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM
In his claim for breach of contract, Carr alleges the "Union Constitution and by-laws of the organization are enforceable contracts between the Union and the members." See Complaint ¶ 23. He maintains that the Union "is liable to [him] for breach of contract and for misconduct as defined by Article 25 of the Union Constitution." See Complaint ¶ 25.
The Union does not dispute that it was contractually obligated to represent Carr throughout the grievance process. Rather, it contends that Carr cannot sustain a breach of contract claim because he does not explicitly identify in his complaint what provisions of the Constitution or by-laws were allegedly violated.
In his response to the Union's motion, Carr fleshes out his breach of contract claim by explicitly citing provisions of the Constitution he believes were violated by the Union as well as elaborating on what he perceived as the Union's offending conduct. Carr contends the Union breached duties it owed to its members by entering into a non-ratified contract, making changes on the union contract after ratification, signing an un-ratified contract, allowing an addendum to the contract without membership approval, and failing to correct the contract by deleting the addendum. For the sake of simplicity, the Court will collectively refer to these allegations as the Union's failure to submit the collective bargaining agreement for ratification by the membership of the Union. In addition, Carr cites to the following contractual provisions he believes the Union has violated: the "preamble" to the Constitution; the Declaration of IBEW; and Articles IV, XV, XVI, XVII, XX, and XXV of the Constitution.
In its reply, the Union asserts Carr still has not set forth a claim for breach of contract. The Union states that the constitutional provisions cited by Carr do not provide a basis for a breach of contract claim because the IBEW Constitution does not require ratification of the collective bargaining agreement. The Defendants submitted an affidavit from Edwin D. Hill, the current International President of the Union. He stated the following regarding the IBEW Constitution:
3. The IBEW Constitution does not contain any provision obligating either the IBEW or by IBEW local union to represent union members fairly in collective bargaining. I understand that the duty of fair representation is a statutory duty imposed by federal law. The IBEW Constitution does not contain any provisions which either incorporate or supplement that statutory duty.
4. The IBEW Constitution does not contain any provision requiring local unions to submit collective bargaining agreements to membership ratification or any provisions prohibiting local unions from signing agreements that have not been ratified. Not all IBEW local unions submit their collective bargaining agreements to membership ratification. IBEW local unions can, and do, decide for themselves whether and under what circumstances agreements will be submitted to ratification.
5. Article XV, Section 6 of the IBEW Constitution requires IBEW local unions to submit all local union bylaws and local union collective bargaining agreements to the International President for approval. That section also gives the International Presidents "the right to correct any bylaws, amendments, rule or agreements to conform to this Constitution and the policies of the I.B.E.W." This provision gives me the right, but not the duty, to withhold approval and to correct local union bylaws and agreements that conflict with the IBEW Constitution or IBEW policy.
Affidavit of Edwin D. Hill, ¶¶ 3-5. As a result, the Union asserts that it is not obligated to submit collective bargaining agreements to its membership for ratification.
"Absent bad faith, [the courts] will defer to the union's interpretation of its own constitution, provided that interpretation is reasonable and not contrary to the constitution's express language." Allen v. United Transportation Union, 964 F.2d 818, 821 (8th Cir. 1992). In other words, if the union's interpretation of its constitution is a reasonable one, a court will not substitute its judgment for that of the union as to the meaning of its constitution. Washington v. Laborer's International Union of North America, 792 F.2d 94, 95-96 (8th Cir. 1985).
The Court has carefully reviewed the IBEW Constitution, the depositions, and other evidence the parties have submitted. Articles IV, XV, XVI, XVII, XX, and XXV of the IBEW's Constitution are titled as follows: International President, Rules for Local Unions, Officers of Local Unions, Duties of Local Union Officers, Admission of Members, and Misconduct, Offenses and Penalties. After thoroughly reviewing each of these sections, the Court finds they cannot be reasonably interpreted to require the Union to submit collective bargaining agreements to its membership for ratification. Of these sections, only Article XV, Section 6, speaks to collective bargaining agreements, and it states:
[Local Unions] are empowered to make their own bylaws and rules, but these shall in no way conflict with this Constitution. Where any doubt appears, this Constitution shall be supreme. All bylaws, amendments and rules, all agreements, jurisdiction, etc., of any kind or nature, shall be submitted in duplicate form to the [International President] for approval. In the case of agreements, however, additional copies are required by the [International Office]. Therefore, six (6) signed copies of construction trade agreements or amendments and five (5) signed copies of all other agreements shall be submitted to the [International President]. No [Local Union] shall put into effect any bylaws, amendments, rules or agreements of any kind without first securing such approval. All these shall be null and void without [International President] approval. The [International President] has the right to correct any bylaws, amendments, rules or agreements to conform to this Constitution and the policies of the I.B.E.W.
Approval of Local Union collective bargaining agreements by the [International President] does not make the International a party to such agreements unless the [International President] specifically states in writing that the Interntional is a party to any such agreement.
While this section allows the International President to "correct any bylaws, amendments, rules or agreements, to conform" to the IBEW Constitution, the Court agrees with the Union's interpretation and finds that the IBEW Constitution does not require the membership of the local union to ratify collective bargaining agreements or their addendums. In addition, the Court finds the same holds true for the "preamble" to the Constitution and the Declaration of IBEW. Each of these set forth the various goals or purposes of the IBEW, but neither require membership ratification of agreements.
Thus, the Court finds there are no genuine issues of material fact as to Carr's breach of contract claim. Although Carr claims the Union has breached its contract with him by failing to submit the collective bargaining agreement for ratification, Carr has failed to identify any provisions of the IBEW Constitution which would require the Union to submit the collective bargaining agreement to its membership for ratification. The Court finds, as a matter of law, that the Union's Constitution does not contain a provision requiring membership ratification of all collective bargaining agreements. Because Carr has failed to identify a constitutional provision which prohibits the Union actions he has complained of, the Court finds that no reasonable jury could return a verdict in his favor as to the breach of contract claims. III. CONCLUSION
Carr's breach of contract claim is based on the contention that acceptance of a Union membership application creates a contract between the members and the Union. The Court notes that Carr was not a Local 1593 member at the time of the actions about which he complains.
The Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Docket Nos. 35 38) is GRANTED. The sole remaining claim is Carr's claim that the Union breached its statutory duty of fair representation.
IT IS SO ORDERED.