Opinion
No. C 10-0715 PJH.
October 13, 2011
ORDER
On October 11, 2011, plaintiff Fred C. Carr, Jr., filed a "Motion for Judicial Bias," under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1), which the court interprets as a request for recusal for "bias or prejudice." The motion is DENIED. Plaintiff has not established that recusal is warranted based on "personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding" — the grounds set forth in § 455(b)(1).
"Bias or prejudice" connotes a "favorable or unfavorable disposition of opinion that is somehow wrongful or inappropriate, either because it is undeserved, or because it rests upon knowledge that the subject ought not to possess . . . or because it is excessive in degree." Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 550 (1994). Plaintiff has not shown any "bias or prejudice" directed against him, which stems from an extrajudicial source, and casts doubt upon the court's impartiality. See id. at 544-45. Nor has plaintiff shown that the court has knowledge of "disputed evidentiary facts" concerning his case.
Plaintiff's complaint about the court appears to be based wholly on his disagreement with the court's rulings and the procedural conduct of the case. Judicial rulings will "almost never" provide a basis for a recusal motion; such a motion will be proper only if the rulings "display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible." Id. at 555; see also United States v. Chischilly, 30 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 1994).
Finally, the court notes that the complaint in this action was dismissed on September 9, 2011, for failure to state a hybrid LMRA § 301 claim, and judgment was also entered as of that date. Accordingly, as nothing remains to be done in the case, plaintiff's motion is moot.