Opinion
December 4, 1951. Rehearing Denied January 15, 1952.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Dade County, Marshall C. Wiseheart, J.
Lucille Snowden, Miami, and Wendell C. Heaton, Tallahassee, for appellant.
Anderson Nadeau, Miami, for appellees.
Appellants were defendants in the court below and represent numerous labor crafts in the Miami area. They will hereinafter be referred to as defendants. Appellees were plaintiffs in the court below and represent the general contractors in the Miami area. They will be hereinafter referred to as complainants. The building industry in this area is administered by contracts between complainants and defendants, the primary element in which has to do with working hours and rate of pay.
Prior to 1948, these contracts expired at various times throughout the year which was unsatisfactory to the laborer and the contractor. After much effort a conference was arranged between representatives of complainants and defendants that resulted in an agreement providing that all future construction contracts contain the following specifications:
"(a) All agreements shall expire on one date, i.e., March 31st of each calendar year, for all skilled craftsmen. Notice of any proposed changes to be given 60 days in advance in accordance with the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 [29 U.S.C.A. § 141 et seq.].
"(b) Wage rates for all skilled craftsmen in the Industry to be adjusted simultaneously; thereby permitting accurate forecasting of construction costs prior to starting the volume of construction work during the Spring months.
"(c) Six uniform Holiday days to be observed during the calendar year, and Presidential election day each 4th year.
"(d) Jurisdictional disputes and related issues to be referred to a permanent Labor-Management Joint Committee, consisting of 7 representatives of each group. Decisions to be in accordance with rules and regulations of the `joint Board for Settlement of Jurisdictional Disputes in the Construction Industry.'
"(e) Labor-Management Committee to hear all issues requiring attention of problems affecting mutual interests."
In September 1950, some of the complainants petitioned the council, (Joint committee provided by specification (d) of contract) for review of wage rates fixed as per above specifications but their request was denied. Thereupon the Carpenters' Craft notified the council that beginning November 1, 1950, the scale for journeymen carpenters would be $2.50 per hour. Complainants forthwith filed their bill of complaint in this cause, alleging the contract with defendants that the proposed wage scale was contrary thereto and praying the court to determine whether or not said contract was enforceable up to March 31, 1951, such being the date to which it was renewed. At this point an application for temporary injunction on the part of complainants was heard, evidence was taken and the court found the contract to be valid and binding.
A motion to dismiss the complaint on numerous grounds, one of them being that the National Labor Relations Board had exclusive jurisdiction of the cause, was denied. Suit to test the question of jurisdiction was dismissed. Defendants then filed their answer admitting the material allegations of the bill of complaint but denied that any collective bargaining agreement had ever been made. Upon the issues so made evidence was taken and the court, among other things, found:
"2. In 1948, in order to bring some stability out of the chaotic conditions which had theretofore existed in the building industry in Dade County, an organization known as the Construction Industry Council was formed. This Council consisted of 14 men, seven of whom were selected by organizations of contractors and builders, including the plaintiff organizations, and seven were selected by the various labor unions, then operating in Dade County, including the defendant, Carpenters' District Council. The object of the Construction Industry Council was to create a governing board consisting of seven men from what was known as management and seven men from labor who would undertake to fix the time in which wage agreements would expire, the conditions under which they could be terminated, the wage rates for all skilled craftsmen in the industry and the number of holidays. The Council was also to have power to settle jurisdictional disputes and related issues. This Council determined the rate of wages as follows:
Journeyman Carpenters $2.06 1/4 per hour Apprentices 1st year 1.03 per hour Apprentices 2nd year 1.29 per hour Apprentices 3rd year 1.55 per hour Apprentices 4th year 1.81 per hour and the time when all contracts were to have expired was fixed as of March 31, 1950."3. Said contract was extended to March 31, 1951, and was until said date in full force and effect. Notwithstanding this, on October 17, 1950, the complainants, through its duly authorized officer, breached the said agreement and thereafter refused to permit its members to work for the wages fixed in said contract, but insisted instead on its members being paid as follows:
Journeyman Carpenters $2.50 per hour Apprentices 1st year 1.25 per hour Apprentices 2nd year 1.56 per hour Apprentices 3rd year 1.87 1/2 per hour Apprentices 4th year 2.19 per hour and thereafter, and from time to time, undertook to coerce its several members into refusing to work for the rate of wages fixed in the said contract and threatened and intimidated its members who continued to work for the wages fixed in said contract."From this decree the defendants have appealed.
It is first contended that the trial court erred in its interpretation of the contract because the evidence shows that the negotiating committee never intended to write a group collective bargaining agreement but merely agreed on terms to be incorporated in individual collective bargaining agreements to be executed by complainants and defendants.
After all is said, the answer to this question turns on the interpretation of the evidence affecting the transaction between the parties. Appellants' brief on this and the second point raised is right much in the nature of a plea in confession and avoidance. It is admitted that there were many meetings of the Council, that the wage scale set out in the contract was agreed on by the Union Carpenters and that both parties were pleased with it. It was also agreed that this was the main duty and responsibility of the council. All of which would appear tantamount to an admission that the Union was bound by the decision of the Council.
The complaint is bottomed on the theory that the Union agreed to the wage scale of $2.06 1/4 per hour for Journeymen Carpenters and that in violation of said agreement the Union attempted to prevent its members working for the contractors unless the carpenters were paid $2.50 per hour. It is conclusively shown that the Union threatened to expel those members who did not insist on $2.50 per hour in violation of the agreement made by the council. The decree opened the way for carpenters to work for the contractors at the wage scale fixed by the council without fear of interference from the Union organization. In fine, the decree finds and the Unions admit that they were bound by the agreement made by the council.
In so holding the court gave substance to the most fundamental of man's inalienable rights. The right to work is equivalent to the right to eat and the right to eat and provide raiment for his dependents is man's most dominant urge. In a free country like ours such a right should not depend on one's race, color, the lodge, craft, church or other organization to which he belongs. Such a requirement is contrary to the spirit of our institutions, the basis on which our democracy was founded and every impulse of the forefathers who gave it existence. I can think of nothing more out of harmony with true Americanism. Membership in one's lodge, craft or church may be a means of enlarging spiritual, cultural and physical assets but to make his bread depend on craft or church membership would be the worse species of anti-americanism. There has not yet been discovered a more fertile field for the spread of isms alien to democracy than hungry bellies. Section 12, Declaration of Rights, Constitution of Florida, F.S.A.; Section 447.01, Florida Statutes 1949, F.S.A.; Local Union No. 519 v. Robertson, Fla., 44 So.2d 899; Opera on Tour, Inc. v. Weber, 285 N.Y. 348, 34 N.E.2d 349, 136 A.L.R. 267; Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 36 S.Ct. 7, 60 L.Ed. 131; Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 35 S.Ct. 240, 59 L.Ed. 441; Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Company, 111 U.S. 746, 4 S.Ct. 652, 28 L.Ed. 585.
The only other point raised is one of jurisdiction. Appellants contend that since the case involves a labor dispute, a collective bargaining agreement and a charge of unfair labor practice, exclusive jurisdiction rested in the National Labor Relations Board, consequently the state courts were without jurisdiction to consider the case.
If there was any merit to this contention, it was settled when prohibition was denied and the writ dismissed by this court early in the history of the case. We do not think the record presents a labor dispute, a collective bargaining agreement or any semblence of an unfair labor practice. To the contrary, the only question presented to and determined by the trial court is whether or not appellants (Carpenters Union) made and became a party to the agreement by which the wages and hours specified were fixed.
The rule is well settled in this country that controversies between labor organizations and employees may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties. Citizenship and the amount in controversy are not material. Mountain States Division No. 17, etc. v. Mountain States Telephone Telegraph Co., D.C., 81 F. Supp. 397; Amazon Cotton Mill Company v. Textile Workers Union, 4 Cir., 167 F.2d 183; United Automobile Workers Amalgamated Local 286 v. Wilson Athletic Goods Manufacturing Company, 6 Labor Law Reporter C.C.H. 65, Vol. 31 Am.Jur. (Labor) Section 334, Page 997.
In essence we find nothing in this controversy that was not proper for a Court of Equity to adjudicate. Outside of the public element involved, it is nothing more than a controversy between individuals to compel respect for obligations fairly and legally entered into. On either ground the chancellor's decree of injunction finds ample support in the record.
It is therefore affirmed.
Affirmed.
SEBRING, C.J., and CHAPMAN and THOMAS, JJ., concur.