It does not signify the exact spot at which vehicles are required to stop. See 7 Am Jur 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, § 196, p 747; Hamilton v. Cadwell (1938), 195 Wn. 683 ( 81 P.2d 815); People v. Ubertini (1943), 182 Mich. 634 ( 51 N.Y.S.2d 62); Carpenter v. Snipes (1950), 203 Okla. 534 ( 223 P.2d 761); Clifton v. Turner (1962), 257 N.C. 92 ( 125 S.E.2d 339). Placement of the sign some distance from the intersection of a servient and dominant highway gives the motorist ample time to slow down and stop before entering the intersection.

The Oklahoma courts have said that it was not "intended that motor vehicles should stop at the exact spot or place where the sign was erected, but it was intended as a warning to stop at the intersection." Carpenter v. Snipes, 203 Okla. 534, 223 P.2d 761, 767. But we do not understand the Oklahoma court to mean that the failure to stop at the intersection is negligence as a matter of law.

Without attempting to subdivide the evidence relative to the different acts of negligence charged in the petition, a recitation of the facts together with the applicable principles of law which I think control in such circumstances is set forth hereafter. In Carpenter v. Snipes, 203 Okla. 534, 223 P.2d 761, this court announced the following rule: "* * * Our attention is also called to the rule stated in White v. Rukes, 56 Okla. 476, 155 P. 1184, that: `The owners of automobiles have the same rights on highways as those riding horseback or traveling by other vehicles, but must use this means of locomotion with due regard for the rights of others.

At the outset in instructing the jury the trial court should have instructed the jury that under the ordinance it was plaintiff's duty to stop at the intersection of Dewey Street. In Carpenter v. Snipes, 203 Okla. 534, 223 P.2d 761, 767, in the body of the opinion this court said: "Any reasonably prudent, or reasonably intelligent person would readily see and understand that it was not intended that motor vehicles should stop at the exact stop or place where the sign was erected, but was intended as a warning to stop at the intersection."

"A demurrer to the evidence admits all the facts which the evidence in the slightest degree tends to prove, and all the inferences or conclusions which may be reasonably and logically drawn from the evidence, and upon a demurrer to the evidence the plaintiff is entitled to every inference which the evidence, considered in the light most favorable to him, reasonably tends to prove." In the case of Carpenter v. Snipes, 203 Okla. 534, 223 P.2d 761, 762, syl., pars. 1, 2, and 3, we recently said: "A demurrer to the evidence admits every fact which the evidence, in the slightest degree, tends to prove, and all inferences and conclusions which can be reasonably and logically drawn therefrom; and if there is a conflict in the evidence, that which is unfavorable to the party against whom the demurrer is directed is to be considered withdrawn.

We are committed to the rule that a demurrer to the evidence admits every fact which the evidence, in the slightest degree, tends to prove, and all inferences and conclusions which can be reasonably and logically drawn therefrom; and if there is a conflict in the evidence, that which is unfavorable to the party against whom the demurrer is directed is to be considered withdrawn. Carpenter v. Snipes, 203 Okla. 534, 223 P.2d 761. Measuring the proof with the standard thus announced we conclude that the judgment of the trial court must be sustained. Plaintiff's proof that defendant failed to ring the bell or blow the whistle as the train approached the crossing may be assumed by reason of the witness Cole's testimony, that as he drove a school bus over the tracks immediately prior to the accident, and as he proceeded north to the top of the hill, at which point he passed the King automobile, that he did not hear the bell or the whistle.

The effect of defendant's demurrer was to admit every fact which plaintiff's evidence tended in the slightest degree to prove, together with all logical and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. Carpenter v. Snipes, 203 Okla. 534, 223 P.2d 761. Upon this basis it was established that plaintiff had entered into a valid and approved contract, that there were funds available to contract against at the time same was approved, and that this contract was breached by defendant without justification, thus entitling plaintiff to a judgment for damages in the amount of the contract for such breach. Under these circumstances, the rule is that a demurrer to the evidence should be overruled, the evidence and inferences deducible therefrom being sufficient to support the verdict.

" See, also, Carpenter v. Snipes, 203 Okla. 534, 223 P.2d 761. In Schmit, Respondent, v. Dallas Jansen, Guardian, Appellant, 247 Wis. 648, 20 N.W.2d 542, 162 A.L.R. 925, it was held:

As to defendant Richard Dickinson, an entirely different question is presented. At the outset we must take into consideration the well established and oft-repeated rule that for the purpose of a demurrer to the evidence or a motion for a directed verdict, such demurrer, or motion for a directed verdict, as the case may be, admits every fact which the evidence, in the slightest degree, tends to prove and all inferences and conclusions which can be reasonably and logically drawn therefrom, and if there is a conflict in the evidence, that which is unfavorable to the party against whom the demurrer or motion is directed is to be considered as withdrawn. Carter v. Pinkerton, 194 Okla. 34, 146 P.2d 842; Carpenter v. Snipes, 203 Okla. 534, 223 P.2d 761. Under that rule, in case of conflict, all the evidence of defendant unfavorable to plaintiff intended to prove that plaintiff ran into the side of defendant's car; that plaintiff entered and attempted to cross Boston avenue at the place outside the lane set apart for pedestrians, and that plaintiff was under the influence of intoxicating liquors at the time of the injury, must be considered as withdrawn. Then we have the uncontradicted testimony of the plaintiff which, together with admissions of defendants, that plaintiff, then a resident of the city of Guthrie, went to the city of Tulsa and arrived there about 3 o'clock p.m., on the 19th day of September, 1946; that he registered in at the Hotel Bliss located on the northeast corner of Boston avenue and Second street in the city of Tulsa, and was assigned a room about that time; that a short time thereafter he left his room and went to a drugstore; that in returning to his room while on the elevator, he met a man who was a strange

There is no indication that stop signs are to be used to control the speed of traffic as indicated in this request and there is no specific authorization to place stop signs at any point other than at an intersection. The purpose of placing a stop sign at an intersection has been discussed by the courts and in the case of Carpenter v. Snipes, 203 Okl. 534, 223 P.2d 761 (1950), the court stated: "Where stop sign on street is placed 125 feet from intersection, any reasonable prudent or reasonably intelligent person would readily see and understand that it was not intended that motor should stop at exact spot or place where sign was erected, but that it was intended as warning to stop at intersection." Chapter 15 of Title 47 describes the powers of local authorities to enact or enforce regulation regarding traffic control and 47 O.S. 15-102 [ 47-15-102] provides, in part, as follows: "(a) The provisions of this act shall not be deemed to prevent local authorities with respect to streets and highways under their jurisdiction and within the reasonable exercise of police power from: 6. Designating any highway as a through highway and requiring that all vehicles stop before entering or crossing the same or designating any intersection as a stop intersection or a yield intersection and requiring all vehicles to stop or yield at one or more entrances to such inters