DECIDED NOVEMBER 25, 1980. Certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Georgia — 154 Ga. App. 776 ( 269 S.E.2d 897) (1980). Eugene A. Epting, for appellants.

Construing appellant's own testimony most favorably for her, she had suffered a "serious injury" in the form of a disability which commenced almost immediately after the collision and continued for some six weeks thereafter. See Pruitt v. Tyler, 181 Ga. App. 174, 176 (2) ( 351 S.E.2d 539) (1986); Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v. Davalos, 154 Ga. App. 776, 777 (1) ( 269 S.E.2d 897) (1980), rev'd on other grounds, 246 Ga. 746 ( 272 S.E.2d 702) (1980). See also Jordan v. Smoot, 191 Ga. App. 74 (1) ( 380 S.E.2d 714) (1989).

"`Although the question asked by appellee's counsel [may have been] a patent attempt to introduce inadmissible evidence, the question was never answered, and we do not believe that in the context of all the evidence presented during this [three]-day trial it so prejudiced the proceedings as to require a mistrial as a matter of law.' [Cit.]" Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v. Davalos, 154 Ga. App. 776, 780 (3) ( 269 S.E.2d 897) (1980), rev'd on other grounds, 246 Ga. 746 ( 272 S.E.2d 702) (1980). Judgment affirmed. McMurray, P. J., concurs. Beasley, J., concurs in the judgment only.

Appellant contends further that plaintiffs apparently sought to file a direct action against it by authority of OCGA § 46-7-12 (e), but failed to allege and prove that the Public Service Commission had approved the insurance policy, citing McClendon Trucking Co. v. Williams, 183 Ga. App. 508 ( 359 S.E.2d 351). Plaintiffs were required to "allege and prove" that appellant's policy was approved by the PSC (see Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v. Davalos, 154 Ga. App. 776, 778 ( 269 S.E.2d 897)), but plaintiffs could have amended their complaint or even alleged and proven the facts at trial. See OCGA § 9-11-15 (a), (b). Appellant has not contended that plaintiffs' failure to allege the approval of the PSC of appellant's policy is a nonamendable defect which entitles it to a dismissal.

St. Paul Fire c. Ins. Co. v. Fleet Transp. Co., 116 Ga. App. 606, 609 (2) ( 158 S.E.2d 476) (1967). See also Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v. Davalos, 154 Ga. App. 776, 778 (2) ( 269 S.E.2d 897) (1980), rev'd on other grounds 246 Ga. 746 ( 272 S.E.2d 702) (1980). Evidence merely that the alleged tortfeasor had secured a policy which provided liability coverage would show only the existence of a policy which indemnified the alleged tortfeasor himself against loss for his own liability.

As the majority concludes, when the affidavit is construed most favorably for appellant as the non-moving party, a genuine issue of material fact remains with regard to her "disability" as defined in OCGA § 33-34-2 (2). Even assuming without deciding that the affidavit fails to show that appellant had an "occupation," it was sufficient to show that she at least had as her "principal activity" the maintenance of her home for providing room and board to another, which activity was curtailed for more than a ten-day period after the collision. See generally Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v. Davalos, 154 Ga. App. 776, 777 (1) ( 269 S.E.2d 897) (1980), rev'd on other grounds, 246 Ga. 746 ( 272 S.E.2d 702) (1980). Compare Griffin v. Louisville Nashville R. Co., 159 Ga. App. 598 ( 284 S.E.2d 101) (1981).

The activities enumerated by plaintiff were either not sufficiently curtailed or were not sufficient to qualify as plaintiff's "principal activities." Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v. Davalos, 154 Ga. App. 776 ( 269 S.E.2d 897), revd. on the other grounds, 246 Ga. 746 ( 272 S.E.2d 702), is factually distinguishable with regard to the injuries and activities involved. Judgment affirmed. Birdsong and Sognier, JJ., concur.

QUILLIAN, Chief Judge. Division 2 of the opinion and the judgment of the court in this case, 154 Ga. App. 776 ( 269 S.E.2d 897), having been reversed by the Supreme Court on certiorari, 246 Ga. 746 ( 272 S.E.2d 702), Division 2 and the judgment are hereby vacated, the decision of the Supreme Court is adopted as Division 2 of our decision, and the judgment of the trial court is reversed. Judgment reversed. Shulman, P. J., and Carley, J., concur.