Consequently, the court concluded that Rupe's actions in leaving the travel lanes and crashing into Zaffer's rig were the proximate cause of plaintiffs' losses. In so deciding, the court relied upon Carney v. Goodman, 38 Tenn.App. 55, 270 S.W.2d 572, 576 (1954), which concluded that "the negligence of one in obstructing the highway by a standing vehicle was superseded by another's negligence in running into such vehicle, and that the latter's negligence was the proximate cause of the accident." See also Dunnivant v. Nafe, 206 Tenn. 458, 334 S.W.2d 717, 719 (1960).
Appellant Morgan's principal contention is bottomed on causation, i.e. that Morgan was not the proximate or legal cause of the injuries to appellee. In Carney v. Goodman, 38 Tenn. App. 55, 62, 270 S.W.2d 572, the court quoted with approval the following definition of proximate or legal cause set forth in the Restatement of Torts, § 431: "The actor's negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if (a) his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and (b) there is no rule of law relieving the actor from liability because of the manner in which his negligence has resulted in the harm."
The Tennessee Supreme Court has adopted special rules of proximate causation in cases involving stationary vehicles. See, e.g.,Carney v. Goodman , 38 Tenn.App. 55, 270 S.W.2d 572 (1954). In Carney , the Tennessee Supreme Court noted two lines of precedent dealing with standing vehicles.
Even if a jury found that Officer Dedman or Metro was somehow negligent, for the reasons stated in Kellner v. Budget Car and Truck Rental, Inc., 359 F.3d 399, 403-404 (6th Cir. 2004), any negligence of Dedman or Metro in training, instructing, requiring or carrying out the aid to a disabled motorist in this case was superseded by Defendant Fitzgerald's undeniable and unforeseeable negligence in running into Officer Dedman's patrol car, which was the proximate cause of this wreck. In Kellner, the court noted that, through Carney v. Goodman, 270 S.W.2d 572, 576 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1954), "Tennessee [has] adopted a special rule about proximate causation in standing vehicle cases." Kellner, 359 F.3d at 404 (citingCarney, 270 S.W.2d at 576).
Thus, no negligence claim can succeed unless the plaintiff can first prove that the defendant's conduct was the cause in fact of the plaintiff's loss. Lancaster v. Montesi, 216 Tenn. at 55, 390 S.W.2d at 220 (stating that "[i]f . . . defendant's conduct . . . was not a factor in causing plaintiff's damage, that ends the matter."); Drewry v. County of Obion, 619 S.W.2d 397, 398 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1981) (stating that "[p]roof of negligence without proof of causation is nothing."); Carney v. Goodman, 38 Tenn.App. 55, 61, 270 S.W.2d 572, 575 (1954). The inquiry is not a metaphysical one, but rather a common sense analysis of the facts that lay persons can undertake as competently as the most experienced judges.
If plaintiff had been driving an automobile in high gear on the wrong side of the road next to the curb instead of a bicycle, and had run into the defendant who was pulling from a stop sign after not having noticed plaintiff who was unexpectedly driving down the wrong side of the road, it seems to us that the evidence would clearly preponderate in favor of a finding that plaintiff was a proximate cause of his own injuries. In the much cited case, Carney v. Goodman (1954) 38 Tenn. App. (M.S.) 55, 270 S.W.2d 572, 575, the Court quoted Prosser on Torts as affording the best test for determining proximate cause as follows: The actor's negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if (a) his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and (b) there is no rule of law relieving the actor from liability because of the manner in which his negligence has resulted in the harm.
See Shouse v. Otis, 224 Tenn. 1, 448 S.W.2d 673 (1969); Winnebago Industries, Inc., supra; De Rossett v. Malone, 34 Tenn. App. 451, 239 S.W.2d 366 (1950). But Ford's exclusive reliance on the "but for" test overly simplifies the causation problem and ignores a further test developed or accepted by the Tennessee Courts as more suitable to determine causation issues where a chain of causation exists as here. This test was initially applied by the Tennessee Courts in Carney v. Goodman, 38 Tenn. App. 55, 270 S.W.2d 572 (1954): In every case the question of proximate cause, . . ., involves first an inquiry into the question of cause in fact. If the inquiry shows that defendant's conduct, in point of fact, was not a factor in causing plaintiff's damage, that ends the matter.
The Town of Alamo insists that it was for the jury to determine whether either or both defendants, Crisp and Patrick, were guilty of proximate negligence resulting in damage to the patrol car. One of the most recent decisions dealing with accidents caused by vehicles left standing in the highway is the case of Carney v. Goodman, 1954, 38 Tenn. App. 55, 270 S.W.2d 572, 575. In that case one defendant, Mrs. Della Stamper left her Plymouth automobile parked at an angle in the highway with its left rear about five feet and its left front about two feet on the paved part of the eastern half or northbound traffic lane. Two vehicles approached this parked Plymouth from the south — one driven by the defendant Goodman and the other driven by an employee of Ormes Roofing Company in which the plaintiff, Carney, was riding.
The question of proximate cause is always to be determined on the facts of each case. See Wooten v. United States, 574 F. Supp. 200 (W.D.Tenn. 1982), aff'd, 722 F.2d 743 (6th Cir. 1983); Ricker v. Zinser Textilmaschinen GmbH., 506 F. Supp. 3 (E.D.Tenn. 1978), aff'd, 633 F.2d 218 (6th Cir. 1980); Wyatt v. Winnebago Industries, 566 S.W.2d 276 (Tenn.App. 1977); Mullins v. Seaboard Coastline Railway, 517 S.W.2d 198 (Tenn.App. 1974); Carney v. Goodman, 38 Tenn. App. 55, 270 S.W.2d 572 (1954). On the basis of expert testimony (consisting of treating physicians, medical specialists, scientists, psychiatrists, clinical psychologists, engineers, hydrologists, and the plaintiffs themselves), numerous studies, and extensive literature, the district court concluded that Velsicol's chemicals and the duration of the plaintiffs' exposure to them were capable of causing the types of injuries alleged by the plaintiffs.
We therefore are faced with the question of whether Mrs. Hilliard sustained her burden of proving it to be more likely than not that Attorney General Williams' and T.B.I. Agent Clark's conduct was a substantial factor and a material element in bringing about her conviction and imprisonment. See Lancaster v. Montesi, 216 Tenn. 50, 390 S.W.2d 217 (1965); Carney v. Goodman, 38 Tenn. App. 55, 270 S.W.2d 572 (1954); W. Prosser, Torts 239-41 (4th ed. 1971). The District Court treated the question as one of law and answered it in the negative.