Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-2276-12T3
06-06-2014
DEBORAH CARNEY, Plaintiff, and BRIAN P. CARNEY, Plaintiff/Intervenor-Appellant, v. THOMAS P. CANNON, Defendant-Respondent.
Brian P. Carney, appellant pro se. Thomas P. Cannon, respondent pro se.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Kennedy and Guadagno.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Somerset County, Docket No. FD-18-0007-10.
Brian P. Carney, appellant pro se.
Thomas P. Cannon, respondent pro se. PER CURIAM
Appellant, Brian P. Carney, the adult son of plaintiff Deborah A. Carney, and defendant, Thomas P. Cannon, appeals from that portion of a Family Part order entered on December 11, 2012, denying plaintiff's third motion for reconsideration of a July 2007 order. Repetitive motions for reconsideration are not permitted under our court rules and, even granting the dubious proposition that appellant has standing to appeal, we affirm the Family Part's order of December 11, 2012, for substantially the same reasons expressed by the motion judge.
Although the notice of appeal indicates that appellant challenges the earlier motion orders as well, we note hereafter that any appeal from those earlier orders is untimely.
I.
Appellant is an adult and attended Fairleigh Dickinson University, graduating in December 2011. In a Family Part matter between plaintiff and defendant in July 2007, an order was entered which required defendant to be responsible for only a percentage of appellant's college debt, and reduced defendant's child support obligation.
On November 10, 2011, plaintiff filed a motion to vacate portions of the July 2007 order pertaining to "the yearly college expense debt imputed to" appellant and reducing defendant's child support obligation. On December 2, 2011, appellant filed a notice of motion for leave to intervene, and thereafter defendant filed a cross-motion seeking the emancipation of appellant, and requesting counsel fees.
On February 6, 2012, Judge Margaret Goodzeit entered an order allowing appellant to intervene, and granting defendant's motion to declare him emancipated. The order further denied plaintiff's motion to vacate the July 2007 order reducing defendant's child support obligation and establishing the yearly college expense debt imputed to appellant. The order was accompanied by a comprehensive statement of reasons establishing the basis for the court's decision. No appeal from this order was taken by plaintiff or by appellant.
Plaintiff subsequently moved to reconsider portions of the order of February 6, and on June 25, 2012, Judge Goodzeit denied that application. Again her order was accompanied by a thorough statement of reasons setting forth the basis for her decision.
Neither plaintiff nor appellant appealed any of Judge Goodzeit's orders, although on August 21, 2012, plaintiff filed another motion for reconsideration of the February 6 order, as well as for other relief. Again, Judge Goodzeit denied reconsideration, although she granted plaintiff some ancillary relief, the substance of which is not at issue here.
Plaintiff, undeterred, filed a motion for reconsideration of the judge's September order dismissing, in large measure, her prior motion for reconsideration. Judge Goodzeit denied plaintiff's motion on December 11, 2012, and, in her statement of reasons, explained, in part:
Plaintiff has filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court's September 4, 2012 Order. However, said Order, itself was the result of plaintiff's prior motion for reconsideration of the June 25, 2012 Order. Thus plaintiff seeks not a second, but a third bite at the proverbial apple. The Court will not condone such inappropriate use of the Court system. Finding the balance of plaintiff's unopposed application to be wholly without merit, the Court denies all requests, for the reasons set forth below.
. . . .
. . . Plaintiff's arguments are no different than they were before; she merely expands on them in an attempt to convince the Court it has been wrong twice. "Motion practice must come to an end at some point, and if repetitive bites at the apple are allowed, the court will swiftly sour." D'Atria v. D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 401 (Ch. Div. 1990)[.]
. . . .
As set forth in Capital Fin. Co. v. Asterbadi, 398 N.J. Super. 299, 310 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 195 N.J. 521 (2008) (citations omitted):
Reconsideration is a matter to be exercised in the trial court's sound discretion. "A litigant should not seek reconsideration merely because of dissatisfaction with a decision of the [c]ourt." . . . "Reconsideration should be utilized only for those cases
. . . that fall within that narrow corridor in which 1) the [c]ourt has expressed its decision based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or 2) it is obvious that the [c]ourt either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence."The foregoing instruction from the Appellate Division makes clear that plaintiff has failed to fulfill the criteria which support a motion for reconsideration.
Reconsideration cannot be used to expand the record and reargue a motion. Reconsideration is only to point out "the matters or controlling decisions which counsel believes the court has overlooked or as to which it has erred." A motion for reconsideration is designed to seek review of an order based on the evidence before the court on the initial motion, not to serve as a vehicle to introduced new evidence in order to cure an inadequacy in the motion record.
II.
Appellant appeals from the denial of plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of the denial of a prior motion for reconsideration. No such relief is provided for in our rules. See R. 4:49-2; D'Atria, supra, 242 N.J. Super. at 401. Filing another motion to reconsider the denial of reconsideration does not resurrect that order, and a party cannot indefinitely extend the period for appeal by filing serial motions for reconsideration.
We have no need to address appellant's standing to appeal from orders he was not party to, given our disposition of this case.
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Appellant's appeal of the February 6, June 25, and September 4, 2012 orders denying plaintiff's motions for reconsideration is untimely. Appeals from final judgments must be taken within forty-five days of their entry. R. 2:4-1(a); Lombardi v. Masso, 207 N.J. 517, 540 (2011). Appellant filed his notice of appeal on January 25, 2013, and, therefore, we have limited our review to the provisions of the December 11, 2012 order denying reconsideration.
As noted earlier, we affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by Judge Goodzeit in her comprehensive and well-reasoned opinion. We add only that not only are successive motions for reconsideration violative of our rules, but, as here, are procedurally improper, as well. See, e.g., Rule 4:49-2 requiring motions for reconsideration to be served within twenty days after service of a final order or judgment, a period that cannot be relaxed; Baumann v. Marinaro, 95 N.J. 380 (1984).
Beyond this, a motion for reconsideration is addressed to the sound discretion of the motion court. Capital Fin. Co. of Del. Valley, Inc., supra, 398 N.J. Super. at 310 (citing Johnson v. Cyklop Strapping Corp., 220 N.J. Super. 250, 257 (App. Div. 1987), certif. denied, 110 N.J. 196 (1988)). "Reconsideration should be utilized only for those cases [that] fall into that narrow corridor in which either 1) the [c]ourt has expressed its decision based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or 2) it is obvious that the [c]ourt either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence." Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 384 (App. Div. 1996) (quoting D'Atria, supra, 242 N.J. Super. at 401); see also Fusco v. Newark Bd. of Educ, 349 N.J. Super. 455, 462 (App. Div. 2002). Trial courts should grant motions for reconsideration "only under very narrow circumstances." Ibid.
Employing this standard, we determine that the motion to reconsider brought in this matter was nothing other than a rehash of the same arguments patiently and properly denied by Judge Goodzeit on numerous occasions. Consequently, the appeal from that order is utterly meritless.
The remainder of appellant's arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPEALATE DIVISION