These observations established a violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-8-23(d). See Carnes v. State, 293 Ga. App. 549, 550, 667 S.E.2d 620, 621 (2008) ("'There was probable cause for the initial stop, based on the officer's observance of a traffic violation, the nonfunctioning tag light.'") (citations omitted); and see United States v. Cubillos, 2012 WL 1636175, at *3 (N.D. Ga. March 20, 2012), adopted by 1:10-CR86-RWS, Doc. 721 (N.D. Ga. May 8, 2012) (based on the officer's testimony that there was no tag light on the vehicle as required by law, he "had probable cause upon which to stop the [vehicle] for this perceived violation of Georgia law").
Requesting and obtaining Sommese's consent to the search of her vehicle prior to fulfilling the initial purpose of the traffic stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment. See Blitch v. State, 281 Ga. 125, 125-126 (1) ( 636 SE2d 545) (2006); Salmeron, 280 Ga. at 736 (1); Carnes v. State, 293 Ga. App. 549, 551 ( 667 SE2d 620) (2008). For these combined reasons, the trial court correctly found that Sommese's detention by the officer was not unreasonably prolonged beyond the time necessary to fulfill the initial purpose of the traffic stop.
The officer's inability to obtain a return when he normally did, the difference in age between Matthews and the teenager, the late hour, the teenager's inconsistent answers about her age and identity, her appearance and demeanor, her underage consumption of alcohol, and the conflicting information about Matthews's status as her uncle, all provided the officer with reasonable, articulable suspicion to continue his detention of Matthews. See Andrews v. State, 289 Ga. App. 679, 682-683 ( 658 SE2d 126) (2008) (conflicting stories during traffic stop provided reasonable suspicion to prolong traffic stop); Carnes v. State, 293 Ga. App. 549 ( 667 SE2d 620) (2008) (articulable suspicion developed during course of traffic stop to expand the scope of inquiry). (c) Matthews asserts that our opinions in State v. Joyner, 270 Ga. App. 533 ( 607 SE2d 184) (2004) and State v. Swords, 258 Ga. App. 895 ( 575 SE2d 751) (2002) require a different result.
The officers' testimony—which was found credible by the district court—established that Defendant committed a traffic violation under § 40-8-23(d) because his tag was not being illuminated, regardless of how far away the officers were when they observed the violation. See Carnes v. State, 667 S.E.2d 620, 621 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) ("There was probable cause for the initial stop, based on the officer's observance of a traffic violation, the nonfunctioning tag light." (quotations omitted)).
As this court has held, See generally Carnes v. State , 293 Ga.App. 549, 550, 667 S.E.2d 620 (2008) (holding that the initial traffic stop was justified by probable cause, where the officer observed a traffic violation—“regardless of the officer's subjective intent”); Navicky v. State , 245 Ga.App. 284, 285, 537 S.E.2d 740 (2000) (“When an officer sees a traffic offense occur, a resulting traffic stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment even if the officer has ulterior motives in initiating the stop.”) (punctuation and footnote omitted).