[¶ 7] Courts exercise limited review in appeals from an administrative agency under the Administrative Agencies Practice Act, N.D.C.C. ch. 28–32. Carlson v. Workforce Safety & Ins., 2009 ND 87, ¶ 10, 765 N.W.2d 691. In an appeal from a district court's review of an agency's decision, this Court reviews the agency's decision.
CROTHERS, Justice.[¶ 1] Merwin Carlson appeals from a judgment affirming a Workforce Safety and Insurance (“WSI”) decision denying his claim for workers' compensation benefits after remand in Carlson v. Workforce Safety & Ins., 2009 ND 87, 765 N.W.2d 691 (“Carlson I ”). Under Carlson I and the law of the case, we hold an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) erred in concluding WSI properly exercised its continuing jurisdiction under N.D.C.C. § 65–05–04 to deny Carlson benefits on remand. We reverse and remand for WSI to award Carlson benefits based on the ALJ's calculation that Carlson's average weekly wage was $722.
Carlson v. Roetzel & Andress, 2008 WL 873647 *16 (D.N.D., March 27, 2008), aff'd on other grounds552 F.3d 648 (8th Cir.2008). [¶ 4] In Carlson v. Workforce Safety & Ins., 2009 ND 87, ¶¶ 34–35, 765 N.W.2d 691 (“ Carlson I ”), this Court held that because GMR's nonresident attorneys failed to timely comply with pro hac vice admission requirements, GMR's reconsideration request by its non-attorney agents was void, and therefore WSI's October 3, 2006, notice of decision awarding Carlson benefits could not be reheard or appealed. We remanded “for further proceedings for calculation of Carlson's average weekly wage,” an issue WSI had not addressed because it determined Carlson was an independent contractor.
But Carlson I holds that a request for reconsideration filed by a nonresident attorney on acompany's behalf is void, which resulted in WSI's initial decision becoming final and nonappealable. 2009 ND 87, ¶¶ 34-35, 765 N.W.2d 691. Carlson II holds that an administrative agency must follow this Court's instructions on remand. 2012 ND 203, ¶ 19, 821 N.W.2d 760. This Court has never ruled on the underlying issue of Merwin Carlson's employee status.
Oden has essentially sought in this action to collaterally attack WSI's final decision requiring him to reimburse WSI for the benefits. [¶40] To the extent Oden contends his Missouri counsel requested reconsideration of WSI's March 2016 notice of decision, our decision in Carlson v. Workforce Safety & Ins. , 2009 ND 87, ¶¶ 34-36, 765 N.W.2d 691, is dispositive. In Carlson , this Court held that because nonresident attorneys had failed to timely comply with the requirements for pro hac vice admission, their corporate client's request for reconsideration by its non-attorney agents was void.
” “When we interpret court rules, we apply canons of statutory construction and look at the language of the rule first to determine the meaning.” Carlson v. Workforce Safety & Ins., 2009 ND 87, ¶ 22, 765 N.W.2d 691. We construe words to give them their “plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning.”
McKenzie could not have represented Jassek when he requested binding dispute resolution because McKenzie was not a licensed North Dakota lawyer. As a nonlawyer, McKenzie had no authority to represent Jassek before WSI. See Carlson v. Workforce Safety & Ins., 2009 ND 87, ¶ 34, 765 N.W.2d 691 (attempted WSI appeal by out-of-state lawyer for corporation was void); see also Wetzel v. Schlenvogt, 2005 ND 190, ¶ 11, 705 N.W.2d 836 (“Just as one unlicensed natural person may not act as an attorney for another natural person in his or her cause, an unlicensed natural person cannot attorn for an artificial person, such as a corporation.”). Therefore, because the binding dispute resolution proceeding unquestionably was “requested by a medical provider,” judicial review of WSI's decision is prohibited under N.D.C.C. § 65–02–20, and any decision on the merits of the case is improper.
(c) the file be sealed 61 days after expiration or termination of probation. [¶ 8] The interpretation of a court rule, like the interpretation of a statute, is a question of law. Carlson v. Workforce Safety Ins., 2009 ND 87, ¶ 22, 765 N.W.2d 691. When we interpret a rule or a statute, we apply the rules of statutory construction and look at the language of the rule or statute to determine its meaning.
7th Cir 2011, Posner, J.] ["[H]aving obtained counsel, [the corporation] could resurrect the litigation by amending its petition . . . with relation back to the date of the original filing."]; H & H Dev., LLC v Ramlow, 364 Mont 283, 289-290, 272 P3d 657, 662-663 [2012] [A court has discretion to cure a corporate pro se complaint and should "not declare an otherwise valid complaint void for technical reasons."]; Save Our Creeks v City of Brooklyn Park, 699 NW2d 307, 310 [Minn 2005] ["[A] complaint signed and filed by a nonattorney on behalf of a corporate entity is not a legal nullity."]; Boydston v Strole Dev. Co., 193 Ariz 47, 50 [1998] ["A corporation cannot appear without a lawyer, but . . . a reasonable opportunity should be given to cure the problem."]; Hawkeye Bank & Trust, N.A. v. Baugh, 463 NW2d 22, 26 [Iowa 1990] [The trial court abused its discretion by rejecting a motion for continuance by a nonattorney representative of a corporation who wished to secure counsel.]; but see Carlson v Workforce Safety & Ins., 2009 ND 87, ¶26, 765 NW2d 691, 702 [2009] ["The proper remedy when a corporation is represented by a non-attorney agent is to dismiss the action and strike as void all legal documents signed and filed by the non-attorney."]; cf. Torrey v Leesburg Reg'l Med. Ctr., 769 So2d 1040, 1045 [Fla 2000] [A complaint filed and signed by an unlicensed attorney was an amendable defect, rather than a nullity.]).
To resolve this dispute, we must “interpret each part or section of [the rules] with every other part or section, so as to create a harmonious whole.” Pebble Ltd. P'ship ex rel. Pebble Mines Corp. v. Parnell, 215 P.3d 1064, 1076 (Alaska 2009) (quoting State, Dep't of Commerce, Cmty., & Econ. Dev., Div. of Ins. v. Progressive Casualty Ins. Co., 165 P.3d 624, 629 (Alaska 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also People v. Santiago, 236 Ill.2d 417, 339 Ill.Dec. 1, 925 N.E.2d 1122, 1129–30 (2010) (construing a Rule of Professional Conduct in the context of the Rules as a whole “in order to make them harmonious and consistent.”); Carlson v. Workforce Safety & Ins., 765 N.W.2d 691, 700–01 (N.D.2009) (stating that “canons of statutory construction” apply to the interpretation of the Professional Conduct Rules and that “[r]ules are construed as a whole, giving meaning to each word and phrase, if possible”); LK Operating, LLC v. Collection Grp., LLC, 181 Wash.2d 48, 331 P.3d 1147, 1158 (2014) (en banc) (“When interpreting the meaning of any [Professional Conduct Rule], we apply settled principles of statutory construction. Our goal is to give effect to the intent behind the rule, which we discern, where possible, from the plain language of the rule at issue in the context of the [Professional Conduct Rule] as a whole.