Opinion
No. 5-892 / 05-0335
Filed December 21, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Douglas S. Russell, Judge.
Dawn Carlson-Frees appeals from the district court's order denying her motion for new trial. AFFIRMED.
Corinne R. Butkowski and Jason M. Craig of Lynch Dallas, P.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellee.
Barbara J. Diment of Diment Law Office, West Des Moines, for appellant.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Vogel and Eisenhauer, JJ.
Dawn Carlson-Frees appeals after an adverse jury verdict in her negligence claim against the defendants. She claims the district court erred in denying her motion for new trial. She contends a new trial is warranted because the jury's verdict was not supported by sufficient evidence. She further contends the court erred in overruling her motion for mistrial and in failing to give a curative instruction on the law of subrogation. She also contends the court's instructions on insurance were conflicting and not supported by the parties' stipulation. Finally, she contends the court erred in admitting one of the defendant's exhibits.
Dawn Carlson-Frees was involved in a vehicle collision on April 20, 2002. Julie Hippler admitted negligence in the crash, but denied her negligence was the proximate cause Carlson-Frees's damages. Following trial, a jury returned a verdict finding Hippler negligent, but not the proximate cause of the injuries alleged by Carlson-Frees. Carlson-Frees filed a motion for new trial, which the district court denied.
The standard of review of a denial of a motion for new trial depends on the grounds for new trial asserted in the motion and ruled upon by the court. Vaughn v. Must, Inc., 542 N.W.2d 533, 542 (Iowa 1996). If the motion and ruling are based on a discretionary ground, the trial court's decision is reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion. Id. In ruling on motions for new trial, the court has broad but not unlimited discretion to determine if the verdict effectuates substantial justice among the parties. Id.
We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Carlson-Frees's motion for new trial on the grounds the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict. Carlson-Frees sought damages for injuries to her left shoulder, back, neck, and hand. The evidence shows Carlson-Frees suffered neck and shoulder injuries in vehicle collisions in 1997 and 1998. She further reported neck and shoulder pain as a result of a domestic abuse incident and from performing physical labor. She received treatment for this pain as late as June 11, 2001. Given the multiple causes for Carlson-Frees's injuries and damages, it was the jury's function to sift through the evidence and determine whether the accident with Hippler was a substantial factor in bringing about Carlson-Frees's damages. See Baker v. City of Ottumwa, 560 N.W.2d 578, 584 (Iowa 1997) (holding the jury may accept or reject evidence as it sees fit). Sufficient evidence supported the jury's finding that Hippler's negligence was not the proximate cause of Carlson-Frees's damages. Therefore the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Calrson-Frees's motion for new trial on this ground.
Carlson-Frees next contends the court erred in denying her motion for mistrial and for new trial on the grounds that she was prejudiced from an alleged misstatement of the law of subrogation. During cross-examination, defense counsel asked if Carlson-Frees understood she was not required to reimburse her health insurance company for any payments made to her if she did not received an award in the lawsuit. Carlson-Frees argues the court failed to properly cure this statement with a jury instruction. We disagree. The court instructed the jury as follows:
Insurance coverage is not an issue in the trial. The fact certain of Plaintiff's medical expenses were paid by Blue Cross/Blue Shield and may have to be paid back by the plaintiff is not an issue in the trial and shall not be considered in your deliberations.
A jury is presumed to follow the court's instructions. Schwennen v. Abell, 471 N.W.2d 880, 887 (Iowa 1991). The court did not abuse its discretion in denying Carlson-Frees's motions for mistrial and new trial on this ground.
Carlson-Frees next contends the court's instructions on insurance were conflicting and confusing. However, she failed to object to either of the instructions of which she now complains. Accordingly, error has not been preserved and we will not consider this issue on appeal. Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002).
Finally, Carlson-Frees contends the court abused its discretion in admitting into evidence a letter from physician's assistant Scott Frisbie to her former counsel because it was inadmissible as hearsay. Assuming without deciding that error was preserved on this issue and that the evidence was inadmissible, we conclude Carlson-Frees was not prejudiced by it. The portion of the letter Carlson-Frees objects to reads as follows:
Making a determination of the exact etiology of these complaints within a reasonable degree of medical certainty was and is confounded by the [sic] Mrs. Carlson-Frees' past medical history documented in my initial note as well as previously in our medical records. This history includes 1) the reports of a neck injury due to past domestic abuse and a previous motor vehicle accident, 2) an office visit to our clinic on June 11, 2001 for evaluation of 2 months of left side neck and upper back pain, and 3) the radiology report from Mrs. Carlson-Frees' . . . visit following the April 20, 2002 motor vehicle accident indicating significant degenerative changes without acute fractures. Based on this history, it would be reasonably surmised that there was an aggravation of old areas of injury, but I cannot rule out new soft tissue injuries based on my review of past history, physical exam, and radiographic studies.
The letter simply recounts Carlson-Frees past medical history, which is cumulative evidence. Frisbie also states it would be difficult to determine the exact source of Carlson-Frees's injuries, an issue known to the jury as it was the primary issue at trial. Finally, Frisbie states he did not have enough information to determine if Carlson-Frees's damages were aggravations of old injuries or new injuries. Frisbie so testified at trial, stating he would defer on the issue of causation to the specialists to whom he referred Carlson-Frees. The court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for new trial on the basis of the admittance of this evidence.