This enumeration fails. 277 Ga. 99, 586 S.E.2d 240 (2003). Id. at 100, 586 S.E.2d 240.
Coker v. State, 181 Ga. App. 559, 560 ( 353 SE2d 56) (1987); Ciprotti v. State, 187 Ga. App. 61, 63 ( 369 SE2d 337) (1988); Bond v. State, 212 Ga. App. 608, 609-610 ( 442 SE2d 482) (1994); Day v. State, 216 Ga. App. 29, 30 ( 453 SE2d 73) (1994).Carlisle v. State, 277 Ga. 99, 101 ( 586 SE2d 240) (2003). See OCGA § 17-3-1 (d) (statute of limitation on misdemeanors is two years).
This enumeration fails. 277 Ga. 99 (586 SE2d 240) (2003). Id. at 100.
MIKELL, Judge. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case and, in Carlisle v. State, 277 Ga. 99 ( 586 SE2d 240) (2003), reversed the judgment of this Court. Therefore, we vacate our earlier opinion and adopt the judgment of the Supreme Court as our own.
“After that time, the prosecution cannot be recommenced, absent a statutory ground for the suspension of the statute of limitation.” Carlisle v. State, 277 Ga. 99, 101, 586 S.E.2d 240 (2003).As discussed previously, Outen was charged with felony vehicular homicide based on events that occurred on March 21, 2007.
“[A]fter a nolle prosequi, the State may reindict a defendant for the crimes at issue ‘within the applicable statute of limitation, or within six months after the entry of the nolle pros if that occurs later.’ [Carlisle v. State, 277 Ga. 99, 101, 586 S.E.2d 240 (2003)].” Davis v. Wilson, 280 Ga. 29, 622 S.E.2d 325 (2005).
Under Georgia law, if the State obtains an indictment within the time allowed, and a nolle prosequi is later entered as to the first indictment, the State may re-indict the defendant within six months after the entry of nolle prosequi, regardless of the intervening expiration of the initial limitation period. Carlisle v. State, 277 Ga. 99, 100–101, 586 S.E.2d 240 (2003); Sallie v. State, 276 Ga. 506, 513–514(12), 578 S.E.2d 444 (2003). Because the State re-indicted Hicks within six months of the entry of the nolle prosequi, the trial court did not err in denying his plea in bar.