Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. AD020569.
Mihara, J.
Appellant Carla M. brought a fraud action against respondents Susan E. and D.P. in which she sought to rescind respondents’ adoption of P.P. and to reestablish appellant’s parental rights. Following appellant’s presentation of her case, the trial court granted respondents’ motion for judgment (Code Civ. Proc., § 631.8). On appeal, appellant contends: (1) the trial court was biased against open adoptions; (2) the trial court “misstated and misapplied the applicable law”; and (3) there was insufficient evidence to support the judgment. We find no error and affirm the judgment.
I. Statement of the Case
In February 2007, appellant filed a first amended complaint to establish parental rights and set aside the adoption due to fraud. The complaint alleged: respondents promised to file the “Independent Adoption Center Preliminary Open Adoption Agreement” (Preliminary Agreement); they did not file this document; they represented to the court that the adoption was not an open adoption; and appellant would not have surrendered her parental rights if she had known that the Preliminary Agreement would not be filed. The complaint also alleged that respondents made numerous statements to appellant that the adoption would be open and she relied on respondents’ false statements in relinquishing her parental rights.
Charlie M., P.’s birth father and appellant’s former husband, is not a party to this action.
The first amended complaint also included a cause of action for constructive fraud. However, this cause of action was withdrawn by appellant prior to trial.
A court trial was held between March 22 and 30, 2010. Following presentation of appellant’s case, the trial court granted respondents’ motion for judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 631.8. The trial court found that appellant failed to establish fraudulent inducement for the relinquishment of her parental rights. Appellant brought a motion to vacate the judgment or, in the alternative, for a new trial, which was denied. Appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal.
II. Statement of Facts
The Independent Adoption Center (IAC), a private placement agency, facilitated adoptions between birth parents and adoptive parents. The IAC had no requirements regarding the level of contact between birth parents and adoptive parents following the adoption, and contact depended on the relationship between them. Respondents wanted an open adoption, which would involve their adopted child knowing his or her birth parents and having some contact with them.
Respondents contacted the IAC, and posted a prospective adoptive parent profile. This profile stated in part: “We admire your courage and love in considering open adoption. If you choose to do this, you will... become part of our lives forever.” On September 29, 2003, appellant contacted respondents. Appellant, Charlie, and respondents participated in a conference call that evening to discuss the possibility of adoption. During this call, respondents stated that they wanted an open adoption. Respondents decided to meet appellant and Charlie the following weekend at their home in Utah. At the end of this visit, appellant and Charlie told respondents that they wanted to place their child with them.
Between October and November 2003, the two families were in contact “[e]very day, every few days.” In November 2003, appellant, Charlie, and their daughter A. came to respondents’ home in California, and the parties began to develop a friendship. D. anticipated that there would be ongoing contact after the adoption.
When Pam Steele, an open adoption counselor at the IAC, told Susan that respondents would be required to file an ADOPT-310 form with the court when the adoption was finalized, Susan informed her that they did not want to sign any document that was legally enforceable. Susan told Steele that if the IAC required that they sign this document, they were not interested in going through with the adoption. Respondents had learned that the ADOPT-310 form caused problems for some adoptive parents because the birth parents did not have obligations under the agreement. Respondents were also concerned that it would infringe on their parenting choices because, as Susan explained, they “were reluctant to make a legal commitment with birth parents [that they] did not know well and did not know how they would behave during visits nor make an agreement which didn’t take into account how the child might react.” After speaking with the IAC director, Steele informed respondents that they would not be required to file the ADOPT-310 form if they completed and signed the Preliminary Agreement.
Family Code section 8616.5 provides that the court may grant post-adoption privileges pursuant to an agreement between the parties. (See generally Fam. Code §§ 8616.5, subds. (a), (c), 8714, subd. (c).) A mandatory Judicial Council form entitled Contact After Adoption Agreement is submitted under these circumstances. (See Judicial Council Forms, form ADOPT-310; see also Fam. Code, § 8714, subd. (c).)
On November 16, 2003, the respondents, appellant, and Charlie met with Steele. Steele stated that the purpose of the meeting was to “stimulate some dialogue about what [their] relationship might be in the years to come and to get [them] to talk about [their] expectations....” The introduction to this Preliminary Agreement states: “We all understand that: [¶] This is not a legally binding document, except in California where it is legally binding when filed with the court, along with the Contact After Adoption Agreement Form, at the time of the finalization of the adoption.” (Italics omitted.) The introduction also states that the document “is designed to explore the possibilities of open adoption and encourage cooperation[, ]” that the document represents “an informal understanding” between the birth parents and adoptive parents, and that the parties’ “needs are subject to change and therefore [the] document may need updating from time to time.” The end of the document states: “UNDERSTANDING – CALIFORNIA ONLY: We understand we can make informal changes in these plans when we all agree (for example, to increase communications) but that this Agreement cannot be changed to decrease visitation, contact, and information sharing except in writing, signed by all parties, and preferably filed with the court. [¶]... [¶] This Agreement will be effective when all parties have signed below. This Agreement become legally binding after a ruling of the court at the time the adoption is finalized.”
Prior to signing the Preliminary Agreement, the parties left most of the document blank, but they completed the section entitled “Contact, Communication, and Visits.” (Caps omitted.) This section states that “[i]t is also important to note that specific requests by the birth parent(s) and adopting parent(s) for contact beyond the first birthday are generally hard to predict at this time.” (Italics omitted.) The section provides that the adoptive parents shall send photographs twice a year (after the first year) upon request, that both the birth parents and the adoptive parents may initiate telephone contact, and that the parties will facilitate a minimum of one annual visit between the birth parents and the child. As they were signing the Preliminary Agreement, Steele stated that the signing of the document did not make it legally enforceable. Respondents did not tell appellant or Charlie that they would file the Preliminary Agreement with the court, and appellant never asked them to do so. Respondents did not know if Steele had communicated to appellant on this issue.
The parties continued to communicate frequently by telephone and e-mail. They developed a friendly relationship and participated in a television show on adoption for the Discovery Health Channel. The filming began two weeks before P. was born, and reflected the close relationship between the parties. During the filming, D. anticipated regular contact and visits with appellant after the adoption.
P. was born in January 2004. Between January through September 2004, the relationship between the parties was “fine, ” though some issues had developed. Respondents told appellant that they wanted the letters and telephone calls from her mother to stop, and they did. By the time respondents decided to tell appellant to stop sending breast milk, she had already come to the same decision. The larger issue, however, was Susan’s feeling that “[her] own needs were taking a back seat” because appellant was “very intrusive and pushing, ” and there was a “very strong need on [appellant’s] part to be tied very closely to” her. Susan believed that appellant was sending an unusual number of e-mails and she discussed the issue with Steele, who told her that the number of e-mails would decrease over time. When Susan tried to talk to appellant, she felt that appellant wasn’t “really hearing [her] or being sensitive to [her] concerns.” Though they did not inform appellant, respondents believed that appellant was not “moving on” and sending too many e-mails.
On September 15, 2004, the adoption was finalized. Respondents did not file either the ADOPT-310 form or the Preliminary Agreement with the court. Six days later, Susan sent an e-mail to appellant and requested that she stop sending parenting-related e mails. Appellant responded by asking if she could “up [her] standard for sending things but still occasionally send [her] an article that seems really important?” Appellant also explained in this e-mail that if she did not send these e-mails she would “agonize over what might happen if [Susan didn’t] have the information.” Susan was angry with appellant and again asked her not to send the parenting-related e-mails. In D.’s view, appellant saw respondents as close relatives and respondents were not comfortable with this relationship. According to D., appellant not only provided information, but she also advocated a certain course of action.
Between October 15 and 17, 2004, appellant, her friend, and A. visited respondents and P. at their home. During this visit, Susan and appellant met with Steele. They decided that appellant and Charlie would only have contact with D. for the foreseeable future. However, Susan remained uncomfortable with this contact because she felt that appellant “still wanted to have some part of a mothering role.” D. suggested to appellant that she give Susan “time and space” and told her that P. would see appellant throughout her life. At that time, he believed contact between the families would eventually improve.
Unfortunately, the circumstances in respondents’ household deteriorated. When appellant and Charlie contacted D., it continued to cause distress to Susan. On January 31, 2005, appellant e-mailed D. and informed him that she and Charlie were moving to Massachusetts. Respondents then e-mailed appellant and Charlie, requested their address and telephone number, informed them that they did not want to communicate with them for the next several months, and stated that they would contact them shortly before their next visit.
In April 2005, appellant contacted D. about a marriage book that she was making. After Charlie called respondents in May 2005, Susan left him a voicemail in which she repeated that they had asked him and appellant not to call them. She also stated that they were looking forward to visiting them with P. in late summer or early fall.
On July 8, 2005, Steele and Susan had a “very heated discussion” regarding contact between the families. After Steele pressured Susan to contact appellant more often, Susan told her that they were complying with the Preliminary Agreement. During the call, Steele also asked Susan whether she “was willing to go to court.”
Respondents continued to comply with their obligations under the Preliminary Agreement. They brought P. to visit appellant and Charlie in Massachusetts in 2005. After appellant and Charlie were divorced, respondents developed a closer relationship with him. Charlie had three one-day visits with P. in 2009.
III. Discussion
A. Judicial Misconduct
Appellant first contends that the trial court’s decision was “biased by an [sic] personal and extra-judicial opposition to high-contact open adoptions.”
Litigants have due process rights to an impartial judge under both the state and federal Constitutions. (People v. Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 401, 455.) These rights extend not only to criminal defendants but also to civil litigants. (See People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188, 1206.) Bias may be shown where “a judge reveals preconceived ideas based on stereotypes.” (Hall v. Harker (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 836, 843 (Hall), disapproved on another ground in Casa Herrera, Inc. v. Beydoun (2004) 32 Cal.4th 336, 349.) However, it is the trial court’s “duty to consider and pass upon the evidence produced before him, and when the evidence is in conflict, to resolve that conflict in favor of the party whose evidence outweighs that of the opposing party. The opinion thus formed, being the result of a judicial hearing, does not amount to [improper] bias and prejudice....” (Kreling v. Superior Court (1944) 25 Cal.2d 305, 312.) “A judge’s impartiality is evaluated by an objective, rather than subjective, standard.” (Hall, at p. 841.) At issue is whether a reasonable person “ ‘ “ ‘would entertain doubts concerning the judge’s impartiality.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.) An appellate court reviews the record to determine whether the appellant was deprived of “ ‘a fair, as opposed to a perfect, trial.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 78.)
To support her claim of judicial bias, appellant relies on the following statements by the trial court: (1) “I don’t know that it would be particularly healthy for an adopted child to have weekly or monthly contact with the birth mother. It seems to me that you have got a bond with that baby, and it would be confusing for there to be excessive contact”; and (2) “[i]t certainly can be questioned whether it is healthy for an adopted child to have weekly or monthly contact with a birth mother. The child must have an opportunity to bond with her adoptive parents.” Appellant argues that there was no evidence regarding “risks for adopted children from maintaining regular contact with biological parents” and any such evidence would have been irrelevant to the fraud issue. She further claims that the trial court’s “use of this belief to justify its decision indicates that the Court ruled against [appellant] based inappropriately on a personal belief that the adoption as discussed and planned by the parties would not have been healthy for P[.]”
First, appellant has taken the trial court’s statements out of context. Noting that open adoptions involve a wide variety of circumstances, the trial court stated that it credited Susan’s testimony on the issue. Susan testified that an open adoption involved “having no secrets with the child that you’re raising, ” providing them with information about their heritage, and maintaining “some contact [with the birth parents] in the event the child wants to meet them.” She also testified that appellant’s conduct was “very intrusive” and “unhealthy, ” noting that appellant “still wanted to have some part of a mothering role, ” thereby interfering with Susan’s role in the adoptive family. Thus, the trial court’s statements were based on inferences that it could draw from the testimony. Second, this evidence was relevant to the fraud issue. Susan was explaining that the decreased contact between the parties was not due to fraud by respondents, but was the result of appellant’s conduct.
Appellant also focuses on other comments by the trial court. In explaining its decision, the trial court stated: “I’ll give you one example, Exhibit 20. It’s a letter you wrote, oh, maybe 6 weeks after the baby was born.... And getting into the details of, oh, you are doing a good job. We have got to think about breastfeeding, think about lactating. All of this stuff I thought it was really intense. [¶] And I’m just a dad and a granddad. But it’s one of those things, when I looked at it, I thought that just doesn’t feel right. So I can understand Susan’s position resonates with me that there was some reason to be emotionally concerned about what your expectations were as a birth mother.” Appellant claims that the trial court’s “comments indicate that, due to its personal beliefs, the Court supported the limits on contact instituted by [respondents] starting shortly after finalization, and did not fairly consider whether those limits (and [respondents’] ability to completely eliminate contact) did, in fact, substantiate [appellant’s] claim of fraud....” We disagree. The trial court was explaining that appellant’s letter supported respondents’ testimony that appellant was having difficulty in relinquishing her role in P.’s life.
Appellant next argues that there was no evidence to support the trial court’s comment that “the point of open adoption is that the child knows where he or she came from.” Appellant is wrong. Susan testified that open adoption involved “telling [children] the truth about their heritage and where they come from.”
Appellant further contends that the trial court appeared to have decided to rule against her prior to her questioning of Susan.
After appellant concluded her examination of D., the trial court asked respondents’ counsel: “Okay, Mr. Somit, do you want to question your client at this time or defer that to your case in chief, if you have to bring one?” At this point in the trial, the court had read the parties’ trial briefs, heard extensive and repetitive testimony from Steele, D., and appellant, reviewed numerous exhibits, and the only remaining witness was Susan. Given that much of the preceding testimony and exhibits included what Susan said, felt, and did, the trial court could have had reasonably anticipated that the testimony of the witness most hostile to appellant would not have established the elements of fraud for which proof was still lacking. The trial court then allowed appellant to call Susan. Under these circumstances, appellant has failed to establish that the trial court’s question was evidence of bias against her.
Appellant also asserts that the trial court’s granting of respondent’s motion in limine to exclude her expert witness demonstrated its “personal bias against high-contact open adoption.”
Appellant offered into evidence a note written by D. This note, which was not sent to anyone, stated respondents “perception” that appellant was “not happy with [the] current relationship, ” the details of the “[c]ontact plan – [a]lternating yearly visits, photos twice, and calls to plan visits... and emails concerning major life events, ” and the “[r]easons for this arrangement - [¶] reaction to past attempts at giving parenting advice; [¶] not comfortable with role as consultant[;] [¶] had not achieve a balanced relationship.” The note is dated July 12, 2005. Respondents’ motion in limine sought to exclude the testimony of Erich Speckin, who would testify that this note was written within the last three years. Respondents’ position was that the note was written in 2005. In their motion, respondents stated that the parties had stipulated that there would be no expert witnesses at trial, and they argued that “given the nature of the case, and the questionable nature of the science potentially relied upon by [appellant’s] previously disclosed expert, any expert testimony... would cause more delay and cost, use of court and attorney time, etc., than its probative value would justify.” Appellant disputed that there had been any stipulation regarding expert witnesses, and she argued that respondents had falsified evidence. The trial court granted the motion to prohibit expert testimony.
In our view, the trial court’s ruling does not demonstrate a bias against “high contact open adoption.” The trial court made no statements relating to open adoption when it made its ruling. Thus, there is simply no basis on which to infer that the trial court had any bias.
We also note that appellant has not contended that the trial court erred in granting the motion and, even if she had, this contention would be without merit. Evidence Code section 352 provides in relevant part that “[t]he court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will... necessitate undue consumption of time....” This court reviews the exclusion of such evidence under the abuse of discretion standard. (People v. Hamilton (2009) 45 Cal.4th 863, 930.) Appellant argues that the back-dating of the note was relevant to the issue of respondents’ credibility. However, respondents testified regarding their reasons for limiting contact following the finalization of the adoption, and they would have gained little by introducing a note to support those reasons. Even if this evidence had some marginal relevance as to their credibility, it was clearly outweighed by the undue consumption of time. Had appellant’s expert been allowed to testify, respondents would have needed a continuance to conduct a deposition and an opportunity to present their own expert testimony regarding when the note was written. Thus, assuming that appellant had challenged the trial court’s ruling, she would have been unable to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion.
Appellant next claims that the trial court’s statements that “it did not consider it relevant to a fraud determination whether [respondents] had fabricated a handwritten note documenting a phone call between the parties” demonstrated bias against open adoption. Appellant has not accurately summarized the trial court’s statements.
At trial, D. testified that he wrote the note prior to calling appellant in July 2005. He was “absolutely certain” that the contents of the note were written in 2005 because he wrote the note prior to calling appellant after her daughter, E., was born, which would have been at the end of July 2005. He added the date “July 12, 2005, ” and the phrase “Call to Carla” “about a year and a half” prior to trial when respondents “were looking through materials related to the adoption.” After appellant questioned D. extensively about the note, the following colloquy occurred: “THE COURT: Ms. M[.], it would help me out if you could explain to me why this is such a big deal to you. Why are you spending all this time on this note as to when it was prepared, why it was prepared? I’m not following you. [¶] MS. M[.]: There’s a -- there are indications that the note was written substantially later than the date on the note. [¶] THE COURT: So? Why is that important? You’ve got to help me out. I’ve got to make decisions here. And you are spending time on this issue, and I’m not getting it. [¶] MS. M[.]: Okay. I’m sorry. Because of indications that -- because of the representations as to when the note was written, which were subsequently changed in the lawsuit, I wanted to establish whether or not the note was truly written when respondent said it was written. [¶] THE COURT: Okay. He says it’s written in 2005. You think it was written later. [¶] MS. M[.]: Considerably later. [¶] THE COURT: Why is that important? Forgive me for being naïve, but I’m not getting it. [¶] MS. M[.]: If it was written in preparation for the lawsuit, that [would] constitute falsification of evidence. And I wanted to -- which goes to -- which is probative of potentially of the fraud issues in this case. So I was trying to establish that. [¶] THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead. Ask your next question.” That the trial court gave appellant the opportunity to explain why she was focusing on this issue does not establish that the trial court was biased against open adoption. Instead, the trial court’s questions demonstrated that it wanted to understand the purpose of her questions in order to evaluate the evidence.
After careful review of the record, we conclude that a reasonable person would not have had “ ‘ “ ‘doubts concerning the judge’s impartiality’ ” ’ ” in the present case. (Hall, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 841.) Thus, appellant was not deprived of her due process rights. (Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1112.)
B. Failure to Determine a Material Issue
Noting that the trial court “found that the outcome of this situation would be the same whether or not the [Preliminary Agreement] had been filed at finalization, ” appellant argues that the trial court “failed to accurately apply the law to the facts pursuant to CCP § 631.8(a) and, due to its misapplication of the law, failed to accurately determine a material issue in the case of whether [respondents’] intentional failure to file the [Preliminary Agreement] was indicative of fraud on” appellant. There is no merit to this argument.
The trial court did consider whether respondents’ failure to file the Preliminary Agreement constituted fraud. In its statement of decision, the trial court found: appellant never raised the issue of filing the Preliminary Agreement between September 2003 and January 22, 2004, or for months after that period; the issue was never discussed between the parties; none of the parties asked for a copy of the Preliminary Agreement when it was signed; appellant “made no showing, beyond her self-serving testimony, that acquiring enforceable postadoption contact privileges was important to her at the time”; respondents had no reason to believe appellant expected them to file the Preliminary Agreement or that filing this document was important to her; since appellant conceded, and a court order established, that respondents were not in a fiduciary relationship to her, they did not have a duty to file the Preliminary Agreement; and there was no fraud upon either the adoption court or appellant when respondents checked the box indicating that an ADOPT-310 form would not be filed or when they failed to present the Preliminary Agreement to the adoption court in connection with the adoption of P. Thus, the trial court considered and expressly rejected appellant’s claim that respondents’ “failure to file the [Preliminary Agreement] was indicative of fraud....”
The trial court also stated that “the issue of not filing this agreement and thus rendering a fully enforceable agreement, I believe that we would have -- could have had the same outcome if this agreement had been filed. [¶] Here’s why I say that. This is a significant paragraph.... [¶] ‘The birth parents understand that the adoption order which makes the adoptive parents the legal parents cannot be overturned because this agreement was not complied with. All remedies for the birth parents involve enforcement of this agreement, not overturning the adoption. The birth parents also understand that when the adoption is completed, the adoptive parents are the child’s only legal parents.’ [¶] ‘As legal parents, the adoptive parents have the right to make all decisions that they determine to be in the best interest of the child.’ [¶] And this is what I think is a very important clause: ‘Whether compliance with any conditions of this agreement is in the best interest of the child, ’ I think that the law confers upon adoptive parents a great deal of authority. And if it turns out that some conflict developed between the adoptive family and the birth family, they could very well -- I could see it very easily saying, you know what, this is not good for our child right now. So we are going to severely limit contact. And so I think filing this agreement would have been of relatively little consequence.” The trial court then focused on appellant’s conduct shortly after P. was born, found that it was inappropriate, and concluded that Susan was justified in her concerns regarding appellant. The trial court’s statements did not indicate that it ignored the facts or misapplied the law. Instead, the trial court was merely stating that if the Preliminary Agreement had been filed, it would have found that respondents were justified in restricting contact between appellant and P. based on P.’s best interests. Thus, there was no error.
C. Sufficiency of the Evidence
1. Standard of Review
Following appeal of a judgment entered after a motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 631.8 is granted, this court reviews the trial court’s ruling under the substantial evidence standard. (Roth v. Parker (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 542, 549.) Thus, this court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving that party the benefit of every reasonable inference, and resolving all evidentiary conflicts in support of the judgment. (Jordan v. City of Santa Barbara (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1245, 1254-1255 (Jordan).) “The testimony of a witness, even though a party, may be sufficient to support the trial court. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 1255.)
2. Analysis
Appellant contends that the facts are undisputed that respondents fraudulently induced her to relinquish her parental rights. She argues that respondents “extensively represented” that the adoption would be open, and she relied on this promise.
The elements of fraud are: (1) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (2) knowledge of falsity; (3) intent to defraud; (4) justifiable reliance; and (5) resulting damage. (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638.)
Here, the evidence supports the trial court’s finding that “[t]here were no promises or representations by respondents concerning contact in the future, beyond those contained in the Preliminary Agreement, other than expressions of a belief that such contact would occur.” Respondents testified that they wanted an open adoption and acknowledged making statements to that effect. Respondents understood an open adoption as one in which the child knows her birth parents and has some contact with them. That respondents’ understanding of an open adoption was reasonable was supported by evidence that IAC had no requirements as to the amount of contact between the parties to an adoption, and IAC expected that post-adoption contact would depend on the circumstances of each case. While appellant appears to have understood that an open adoption would have involved significantly more contact, there was no evidence that respondents ever stated that there would be such extensive contact after the adoption was finalized. Thus, respondents’ statements regarding their intent to participate in an open adoption were not false.
Appellant next claims that respondents never disclosed to her that the Preliminary Agreement “would be completely unenforceable.... Essentially, [respondents] represented a close friendship and open contact to [appellant] while making sure that they could avoid being accountable for anything they promised.”
Here, appellant never indicated to respondents that the filing of the Preliminary Agreement and the ADOPT-310 form was important to her. Respondents testified that there was no discussion with appellant about whether the document would be filed. Respondents were not in a fiduciary relationship to appellant and consequently had no duty to file these documents. Thus, there was substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding that respondents did not commit fraud by failing to file the Preliminary Agreement and the ADOPT-310 form when the adoption was finalized.
Though Steele testified that appellant stated at the November 2003 meeting that she wanted the Preliminary Agreement filed with the court, this court must resolve all evidentiary conflicts in support of the judgment. (Jordan, supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1254-1255.)
Appellant also focuses on a conversation that she had with D. in April 2006 in which he said something to the effect of “if there’s a visitation agreement that is enforceable by court, if we were to just pretend there was, in what way are we not following it or not abiding by it?” She suggests that this evidence, along with respondents’ testimony regarding their intent to have an open adoption, establishes that they knew that she wanted the Preliminary Agreement to be filed and told her that they would do so in order to induce her to relinquish her parental rights. However, as previously stated, the trial court rejected appellant’s definition of an open adoption. Moreover, D.’s testimony did not establish that respondents knew her views on the filing of the document or that they told her that they would file it. As D. explained, he knew that appellant was planning a lawsuit at that point, he did not want to antagonize her, and he wanted to “get to the heart of the matter” to determine her view on how they were not meeting their obligations under the Preliminary Agreement.
In sum, there was substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding that respondents did not make any misrepresentations regarding the filing of the Preliminary Agreement or the amount of future contact between appellant and P. Since appellant failed to prove this element of her fraud claim, the trial court properly entered judgment in favor of respondents.
IV. Disposition
Appellant has brought a motion for factual findings and requests that P. be returned to her custody. Since we have affirmed the judgment, the motion for factual findings is denied. Appellant’s motion for sanctions is also denied.
WE CONCUR: Elia, Acting P. J., Duffy, J.