1989). Actual post-injury earnings, while relevant, do not control this determination, see Joyce v. Chicopee Mfg. Co., 103 N.H. 471, 474, 175 A.2d 521, 524 (1961); Desrosiers v. Company, 97 N.H. 525, 530-31, 92 A.2d 916, 920 (1952); Carignan v. Company, 95 N.H. 333, 336, 63 A.2d 241, 243 (1949), because in certain cases they serve only to temporarily mask a real loss of earning capacity. Here, for example, although Normand earned as much during his two years as a shear operator as he did before his injury, once he was laid off his disability prevented him from returning to work as a skidder operator.

His alternative position is that the employee's present earnings are only some evidence of his earning capacity to be considered in connection with other factors which he might be able to show as more truly reflecting such earning capacity. In support of his position respondent calls to our attention decisions in other jurisdictions, notably Whyte v. IndustrialComm'n, 71 Ariz. 338, for the first of his contentions, and Peak v. Nashua Gummed and Coated Paper Co., 87 N.H. 350, and Carignan v. Winthrop Spinning Co., 95 N.H. 333, for the proposition that actual earnings are in fact only some evidence of the employee's present earning capacity. The pertinent facts in Whyte v. Industrial Comm'n are that in 1942 the claimant was employed as a steelworker when injured and was earning an average monthly wage of $241.

Clover c. Co. v. Smith Co., 96 N.H. 491, 493. It necessarily implies a finding that after the accident the plaintiff was able to work longer hours than he did. Lincoln v. Langley, 99 N.H. 158. A finding that the plaintiff was able to work forty hours a week would call for compensation in the sum of $12 a week, assuming $58 a week to have been his average weekly wage before injury. See Laws 1947, c. 266, supra, s. 23; Bolduc v. Company, 96 N.H. 235, 238. On the evidence such a finding could properly be made even though the plaintiff did not actually work such hours and claimed to be unable to work more than 24 hours a week. Cf. Carignan v. Company, 95 N.H. 333, 336. Since the defendant is satisfied that the amount of compensation for partial disability should be $12 a week, the award of $11.60 per week is set aside, and the decree should be modified to provide for such compensation at $12 per week for 104 weeks.

2 Larson's, Workmen's Compensation Law 7; Clark v. Henry Wright Mfg. Co., 136 Conn. 514, 517; see Colby v. Varney, 98 N.H. 99, 102. It is the difference between "his average weekly wage before the injury and the average weekly wage which he is able to earn thereafter" (emphasis supplied) with his injury in suitable work under normal employment conditions. Laws 1947, c. 266, s. 23; Gagne v. Company, supra; Peak v. Company, supra; Carignan v. Company, 95 N.H. 333, 336; 2 Larson's, Workmen's Compensation Law 6; Shaffer v. Midland Empire Packing Co., (Mont.) 259 P.2d 340.

Peak v. Company, 87 N.H. 350, 352. When an injured employee returns to work at the same or larger wage, it does not follow as a matter of law that he is entitled to no compensation. Carignan v. Company, 95 N.H. 333, 336. There was evidence that but for the accident, the plaintiff would have been earning considerably more on his old job than he actually was earning on the new job, that the latter was not a normal or permanent position but one which was being kept open for him "until this thing is settled," that he has a limitation of movement in his back and that he can never do work involving heavy lifting or extreme stretching or bending over.

On the evidence, the question of the totality of the plaintiff's disability was one of fact for the Trial Court. Fennell's Case, supra. Lack of employment following the onset of his disability did not conclusively establish that his disability was total. See Carignan v. Company, 95 N.H. 333, 336. Since supported by evidence, the finding that he had been "able" to work to some extent at a gainful occupation could be made, although in fact he had not so worked. There was no evidence to require a finding that what had once been the plaintiff's means of livelihood for a period of years had ceased to constitute a "gainful occupation," or could not be resumed with regularity and to advantage. There was no evidence that reasonable diligence would not yield employment in other types of light work.

As a cord cutter he could cut, on an average, about 2 1/4 cords per day for which he was paid at the rate of $5 per cord or $67.50 for a six day week. The Court could properly find on the evidence that, since his accident and as result thereof, he can no longer cut by the cord, but is only able to work as a swamper for which he receives 65 cents an hour or $35.10 for a nine hour a day six day week. The doctors were in accord in their testimony that in his condition he is unsuited and unfit for hard and heavy work, such as cutting by the cord, as a permanent employment. The Court properly found that his ability to earn (Carignan v. Company, 95 N.H. 333) had been decreased by his accident, that he had incurred partial disability as a result thereof. The defendant admits, and properly, that under the old act (R. L., c. 216) disability resulting from aggravations of pre-existing diseases or defects by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment were compensable. Rivard v. McElwain Co., 95 N.H. 100; O'Brien v. Manchester Yarn Mills, 95 N.H. 118. And a pre-existing arthritic condition aggravated by an accidental injury, such as is the case here, would have come under that rule.