Opinion
G045792
12-29-2011
CARI G., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ORANGE COUNTY, Respondent; ORANGE COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES AGENCY et al., Real Parties in Interest.
Donna P. Chirco for Petitioner. No appearance for Respondent. Nicholas S. Chrisos, County Counsel, Karen L. Christensen and Julie J. Agin, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest Orange County Social Services Agency.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Super. Ct. No. DP020820)
OPINION
Original proceedings; petition for a writ of mandate to challenge an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Cheryl L. Leininger, Judge. Petition denied. Donna P. Chirco for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Nicholas S. Chrisos, County Counsel, Karen L. Christensen and Julie J. Agin, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest Orange County Social Services Agency.
Cari G. (the mother) seeks relief from an order of the juvenile court denying reunification services with her infant son, V.M., and setting a date for a hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. She argues the court should have exercised its discretion and ordered services despite the opinions of two mental health experts who concluded that she would most likely be unable to reunify with the child during the reunification period. We find these arguments to be without merit and deny the petition.
Subsequent statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
I
FACTS
In January 2011, shortly before V.M. was born, the mother was placed on a section 5150 hold at the hospital. It was reported that the mother had a long history of mental illness and was diabetic, and the father also suffered from chronic mental illness. The mother had reportedly failed to take her psychiatric medication because she believed the doctors were trying to hurt her. On February 1, the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) filed a petition alleging that V.M. came within section 300, subdivision (b). The petition alleged that due to the parents' mental health issues, they were unable to protect the child.
Because only the mother is party to the instant petition, we shall focus on the facts relating to the mother.
The detention report stated the mother had a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia. She had many previous hospitalizations for mental health issues, and was under conservatorship from December 2009 to December 2010. A psychiatrist examined the mother and lifted the section 5150 hold, but agreed that leaving the child with the parents would pose a high risk to his safety because the parents were unable to care for him. The mother was again prescribed psychiatric medications.
The mother's treating physician also agreed the child would be in danger in the parents' care. The mother was reportedly inappropriate with the infant and was inconsistent in taking her medications, claiming her psychiatric meds were not needed. She had received some prenatal care, but had stopped coming to appointments. The day before the birth, the mother appeared at the doctor's office, looking disheveled and unwashed, and told him that she had delivered a dead baby.
The mother's father, Fred G., concurred that both parents were mentally ill. He stated that the mother had a history of medication noncompliance, and that when she was not taking her medications, she was very difficult to talk to. On February 2, the court ordered the child detained, issued further orders and set a jurisdiction and disposition hearing.
SSA prepared a report prior to the jurisdiction/disposition hearing. Senior social worker Barbara Mautino reported that she had been unable to interview either parent, despite multiple attempts to do so. She was also unable to arrange visits between the mother and the child. The mother eventually returned one of Mautino's phone calls and declined to come to the office for an interview, register for services, and arrange visits. She told the social worker she could not come in because she was in a wheelchair following a car accident, though she declined to give any details. She also declined Mautino's offer to visit her at her residence. The mother also told Mautino she did not wish to "upset" her two-week old infant by visiting him when she would be unable to take him home. Further requests for the mother to undergo an interview with Mautino went unanswered.
During the criminal clearance process, SSA learned that the mother had been on probation three times, including once for assault in 2009. The father had a fairly extensive criminal record that included domestic violence charges and state prison time.
In an interview with Fred G., Mautino learned that the mother had a degree in sociology and had been studying to become a paralegal at one point. He also said that the relationship between the parents had a very troubled history, exacerbated by the father's drug use. With regard to the mother's conservatorship, Fred G. said that it had been terminated after she convinced her psychiatrist that she could handle her own affairs. The mother did not wish to stay at his home, however, because she believed it was "evil." He later told Mautino that he believed the mother had been hospitalized approximately three weeks after detention, but that the father had taken her out of the hospital because she had a check, and they had purchased drugs. Fred G. said the father told him that they had spent $100 on crack and speed, and the mother was committing prostitution.
The jurisdictional hearing was continued several times to give SSA the opportunity to find and interview the parents. On April 7, the mother's counsel told the court she had not been in contact with her client since the February 2 detention hearing. The court denied further requests for a continuance, sustained the petition, and set a disposition hearing for early May.
At the disposition hearing on May 5, the court ordered evaluations of each parent pursuant to Evidence Code section 730 (730 evaluations). On May 25, the mother had her first visit with the child. She was appropriate, displaying affection and awareness of the child's needs. She said she wanted to visit weekly, but canceled the next visit.
In early June, the social worker received a handwritten letter from the mother, requesting a continuance of her court date. She stated that her father, whom she had stayed with for two weeks, had molested her and tried to rape her. She also stated her father was stealing her Social Security checks.
On July 6, at the request of their attorneys, guardians ad litem were appointed for both parents. On August 4, the social worker reported that both 730 evaluations had concluded that the mother would not be able to sufficiently benefit from services leading to reunification within 12 months.
On August 10, both parents were present for a visit. The mother was unable to stay awake. She reported problems with her sleep. The father said that he had obtained a medical marijuana card, and the mother told the social worker they could obtain marijuana for "$10 a joint." The parents missed their next visit, on August 19, stating that someone had blocked their car in their driveway.
The dispositional hearing began on August 30, and the court heard testimony from the social worker, Fred G., and the mother. The court also received into evidence the SSA reports and 730 evaluations.
Mautino testified in a manner consistent with her reports. The mother had visited twice a week since May 25, with three missed visits. She was nurturing and appropriate during the visits. Nonetheless, Mautino's recommendation was to bypass reunification services. This recommendation was based on several factors, including the mother's behavior and the 730 evaluations. At times it was impossible to hold a conversation due to the mother's yelling, hostility and complete irrationality. She did not return phone calls, and had declined services at her first meeting with Mautino. During visits, the mother failed to notice the father often behaved in a bizarre manner, and she was concerned about the mother's length mental health history.
Fred G. testified that the mother was noncompliant with medication and appointments during the time she lived with him. The mother had cycled between periods when she would function well, relapse, then function well again. He reported the mother had been hospitalized more than five times, possibly more than ten, since her schizophrenia diagnosis. She heard voices, saw things that were not there, and was disoriented. She was "kind of out of control" at times, and did not understand what he was saying to her. He does not believe she should live alone.
The mother also testified. She acknowledged facts relating to her mental illness, including her diagnosis and multiple section 5150 holds. She admitted going off her medications because she was in denial or ran out of them and that she had not attended all of her psychiatric appointments in the past year. She also admitted that she had lived with the father in a car after the child's birth.
She also testified that she had been staying with Fred G. since the previous week. She admitted her relationship with the father was problematic, but said she was having trouble separating from him. With respect to the child, she testified that she loved her son and would like an opportunity to show that she could be a good mother. Thus, she disagreed with the social worker's recommendation that services not be ordered.
The court reviewed the evidence in detail before issuing a ruling. Although the mother had been articulate and presented well, her long history of mental illness and noncompliance with treatment was a serious concern. For several weeks after the birth, the mother did not work with the social worker or visit the child. While she testified that she knew she had to comply with medication and doctor's appointments, she had often failed to do so while she was pregnant. Even after resuming medication, her doctor visits were erratic. The court was also concerned about the relationship with the father, who was a trigger for her noncompliance, and with whom she was still connected. It did not seem the mother had truly committed to separating from him.
The court stated that the mother, while resuming medication and making some improvements, "still lacks understanding, insight and enduring comprehension and commitment concerning her own mental health issues." The court also relied on the 730 evaluations, which opined that the mother would be unable to benefit from services within 12 months. Accordingly, the court denied services and set a hearing pursuant to section 366.26, to set a permanent plan for the child.
II
DISCUSSION
Section 300, subdivision (b) provides for juvenile court jurisdiction when there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer serious physical harm or illness because of the inability of the parent to provide regular care for the child due to a parent's mental illness. Even when jurisdiction is amply justified, as it is here, at the early stages of dependency, family reunification is the desired goal. Toward that end, parents are offered reunification services. "As a general rule, reunification services are offered to parents whose children are removed from their custody in an effort to eliminate the conditions leading to loss of custody and facilitate reunification of parent and child. This furthers the goal of preservation of family, whenever possible. [Citation.]" (In re Baby Boy H. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 470, 478.)
In some instances, however, reunification services need not be provided. "Reunification services need not be provided to a parent or guardian . . . when the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence . . . [t]hat the parent or guardian is suffering from a mental disability . . . that renders him or her incapable of utilizing those services." (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(2).) "Mental disability" in this context means "a mental incapacity or disorder that renders the parent or parents unable to care for and control the child adequately." (Fam. Code, § 7827, subd. (a).) The evidence of two qualified experts is required to support a finding under this section. (Fam. Code, § 7827, subd. (c).)
"'In enacting section 361.5, subdivision (b), the Legislature has recognized that, notwithstanding the crucial role of reunification services when a minor is removed from the home, it may be useless under certain circumstances to provide services. [Citations.] "Section 361.5 reflects the Legislature's desire to provide services to parents only where those services will facilitate the return of children to parental custody. The exceptions in subdivision (b) to the general mandate of providing reunification services 'demonstrate a legislative determination that in certain situations, attempts to facilitate reunification do not serve and protect the child's interest.' [Citation.]" [Citation.]' [Citations.]" (R.S. v. Superior Court (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1269-1270.)
"In juvenile cases, as in other areas of the law, the power of an appellate court asked to assess the sufficiency of the evidence begins and ends with a determination as to whether or not there is any substantial evidence, whether or not contradicted, which will support the conclusion of the trier of fact. All conflicts must be resolved in favor of the respondent and all legitimate inferences indulged in to uphold the verdict, if possible. Where there is more than one inference which can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the appellate court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the trier of fact." (In re Katrina C. (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 540, 547, 247; see also In re Christina A. (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1073, 1080 [substantial evidence test applies to denial of reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2)].)
The mother does not claim that substantial evidence does not support the court's findings, but rather that the language of section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(2) and (c) makes the decision about whether to order services discretionary. (In re Rebecca H. (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 825, 843.) If our review is for abuse of discretion rather than for substantial evidence, the standard of review is even more weighted in favor of the trial court's findings, but ultimately, the test is similar. Unless the trial court's decision exceeded the bounds of reason, there was no abuse of discretion. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319.)
The mother also argues that substantial evidence would have supported a decision in her favor, but that is irrelevant to our analysis. The question before us is whether substantial evidence supported the conclusions the court actually reached, not alternate findings it might have reached.
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The court had ample evidence to support its decision, specifically, the unrebutted testimony of two expert witnesses, each of whom concluded that the mother suffered from a mental disorder, and as a result, she was unlikely to benefit from services and reunify with the child within 12 months. Further, there was other evidence, including the mother's history of noncompliance with her medication, to support the court's decision. Nothing in the record, including the mother's interactions with her son, her sincerity, or desire to reunify is so overwhelming that it renders the court's decision outside the bounds of reason. We therefore find no abuse of discretion.
III
DISPOSITION
The petition is denied.
MOORE, J. WE CONCUR: BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J. IKOLA, J.