Opinion
No. 04-04-00830-CV
Delivered and Filed: April 6, 2005.
Appeal from the 57th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas, Trial Court No. 2004-CI-16211, Honorable Fred Shannon, Judge Presiding.
Affirmed.
Sitting: Alma L. LÓPEZ, Chief Justice, Sandee Bryan MARION, Justice, Phylis J. SPEEDLIN, Justice.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellants, Cargo Partnership and Henry B. Gonzalez, Jr., appeal the trial court's order denying their application for a temporary injunction against appellees. Appellants contend the trial court abused its discretion because they established a probable right of recovery and, without the temporary injunction, they have no adequate legal remedy and will suffer irreparable harm. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Carlisle Asset Company ("Carlisle") and Henry B. Gonzalez, Jr. ("Gonzalez") jointly own and lease a commercial property in downtown San Antonio through their partnership, Cargo Partnership ("Cargo"). Tom Wright ("Wright") owns Carlisle. In 1991, Carlisle, Gonzalez, Cargo, and Wright signed a written management agreement under which the partners and the partnership gave Wright limited authority to serve as an agent of the partnership. Pursuant to their partnership agreement, Gonzalez controls the second floor of the building through his lease with Cargo, and Carlisle controls the first floor through its lease with Cargo. The Cargo-Gonzalez lease provides that Gonzalez may use the top floor for an "office" and "for no other purpose." The Cargo-Carlisle lease provides that Carlisle may use the bottom floor for a "retail gallery and office" and "for no other purpose."
Carlisle itself has never occupied the ground premises, but has subleased the ground floor to two different art galleries until August 2004. The underlying dispute arises from Carlisle securing a new sublease with AMG Acquisitions, Inc. ("AMG"), for operation of an "art lounge." As an "art lounge," AMG intends to operate an art gallery that also serves alcoholic beverages. Wright, as manager of Cargo and owner of Carlisle, approved the sublease. However, Gonzalez objected to the sublease to AMG for use of the premises as a bar, and sought a temporary injunction seeking to prevent AMG from operating the art lounge and Wright from taking further action as manager of Cargo. The trial court concluded the AMG sublease was in violation of the restrictive clause in the Cargo-Carlisle lease but still denied injunctive relief. The trial court stated the sublease was approved by Wright pursuant to his apparent authority under the Cargo partnership management agreement, even though it may have been without the consent of the partnership. The trial court further stated that because the AMG sublease was secured by Wright's apparent authority, as between AMG and Cargo, AMG should be entitled to enforcement. However, because Wright's actions may have been in violation of the Cargo management agreement and the partnership agreement as owner of Carlisle, the court concluded Gonzalez had an adequate remedy at law against Wright individually as the manager, as well as against Carlisle as a tenant and partner in Cargo. Accordingly, the trial court denied Cargo and Gonzalez's application for temporary injunction.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the grant or denial of a temporary injunction for a clear abuse of discretion without addressing the merits of the underlying case. Walling v. Metcalfe, 863 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex. 1993); Ireland v. Franklin, 950 S.W.2d 155, 157 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1997, no writ). At the hearing for the temporary injunction, the applicant is not required to prove that he will prevail at trial; instead he must establish the right to preserve the status quo pending trial on the merits by showing: 1) a cause of action against the defendant; 2) a probable right to the relief sought; and 3) a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury in the interim if the injunction is not granted. Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002). An injury is irreparable if the injured party cannot be adequately compensated in damages or by any remedies at law. Id.; Ludewig v. Houston Pipeline Co., 773 S.W.2d 610, 615 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied).
A trial court abuses its discretion when it misapplies the law to the "established facts or when the evidence does not reasonably support the conclusion that the applicant has a probable right of recovery." State v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 526 S.W.2d 526, 528 (Tex. 1975). We will draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence in a manner most favorable to the trial court's judgment. City of San Antonio v. Rankin, 905 S.W.2d 427, 430 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1995, no writ). A trial court does not abuse its discretion when it bases its decision on conflicting evidence in the record and the evidence reasonably supports its conclusion. Davis v. Huey, 571 S.W.2d 859, 862 (Tex. 1978). When, as here, the trial court does not make findings of fact or conclusions of law, we must uphold the trial court's order on any legal theory supported by the record. Universal Health Srvs., Inc. v. Thompson, 24 S.W.2d 570, 577 (Tex.App.-Austin 2000, no pet.).
ANALYSIS
We focus our attention on the third required element; whether appellants have established a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury in the interim. Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204. Appellants assert the trial court abused its discretion by denying injunctive relief, because without an injunction, Cargo and Gonzalez will suffer obvious injury to their interests in real property; namely to occupy and lease the building without a bar on the premises as intended under the original partnership agreement. Gonzalez invested in Cargo and signed long-term leases based on written commitments from Cargo and Carlisle that the ground floor would be maintained as a gallery. Gonzalez asserts a bar in the Cargo building beneath the law offices will substantially and continually alter the premises for a use not permitted on the property. According to appellants, because operating a bar is in violation of the use restriction clause in the Cargo-Carlisle lease contract, they have alleged an imminent injury to real property which satisfies the requirement of an irreparable injury without adequate legal remedy.
The underlying lawsuit involves an alleged violation of a restrictive use clause in a building lease contract. Generally, a court will not enforce contractual rights by injunction, because a party can rarely establish an irreparable injury and an inadequate legal remedy when damages for breach of contract are available. Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 211. Although a trial court may grant equitable relief when a dispute involves real property, it is reasonable to conclude that under some circumstances monetary damages afford adequate relief for the loss of real estate. See Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 211 ("trial court may grant equitable relief when a dispute involves real property"); In re Stark, 126 S.W.3d 635, 641 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2004, orig. proceeding) (party seeking injunctive relief must provide evidence showing why uniqueness of the real estate would prevent a trial court from providing complainant with an adequate remedy, including monetary damages); M.G. Bldg. Materials, Ltd. v. C K Materials, Co., Inc., No 04-03-00401-CV, 2003 WL 21918592, at *2 (Tex.App.-San Antonio Aug. 13, 2003, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (trial court may grant equitable relief when dispute involves real property provided there is some evidence regarding the uniqueness of the property).
Here, Gonzalez asserts the mere presence of an establishment serving alcohol would harm the use of the premises for his law practice. Gonzalez testified that his office is "basically an art-gallery type setting," and it was important to have an art gallery under his office to maintain a good surrounding environment similar to his office. However, there is no other evidence demonstrating that the uniqueness of the property would prevent a court from providing appellant with adequate relief, such as money damages. By contrast, the record shows tenants in adjoining buildings, operate as both bars and restaurants. These neighboring tenants share a common courtyard with the entrance to Gonzalez's property. Further, the entrance to AMG's business will be on the other side of the building, entirely separate from Gonzalez's entrance, and the bar will not open until after normal office hours. Viewing the conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's order, we hold that appellants failed to establish that they faced "probable, imminent, and irreparable injury" in the absence of a temporary injunction. Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the application for temporary injunction.
CONCLUSION
We overrule appellants' issue on appeal and affirm the trial court's judgment.