Opinion
5611 Index 154591/13
02-06-2018
Law Office of James J. Toomey, New York (Evy L. Kazansky of counsel), for appellant. Nguyen Leftt P.C., New York (Stephen D. Chakwin, Jr. of counsel), for Pedro Cardenas, respondent. Law Office Of Harris, King, Fodera & Correia, New York (Brian S. Liferiedge of counsel), for Somerset Partners, LLC, 450 Park Avenue LLC, Jones Lang LaSalle Americas, Inc., Banco Bradesco, S.A., Janko Rasic Architects and John Gallin & Son, Inc., respondents.
Law Office of James J. Toomey, New York (Evy L. Kazansky of counsel), for appellant.
Nguyen Leftt P.C., New York (Stephen D. Chakwin, Jr. of counsel), for Pedro Cardenas, respondent.
Law Office Of Harris, King, Fodera & Correia, New York (Brian S. Liferiedge of counsel), for Somerset Partners, LLC, 450 Park Avenue LLC, Jones Lang LaSalle Americas, Inc., Banco Bradesco, S.A., Janko Rasic Architects and John Gallin & Son, Inc., respondents.
Richter, J.P., Mazzarelli, Webber, Kern, Oing, JJ.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Joan M. Kenney, J.), entered September 21, 2015, which denied defendant GM Glass & Mirror, Inc.'s (GM Glass) motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as against it, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
Plaintiff seeks damages for injuries he allegedly sustained when he walked into a floor-to-ceiling clear glass wall installed by GM Glass. Although GM Glass, in support of its motion, was entitled to rely on documentary evidence and depositions of other parties' witnesses (see Olan v. Farrell Lines, 64 N.Y.2d 1092, 1093, 489 N.Y.S.2d 884, 479 N.E.2d 229 [1985] ), the evidence that it submitted failed to establish that it properly installed the glass wall with blue tape or other markings, or that it owed no duty to plaintiff with respect to its work.
Issues of fact exist as to whether GM Glass was still on site at the time of the accident, whether it was responsible for installing and maintaining blue marking tape on the glass wall, and whether it failed to do so, thereby exacerbating or creating a dangerous condition so as to have "launched a force or instrument of harm" ( Espinal v. Melville Snow Contrs., 98 N.Y.2d 136, 141–142, 746 N.Y.S.2d 120, 773 N.E.2d 485 [2002] [internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted]; see Kramer v. Cury, 92 A.D.3d 484, 937 N.Y.S.2d 855 [1st Dept. 2012] ; Grant v. Caprice Mgt. Corp., 43 A.D.3d 708, 841 N.Y.S.2d 555 [1st Dept. 2007] ).