The defendants argue that Virginia law should apply to the loss of consortium claim because that claim "is governed by ‘the law of the state where the marriage is domiciled’ rather than the law of the state where the wrong occurred." Defs.' Mem. at 4 (quoting Cardenas v. Muangman, 998 A.2d 303, 312 (D.C. 2010) ). In response, the plaintiffs argue that the governmental interest analysis compels this Court to apply District of Columbia law because the District "has the greater interest in ruling" on the issue of loss of consortium, whereas "Virginia has little if any interest in whether a consortium claim is recognized herein other than to the extent that the allowance of such a claim promotes its government interest in its citizens achieving maximum recovery."

As noted already, District of Columbia law governs this case. “In a medical malpractice action, the plaintiff carries the burden of establishing, through expert testimony, ‘the applicable standard of care, deviation from that standard, and a causal relationship between the deviation and the injury.’ ” Nwaneri v. Sandidge, 931 A.2d 466, 470 (D.C.2007) (quoting Travers v. Dist. of Columbia, 672 A.2d 566, 568 (D.C.1996)); seeCárdenas v. Muangman, 998 A.2d 303, 306 (D.C.2010) (“Because these issues are distinctly related to some science, profession, or occupation, expert testimony is usually required to establish each of the elements, except where the proof is so obvious as to lie within the ken of the average lay juror.”) (quoting Washington v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 579 A.2d 177, 181 (D.C.1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Under District of Columbia choice-of-law principles, a loss of consortium claim is “governed by ‘the law of the state where the marriage is domiciled' rather than the law of the state where the wrong occurred.” Price v. Stryker Corp., 270 F.Supp.3d 226, 231 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Cardenas v. Muangman, 998 A.2d 303, 312 (D.C. 2010)). For that reason, the court relies on the law of Maryland, which is where Cheryl and Carroll live.

See also, Strickland v. Pinder, 899 A.2d 770, 774 (D.C. 2006)(expert's testimony insufficient to establish national standard of care, as he stated "that his opinion was what other similarly trained doctors would have done under similar circumstances or that it was the standard of care [of] what doctors do in hospitals around the country" without linking the testimony to any certification process, current literature, conference or discussion with other knowledgeable professionals outside of the District of Columbia, where the events occurred). Compare with, Snyder v. George Wash. Univ., 890 A.2d 237, 246 (D.C. 2006)(expert's reference to conferences with College of Surgeons, surgeon certification commissions, relevant scholarly literature that expert made an effort to keep current with, hospital staff and national surgical society meetings, as sources sufficient to establish that expert's testimony was not based on a personal opinion but on a national standard), and Cárdenas v. Muangman, 998 A.2d 303, 310, 311 (D.C. 2010)(expert's testimony met the minimum requirements to establish national standard where he explained that his opinion was based on his familiarity with medical literature, national in scope, including Obstetrics & Gynecology, the official publication of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), the American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology and various textbooks containing sections on second trimester abortions; speakers from over the country, including California, Michigan and New York who came to grand rounds at the Medical College of Virginia, where the expert was on the faculty; attendance at national meetings, including repeated attendance at the annual ACOG meeting, and while attending these meetings, he had discussed second trimester abortions with other physicians from various areas of the country). B. Fall Prevention Measures.

In an action for negligence, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving the national standard of care by a preponderance of the evidence. Cárdenas v. Muangman, 998 A.2d 303, 307 (D.C.2010); see also Frazza v. United States, 529 F.Supp.2d 61, 69 (D.D.C.2008) (citing Varner v. District of Columbia, 891 A.2d 260, 265 (D.C.2006)). The D.C. Court of Appeals has “been demanding in requiring proof of a national standard of care” and requires that the plaintiff's experts articulate a clear standard and how it was violated by comparing specific standards with specific facts alleged.

There appears to be no requirement that the expert's proposed standard be the predominant or prevailing standard nationwide, so it would suffice for the expert to " ‘link his testimony to [a] certification process, current literature, conference[,] or discussion with other knowledgeable professionals,’ at a national level." Cardenas v. Muangman , 998 A.2d 303, 308 (D.C. 2010) (first alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Strickland v. Pinder , 899 A.2d 770, 774 (D.C. 2006) ).

Under Super. Ct. Civ. R. 50 (a), judgment as a matter of law is proper "only upon a finding that a party has been fully heard" and when "there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party." Cardenas v. Muangman , 998 A.2d 303, 306 (D.C. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). "A contract is breached if a party fails to perform when performance is due[,]" at which time the cause of action accrues "and the statute of limitations begins to run[.]"

" Dan B. Dobbs, Undertakings and Special Relationships in Claims for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 49, 54 (2008) (hereinafter Undertakings and Special Relationships). In situations where such an undertaking is established, the plaintiff can recover damages for emotional distress caused by the defendant's breach of a duty of care that is defined in accordance with traditional precepts of negligence law; for example, where there is an allegation of medical malpractice, by reference to the national standard of care. See, e.g., Cardenas v. Muangman, 998 A.2d 303, 306 (D.C. 2010). Alabama does not recognize the separate tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress.