Opinion
Civil No. 08-1819 (JAF).
June 10, 2009
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, Elsa Cardalda-Sánchez, brings this action against Defendant Universidad Carlos Albizu ("the University") alleging discrimination on the basis of religion, disability, and national origin, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000 et seq.; the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 21101 et seq.; Puerto Rico Law No. 100, of June 30, 1959, 29 L.P.R.A. § 146 (2001); Law No. 80, of May 30, 1976, 29 L.P.R.A. § 185a (2006); Law No. 44, of July 24, 1985, 1 L.P.R.A. § 501 (2008); and Law No. 115, of December 19, 1991 ("Law 115"), 29 L.P.R.A. § 194a (2001). (Docket No. 1.) Defendant moves to stay or abstain under the doctrine established in Col. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976) ("Colorado River"). (Docket No. 11.) Plaintiff opposes (Docket No. 20), Defendant replies (Docket No. 23), and Plaintiff surreplies (Docket No. 26).
I. Factual and Procedural History
Unless otherwise noted, we derive the following factual summary from the complaint. (Docket No. 1.)Plaintiff has a doctorate in psychology. Although born in New York, she considers herself Cuban, as both of her parents are from Cuba. She suffers from severe back ailments and spasms as a result of several herniated disks. Defendant is a Puerto Rico corporation that offers college and post-graduate degrees in psychology.
Defendant hired Plaintiff as an associate professor in 1998, under a one-year contract. Upon completion of the year, Plaintiff received a favorable evaluation, as a result of which her contract was renewed for an additional three-year term, beginning in the Fall of 1999. After the three-year term passed, Plaintiff received another favorable evaluation, and her contract was renewed for a five-year term. Typically, Defendant hires faculty members based on a one-year contract, followed by a three-year contract, followed by a five-year contract, followed by a renewable contract for ten years. All contract renewals are contingent on the faculty member receiving favorable evaluations.
On October 10, 2006, Defendant's Human Resources Director notified Plaintiff that the University's chancellor, Lourdes García, had filed an internal complaint against Plaintiff. On October 16, 2006, in anticipation of the termination of her five-year contract in August 2007, Plaintiff requested a promotion from associate professor to full professor. On October 17, 2006, Plaintiff filed a complaint at the Anti-Discrimination Unit of the Puerto Rico Department of Labor ("ADU"), alleging that Defendant had discriminated against her and subjected her to a hostile work environment on the basis of her disability, religious beliefs, and national origin. Specifically, she claimed that Defendant harassed her and made arbitrary demands of her at work; provided her with inferior working conditions because of her disability, religion, or national origin; failed to comply with University regulations and procedures regarding Plaintiff's evaluations, promotion, and contract renewal; denied her employment benefits; mocked the way she practiced her religion; failed to accommodate her disability; and intended to terminate her employment. On November 2, 2006, Plaintiff filed an administrative charge against García based on employment harassment and other complaints.
As a result of the two internal complaints, the one filed by García against Plaintiff and the one filed by Plaintiff against García, the University began an internal administrative response. The University scheduled an administrative hearing for early December 2006, but delayed and rescheduled it several times.
On February 27, 2007, the ADU held a hearing on Plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff expressed her wish to proceed through an alternative mediation process. However, Defendant stated that it had decided not to renew Plaintiff's contract. On April 27, 2007, the Human Resources Director informed Plaintiff that her internal complaint against García had been dismissed because Plaintiff had chosen to proceed with her claims at the ADU.
On May 10, 2007, the University held a hearing regarding García's complaint against Plaintiff, with attorney Juan Arroyo Elicier ("Arroyo") as the examining officer. At the hearing, Plaintiff objected to Arroyo's position as examining officer, because he had previously served as an attorney for the University and Plaintiff. As a result of these concerns, Arroyo recused himself, and the hearing ended. On May 14, 2007, the University notified Plaintiff that García's complaint against her was being closed without prejudice.
On May 15, 2007, Plaintiff submitted a settlement proposal to Defendant. The next day, the University President, Jorge González, informed Plaintiff that her contract would not be renewed in August 2007. The University has a regulation stating that "[f]aculty search committees have primary responsibility for evaluating the credentials of applicants for Faculty positions . . . [w]hen [employment] decisions are reached, the Faculty member should receive written explanation and has a right to appeal for reconsideration." However, González did not explain why Plaintiff's contract would not be renewed, and Plaintiff was never evaluated for the renewal of her contract or the promotion she requested. After receiving the letter of nonrenewal, Plaintiff submitted an appeal to the University's Board of Trustees. This appeal was ultimately denied, and Plaintiff had to leave her position as a professor at the University when her contract expired on August 27, 2007.
On May 18, 2007, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Puerto Rico Court of First Instance, requesting injunctive relief under Law 115 and Law No. 2, of October 17, 1961 ("Law 2") 32 L.P.R.A. §§ 3118-32 (2004). (Docket No. 16-2.) Law 115 provides that "[n]o employer may discharge, threaten, or discriminate against an employee regarding the terms, conditions, compensation, location, benefits or privileges of the employment should the employee offer or attempt to offer, verbally or in writing, any testimony, expression or information before a legislative, administrative or judicial forum in Puerto Rico." 29 L.P.R.A. § 194a. Law 115 further states that successful plaintiffs may obtain economic and emotional damages and reinstatement in their jobs. Law 2 provides employees with a process for the expedited disposition of labor claims. 32 L.P.R.A. §§ 3118-32. In the Commonwealth complaint, Plaintiff did not assert claims under Title VII, the ADA, or Puerto Rico antidiscrimination laws. (Docket No. 16-2.) On July 3, 2007, the Court of First Instance dismissed the request for injunctive relief as premature. (Docket No. 16-3.) It is unclear from the record whether Plaintiff appealed this judgment and whether it became final.
At some point, Plaintiff amended her discrimination complaint before the ADU to include allegations that Defendant decided not to renew Plaintiff's contract and took other adverse employment actions against her in retaliation for Plaintiff's initial filing with the ADU. Plaintiff also requested permission from the ADU to continue with her claims in court. On April 29, 2008, the ADU sent Plaintiff a right-to-sue letter.
On July 27, 2008, Plaintiff filed the present complaint in federal district court against Defendant. (Docket No. 1.) Defendant moved to dismiss or stay on February 18, 2009. (Docket No. 12.) Plaintiff opposed on March 31, 2009 (Docket No. 20), Defendant replied on April 14, 2009 (Docket No. 23), and Plaintiff surreplied on April 27, 2009 (Docket No. 26).
II. Standard Under Rule 12(b)(6)
A defendant may move to dismiss an action against him, based solely on the complaint, for the plaintiff's "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In assessing this motion, we "accept[] all well-pleaded facts as true, and we draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the [plaintiff]." Wash. Legal Found. v. Mass. Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962, 971 (1st Cir. 1993).The complaint must demonstrate "a plausible entitlement to relief" by alleging facts that directly or inferentially support each material element of some legal claim. Gagliardi v. Sullivan, 513 F.3d 301, 305 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007)). Typically, "specific facts are not necessary; the statements need only `give the defendants fair notice of [the claim] and the grounds upon which it rests.'"Thomas v. Rhode Island, 542 F.3d 944, 948 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007)).
III. Analysis
Defendant moves for Colorado River abstention and moves to dismiss the claim for injunctive relief under Rule 12(b)(6) as barred by res judicata. (Docket No. 11.) We address these arguments in turn.
A. Colorado River Abstention
Defendant argues that we should abstain or stay under theColorado River doctrine because Plaintiff has an ongoing case in Commonwealth court stemming from the same underlying set of facts. (Docket No. 11.)
Colorado River abstention permits us to "abstain from hearing a case due to the presence of a concurrent state proceeding for reasons of wise judicial administration." United States v. Fairway Capital Corp., 483 F.3d 34, 40 (1st Cir. 2007) (citingColorado River, 424 U.S. at 819) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Generally, as between state and federal courts, the rule is that `the pendency of an action in state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter in the [f]ederal court having jurisdiction. . . .'" Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817 (quoting McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 282 (1910)).Colorado River abstention applies only in limited circumstances; we consider eight factors to determine whether to decline jurisdiction in a particular case:
(1) whether either court has assumed jurisdiction over a res; (2) the inconvenience of the federal forum; (3) the desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation; (4) the order in which the forums obtained jurisdiction; (5) whether state or federal law controls; (6) the adequacy of the state forum to protect the parties' interests; (7) the vexatious or contrived nature of the federal claim; and (8) respect for the principles underlying removal jurisdiction.Fairway Capital, 483 F.3d at 40 (quoting KPS Assocs. v. Designs by FMC, Inc., 318 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2003)). No single factor is determinative; instead, we must balance our "obligation to exercise jurisdiction" with the factors that weigh against that exercise. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 819.
Here, the only factor that arguably weighs in favor of abstention is the fact that the Commonwealth action was filed first, as Plaintiff filed her complaint in the Puerto Rico Court of First Instance on May 18, 2007, and filed the present action on July 27, 2008. (Docket Nos. 1, 16-2.) However, Plaintiff presents a reasonable explanation for why she filed in Puerto Rico court first: Her Commonwealth charges were an effort to seek protections immediately available at Puerto Rico law, and had she attempted, in May 2007, to file her charges together in federal court, her discrimination charges would have been subject to dismissal for failure to exhaust. (Docket No. 20); see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1), (f)(1) (requiring Title VII plaintiff to file administrative charge prior to initiating action in federal district court); 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (applying Title VII exhaustion requirements to ADA cases). We, therefore, find that this factor weighs in favor of abstention, although only weakly.
As to the remaining factors, although the Puerto Rico court would have been an adequate forum for Plaintiff's federal claims, this does not weigh in favor of abstention. See Fairway Capital, 483 F.3d at 43 (quoting Bethlehem Contracting Co. v. Lehrer/McGovern, Inc., 800 F.2d 325, 328 (2d Cir. 1986) (reasoning that "the possibility that the state court proceeding might adequately protect the interests of the parties is not enough to justify the district court's deference to the state action") (internal quotation marks omitted)). The other factors counsel in favor of our retaining jurisdiction. Accordingly, we decline to dismiss or stay the complaint under the Colorado River doctrine. See 424 U.S. at 817-19.
B. Res Judicata
Defendant argues that res judicata bars Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief under Law 115 because the Puerto Rico Court of First Instance denied that claim in its July 3, 2007, opinion. (Docket No. 11.)
Because we "accord a Puerto Rico judgment the same preclusive effect as would a Puerto Rico court, see 28 U.S.C. § 1738, we apply Puerto Rico res judicata law." Gener-Villar v. Adcom Group, Inc., 417 F.3d 201, 205 (1st Cir. 2005). Puerto Rico law precludes litigation of claims "that were, or could have been, brought in a previous action for which judgment has been rendered," where there is "perfect identity between the things, causes and person of the litigants." Barreto-Rosa v. Varona-Méndez, 470 F.3d 42, 45 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting 31 L.P.R.A. § 3343 (1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The doctrine requires a prior judgment on the merits that is final and unappealable. Cruz v. Melecio, 204 F.3d 14, 20 (1st Cir. 2000) ("[A Puerto Rico] court judgment cannot be accorded preclusive effect until all available appeals have been exhausted."). Under Puerto Rico law, claim preclusion attaches to a second action even if the plaintiff's first action was dismissed as premature. See Robles Meléndez v. Merck Co., 770 F. Supp. 71, 76 (D.P.R. 1991).
On July 3, 2007, the Puerto Rico Court of First Instance issued a judgment dismissing Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief as premature. (Docket No. 16-2.) This decision would appear to preclude further litigation of the same claim if it were final and unappealable. See Robles Meléndez, 770 F. Supp. at 76. Defendant asserts, but does not provide the documentation to prove, that Plaintiff appealed the denial of her Law 115 claim before the Puerto Rico Supreme Court, which denied the appeal. (Docket No. 11.) The present complaint is not clear as to the factual basis of Plaintiff's Law 115 claim, or, for that matter, any of her other claims. (See Docket No. 1.) Therefore, we cannot determine whether Plaintiff is indeed attempting to relitigate the claim already denied as premature by the Puerto Rico Supreme Court.
Accordingly, we order Defendant to show cause, on or before June 26, 2009, as to why we should not deny its motion to dismiss on res-judicata grounds. Defendant must supply documentation demonstrating that the judgment in Plaintiff's Puerto Rico case was final and unappealable. We also grant Plaintiff until June 26, 2009, to amend her complaint to state the factual basis underlying each claim so we can decide the res-judicata issue and any further motions.
IV. Conclusion
In accordance with the foregoing, we hereby DENY IN PART Defendant's motion to dismiss (Docket No. 11). We DENY Defendant's motion to dismiss or stay under Colorado River. We also ORDER Defendant to SHOW CAUSE, on or before June 26, 2009, as to why we should not deny its motion to dismiss on res-judicata grounds. To prevail, Defendant must supply documentation demonstrating that the judgment in Plaintiff's Puerto Rico case was final and unappealable. We also ORDER Plaintiff to amend her complaint to state the factual basis underlying each claim on or before June 26, 2009.