Opinion
98-CV-0235E(F)
October 8, 2002
MEMORANDUM and ORDER
This decision may be cited in whole or in any part.
Plaintiff commenced this action August 6, 1999 against his employer claiming that defendant ("Kenmore") had discriminated against him on the basis of his race, color and national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. ("Title VII"). Plaintiff asserted several causes of action under Title VII including the following: (1) failure to provide reasonable accommodations in the application process, (2) termination of employment, (3) failure to provide reasonable accommodations to allow him to perform the essential functions of his job, (4) harassment on the basis of unequal terms and conditions of employment and (5) retaliation toward him for his complaining about discrimination and harassment. In addition, plaintiff asserted a state law claim that the defendant had breached an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Thereafter, both parties filed motions for summary judgment. This Court, by an August 22, 2001 Memorandum and Order, denied plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and granted defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment with respect to all but two of plaintiff's claims. The two remaining causes of action in this case are plaintiff's Title VII claim that he was discriminated against in the terms and conditions of his employment and plaintiff's state law claim that defendant breached an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Defendant now moves this Court for summary judgment with respect to plaintiff's claim that defendant breached an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCvP") governs the grant or denial of summary judgment and provides that summary judgment shall be entered where the movant demonstrates that there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact" and that "the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323 (1986); FRCvP 56(c). A genuine issue of fact exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
A more detailed recitation of the facts and procedural history in this case is set out in this Court's August 23, 2001 Memorandum and Order. See Carchidi v. Kenmore Dev., No. 98-CV-0235E(F), 2001 WL 967569 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2001).
Plaintiff's state law claim based on a breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was not addressed by the defendant's motion for summary judgment and this Court declined to consider the merits of such claim. See Carchidi, at *2.
In deciding whether summary judgment is appropriate this Court must draw all factual inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co, 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970).
The facts alleged by plaintiff in support of his claim for breach of a covenant of good faith and fair dealing are the same facts as alleged in support of his Title VII claim. See Am. Compl. ¶ 13(j)(1)-(11). Plaintiff is essentially arguing that the defendant was subject to an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing because of the employment relationship between the two parties. Such covenant was breached, according to plaintiff, by defendant's discriminatory actions toward plaintiff. Ibid. Defendant argues that plaintiff was an employee-at-will and that New York Law does not impose an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing on an employer within such an employment relationship. See Def.'s Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J.
Under New York law, absent an agreement establishing a fixed duration of employment, an employment relationship is presumed to be at-will and either party may terminate such an employment relationship at any time. Wright v. Cayan, 817 F.2d 999, 1002 (2d Cir. 1987); Janneh v. Regency Hotel, 870 F. Supp. 37, 40 (N.D.N.Y. 1994); Sabetay v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 69 N.Y.2d 329, 333 (1987); Murphy v. American Home Products Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 300-301 (1983). In addition, New York Courts have rejected the argument that an employer has an implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing with respect to an at-will employment relationship. See Murphy, at 304-305 (holding that in the context of an employment-at-will relationship it would be incongruous to infer that an employer "impliedly agreed to a provision that would be destructive of his right of termination"); See also Wright, at 1004; Sabetay, at 335-336.
Plaintiff has not submitted any evidence that shows that he was hired by defendant for a fixed period of employment. Plaintiff was an employee-at-will and therefore either Carchidi or defendant could have terminated the employment relationship at any time without or without cause. In addition, because Carchidi was an employee-at-will, defendant was not subject to an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. There is no material fact that could support plaintiff's claim based on a breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
See Murphy, at 305 ("[A]bsent a constitutionally impermissible purpose, a statutory proscription, or an express limitation in the individual contract of employment, an employer's right at any time to terminate an employment at will remains unimpaired.").
Accordingly, no reasonable trier of fact could return a verdict for the plaintiff on such a claim and therefore defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex, at 322 (holding that summary judgment is mandated "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial").
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that defendant's motion for summary judgment with respect to plaintiff's cause of action for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is granted.