Opinion
# 2017-044-584 Claim No. 129245 Motion No. M-90325
11-21-2017
JOSEPH CARACCIA v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK
JOSEPH CARACCIA, pro se HON. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: Douglas H. Squire, Assistant Attorney General
Synopsis
Inmate claimant's motion for summary judgment in wrongful confinement claim denied; Court granted summary judgment dismissing the claim to defendant, without necessity for cross-motion.
Case information
| UID: | 2017-044-584 |
| Claimant(s): | JOSEPH CARACCIA |
| Claimant short name: | CARACCIA |
| Footnote (claimant name) : | |
| Defendant(s): | THE STATE OF NEW YORK |
| Footnote (defendant name) : | |
| Third-party claimant(s): | |
| Third-party defendant(s): | |
| Claim number(s): | 129245 |
| Motion number(s): | M-90325 |
| Cross-motion number(s): | |
| Judge: | CATHERINE C. SCHAEWE |
| Claimant's attorney: | JOSEPH CARACCIA, pro se |
| Defendant's attorney: | HON. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: Douglas H. Squire, Assistant Attorney General |
| Third-party defendant's attorney: | |
| Signature date: | November 21, 2017 |
| City: | Binghamton |
| Comments: | |
| Official citation: | |
| Appellate results: | |
| See also (multicaptioned case) |
Decision
Claimant, an inmate proceeding pro se, filed this claim to recover for damages for his allegedly wrongful confinement in a Special Housing Unit (SHU) as a result of a misbehavior report issued on August 26, 2016 while he was in the custody of the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) at Elmira Correctional Facility (Elmira). Defendant State of New York (defendant) answered and asserted two affirmative defenses. Claimant now moves for summary judgment. Defendant opposes the motion.
In his claim and in the documents submitted with this motion, claimant alleges that on August 26, 2016 he was confined to SHU and issued a misbehavior report charging him with violations of Prison Disciplinary Rules 113.10 (possession of a weapon), 114.1 (smuggling), and 115.10 (violation of frisk procedure). He states that the following day he was assigned an inmate employee assistant (a correction officer) in order to prepare for his pending Tier III Disciplinary Hearing. Claimant indicates that he informed the assistant that he wanted six inmates to be both interviewed and called as witnesses.
Claimant has submitted an affidavit and a Statement of Material Facts which reiterate most of the allegations of the claim. Claimant has also attached copies of the misbehavior report, hearing disposition, and appeal memorandum as Exhibits 1, 2 and 4, respectively.
A Tier III disciplinary hearing was held regarding the charges, and was completed on September 14, 2016. Claimant asserts that at the hearing, he again requested that he be allowed to call six inmate witnesses. He asserts that the Hearing Officer denied five of the six witnesses, without providing him with any witness refusal forms or explanation on the record. Claimant alleges that at the time he also objected to the hearing not being completed within 14 days after issuance of the misbehavior report. Claimant states that the Hearing Officer indicated that an extension of time had been granted, but when claimant requested proof of the extension, the Hearing Officer did not provide it. Claimant was found guilty of violating Prison Disciplinary Rules 113.10 and 114.1 and sentenced to one year of SHU confinement, with three months deferred.
On December 2, 2016, Donald Venettozzi, Director of Special Housing/Inmate Discipline reversed the disposition based upon the failure to maintain hearing records. Claimant notes that he had served 108 days of his SHU sentence when the determination was administratively reversed, and further states that he was not released from SHU confinement until December 12, 2016.
Statement of Material Facts, Exhibit 4.
Claimant, as the proponent of a summary judgment motion, is required to set forth evidentiary facts in admissible form which establish a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]; Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). Once this burden has been met, it is incumbent upon the opposing party to produce admissible evidence sufficient to create material issues of fact requiring a trial of the action (Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]). However, absent such a prima facie showing by the movant, the motion must be denied, regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers (Winegrad, 64 NY2d at 853).
In order to establish a prima facie case of wrongful confinement - a "species" of the tort of false imprisonment (Gittens v State of New York, 132 Misc 2d 399, 407 [Ct Cl 1986]) - a claimant must show that "(1) the defendant intended to confine him, (2) the [claimant] was conscious of the confinement, (3) the [claimant] did not consent to the confinement and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged" (Broughton v State of New York, 37 NY2d 451, 456 [1975], cert denied sub nom. Schanbarger v Kellogg, 423 US 929 [1975]). There is no dispute that defendant both intended to and did confine claimant without his consent in SHU as a result of the September 14, 2016 disciplinary hearing. Therefore, the only remaining issue is whether that confinement was privileged.
It is well-settled that defendant is entitled to absolute immunity from claims for monetary damages relating to disciplinary hearings so long as it complies with the rules and regulations that govern such hearings (Arteaga v State of New York, 72 NY2d 212 [1988]). Notwithstanding the subsequent reversal of the underlying disciplinary charges, whether administratively or via a successful CPLR Article 78 proceeding, the immunity is retained as long as the disciplinary proceedings were conducted consistent with the procedures provided in the relevant DOCCS rules and regulations (id.; see Davis v State of New York, 262 AD2d 887 [3d Dept 1999], lv denied 93 NY2d 819 [1999]). Immunity may be lost if defendant violated its own rules and regulations in conducting the hearing or otherwise acted outside the sphere of privileged actions and deprived the claimant of a due process safeguard (Arteaga, 72 NY2d at 220-221).
"Where an alleged regulatory violation implicates no constitutionally required due process safeguard, however, the State retains its absolute immunity from liability" (Bethune v State of New York, UID No. 2015-015-098 [Ct Cl, Collins, J., Dec. 7, 2015]).
Nevertheless, the violation of a rule or regulation alone is not a sufficient basis for a monetary award. Rather, the violation must have caused an actual injury or loss to the claimant (see e.g. Rivera v State of New York, UID No. 2006-028-008 [Ct Cl, Sise, P.J., Feb. 8, 2006]). In other words, claimant must show that if defendant had properly complied with its rules and regulations, the outcome of the hearing would have been different and claimant would not have been wrongfully confined or suffered damages (see Watson v State of New York, 125 AD3d 1064, 1065 [3d Dept 2015]; Lewis v State of New York, UID No. 2007-028-560 [Ct Cl, Sise, P.J., July 16, 2007]).
In his motion, claimant argues that the Hearing Officer wrongfully denied him his right to call witnesses to testify at the hearing. Conversely, defendant asserts that the Hearing Officer stated on the record that five of claimant's six requested witnesses refused to testify, and accordingly they would not be called. Defendant further contends that even if these witnesses had testified, claimant has failed to establish that their testimony would have changed the outcome of the hearing.
7 NYCRR 254.5 (a) provides that an "inmate may call witnesses on his behalf provided their testimony is material, is not redundant, and doing so does not jeopardize institutional safety or correctional goals." If the Hearing Officer denies permission to call a witness, the Officer must give the inmate a written statement containing the reasons, including the specific threat to safety or correctional goals (7 NYCRR 254.5 [a]). The requirement that the Hearing Officer provide a statement with reasons for the denial "applies as well where a requested witness has refused to testify" (Matter of Moye v Fischer, 93 AD3d 1006, 1007 [3d Dept 2012]; see Matter of Barnes v LeFevre, 69 NY2d 649, 650 [1986]). The Third Department has held that "[a] deprivation of the inmate's right to present witnesses will be found when there has been no inquiry at all into the reason for the witness's refusal, without regard to whether the inmate previously agreed to testify" (Matter of Hill v Selsky, 19 AD3d 64, 66 [3d Dept 2005]). In the situation where a witness had previously agreed to testify, but then changed his or her mind, the Hearing Officer "bears a greater responsibility to conduct a further inquiry into the legitimacy of [the] refusal" (Matter of Broadie v Annucci, 131 AD3d 1324, 1325 [3d Dept 2015]).
Although claimant has not submitted a copy of the disciplinary hearing transcript in support of his motion, defendant has provided a copy of the transcript as Exhibit B to its opposition papers and the Court will consider this exhibit in determining claimant's motion. A review of the hearing transcript reveals that when the hearing commenced on September 1, 2016, the Hearing Officer noted that claimant had requested six witnesses. He indicated that Inmate Carr and Inmate Adeyeye had both agreed to testify on claimant's behalf. However, the Hearing Officer specifically stated that "[e]verybody else had refused." The Hearing Officer did not indicate that the other four inmates had executed refusal forms nor did he make any inquiry into the reasons for their refusal. Accordingly, it appears that defendant violated 7 NYCRR 254.5 in its conduct of the hearing.
Affirmation of Assistant Attorney General (AAG) Douglas H. Squire, dated Aug. 31, 2017, in Opposition to Motion, Exhibit B at 4.
The Court notes that on September 7, 2016, Inmate Carr did testify (id., at 13). On September 13, 2016, the Hearing Officer informed claimant that he had called Inmate Adeyeye to testify, but Adeyeye essentially stated that when he agreed to testify, he had just woken up and thought he was agreeing to go to chow (id. at 17). According to the Hearing Officer, Adeyeye also indicated that he would not testify at the hearing because he had no knowledge of the incident and did not witness anything (id.). Adeyeye also apparently said that he had not been threatened or coerced to not testify, and further had executed a refusal form (id.). Clearly, the Hearing Officer satisfied the requirement that he inquire further into the legitimacy of Adeyeye's refusal, and therefore claimant's conditional right to call Adeyeye as a witness was not violated.
However, notwithstanding this apparent violation, claimant has not provided any evidence concerning the substance of the purported testimony of these requested witnesses who declined to testify. Without such evidence, claimant cannot establish that if the witnesses' testimony had been allowed, the outcome of the disciplinary hearing would have been different. Accordingly, claimant has failed to meet his burden of establishing his entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on his wrongful confinement cause of action based upon the Hearing Officer's alleged failure to call several requested witnesses.
Claimant also contends that defendant violated its rules and regulations by not holding the hearing in a timely manner, and further notes that he was not provided with any written extensions of time. In opposition, defendant argues that the hearing was timely commenced and that an extension of time to complete the hearing by September 14, 2016 had been granted.
7 NYCRR 251-5.1 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Where an inmate is confined pending a disciplinary hearing or superintendent's hearing, the hearing must be commenced as soon as is reasonably practicable following the inmate's initial confinement pending said disciplinary hearing or superintendent's hearing, but, in no event may it be commenced beyond seven days of said confinement without authorization of the commissioner or his designee.
(b) The disciplinary hearing or superintendent's hearing must be completed within 14 days following the writing of the misbehavior report unless otherwise authorized by the commissioner or his designee. Where a delay is authorized, the record of the hearing should reflect the reasons for any delay or adjournment, and an inmate should ordinarily be made aware of these reasons unless to do so would jeopardize institutional safety or correctional goals.
In this case, the misbehavior report was written and claimant was confined in SHU on August 26, 2016. The Tier III Hearing was commenced on September 1, 2016, clearly within seven days of claimant's confinement. The hearing was adjourned until September 7, 2016, when Inmate Carr testified, and then adjourned until September 13, 2016. At that time, claimant raised the objection that the hearing was not timely concluded within 14 days of his initial confinement. The Hearing Officer noted on the record that Extension Number 16-EB7093 had been granted and the hearing was to be completed by September 14, 2016. Although it does not appear that claimant was notified of the reasons for the extension, he has not submitted any evidence in support of his allegation that there was no extension or that the extension was not properly obtained. Accordingly, claimant has not met his burden of establishing that he was wrongfully confined based upon the purported violation of 7 NYCRR 251-5.1 governing the timeliness of disciplinary hearings.
Affirmation of AAG Douglas H. Squire, dated Aug. 31, 2017, in Opposition to Motion, Exhibit B at 3.
Id., at 13.
Id., at 16.
Id., at 17.
Id.
Lastly, claimant asserts that even though his disciplinary determination had been reversed on December 2, 2016, he remained wrongfully confined in SHU until December 12, 2016. Conversely, defendant contends that because claimant had been confined at Southport when the disciplinary determination was reversed, he was properly classified as admission detention until he could be transferred to another facility.
It is undisputed that claimant's determination was reversed on December 2, 2016, but he remained confined in SHU until he was transferred from Southport on December 12, 2016. Based upon these facts, it initially appears that claimant's continued confinement in SHU was not authorized. Accordingly, claimant has meet his burden of establishing entitlement to judgment as a matter of law with respect to this cause of action for wrongful confinement.
The burden now shifts to defendant to rebut claimant's prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Defendant has submitted the affidavit of D. Botsford, Director of DOCCS Classification and Movement. Botsford states that shortly after being notified that claimant's disciplinary determination had been reversed, Southport began the process necessary to transfer claimant to another facility. Botsford notes that in order to transfer an inmate, Classification and Movement must verify "whether [the receiving] facility has room to house the inmate and whether an inmate would be appropriate to be transferred to [that] facility. Prior to transfer, [Classification and Movement] verif[ies] that a facility can accommodate an inmate's medical needs and that there is no safety or security concerns with a particular inmate being transferred to a facility." Botsford indicates that as a result, inmates are not immediately transferred from one facility to another. Claimant's disciplinary determination was reversed on December 2, 2016, which was a Friday. According to Botsford, the Southport guidance office submitted a transfer referral to Classification and Movement on December 5, 2016, a Monday. On December 8, 2016, Classification and Movement issued a transfer order, and on Monday, December 12, 2016, claimant was transferred out of Southport. Botsford states that neither guidance office employees nor Classification and Movement analysts are available to process transfer requests on the weekends. He also asserts that Central Transportation operations are not functional on the weekends.
Id., Exhibit E, ¶ 4.
Director Venettozzi has submitted an affidavit in opposition to the motion as well. Venettozzi states that claimant's disciplinary sanction was reversed by memorandum dated December 2, 2016. Venettozzi indicates that a memorandum of this type is sent electronically to the appropriate facility (in this case, Southport) on the day it is issued. He further asserts that the following day, the facility is notified that there is documentation available which should be printed and processed.
T. Bradley, an Inmate Records Coordinator II at Southport, has also provided an affidavit in opposition to the motion. Bradley states that because Southport is a SHU-only facility, in order for an inmate to be moved to general population, the inmate would need to be transferred to a different facility. In order to accomplish a transfer, Bradley indicates that a guidance department employee (who does not work on the weekends) would submit a transfer request to DOCCS Classification and Movement. In claimant's case, that request was submitted on Monday, December 5, 2016. Bradley notes that Classification and Movement approved the transfer on Thursday, December 8, 2016.
Prior to the motion return date, defense counsel submitted a supplemental affirmation in further opposition to claimant's motion. Counsel for defendant states that he was initially advised that documentation pertaining to claimant's status as detention admission did not exist. However, counsel notes that after further investigation (presumably by DOCCS), the Attorney General's Office was provided with a memorandum on September 5, 2017. This memorandum is dated December 7, 2016 and is attached as Exhibit H to defendant's supplemental response. The memorandum was issued by Deputy Superintendent of Security K. Signor and informed claimant that he was being held in Detention Admission "pending a rehearing, reversal or [that his] SHU time [had] expired and [he was] awaiting a transfer." The memorandum specifically provided that "[t]he use of Detention Admission [was] governed via Directive # 4933 - Special Housing Units § 301.3 A 3 [and that] Albany Classification and Movement [would] transfer [him] when an appropriate facility [was] found." The memorandum appeared to indicate that claimant's status as detention admission was reviewed daily from December 7, 2016 through December 11, 2016.
The Court notes that in his notice of motion claimant properly demanded that answering papers be served seven days before the motion return date (see CPLR 2214 [b]). This motion was subsequently adjourned until September 13, 2017. Defendant's initial answering papers were timely served on August 31, 2016. However, AAG Squire's supplemental affirmation was served on September 7, 2016, only six days before the motion return date. Although this further opposition is untimely, claimant has not objected to the supplemental response, and the Court discerns no prejudice in accepting and considering it in determining this motion.
Supplemental Affirmation of AAG Douglas H. Squire, dated Sept. 7, 2016, Exhibit H at 2.
Id.
Pursuant to 22 NYCRR §§ 301.1, an inmate may be admitted to SHU for any of several reasons, including detention admission (see also 22 NYCRR § 301.3 [a]). As is pertinent in claimant's case, "[d]etention admissions may be used . . . in cases where an inmate is awaiting transfer from Southport." Claimant's disciplinary determination was reversed on December 2, 2016 and Southport was notified on December 3, 2016. Because Southport is a SHU-only facility, a transfer was necessary for claimant to be released into a less restrictive confinement. Southport requested a transfer on Monday, December 5, 2016, the first business day after receiving the administrative reversal. The transfer was approved by Classification and Movement on Thursday, December 8, 2016. Claimant was transferred on Monday, December 12, 2016, two business days later. The Court finds that claimant's confinement in SHU as detention admission, after reversal of his disciplinary determination, was privileged as a matter of law. Accordingly, claimant's motion for summary judgment is denied. After searching the record, the Court grants defendant summary judgment dismissing this cause of action for wrongful confinement, without the necessity of a cross motion (see CPLR 3212 [b]).
22 NYCRR § 301.3 (a) (3).
In conclusion, claimant has failed to meet his initial burden of showing his entitlement to judgment as a matter of law with respect to the cause of action for wrongful confinement based upon the purported violations of 7 NYCRR §§ 251-5.1 and 254.5. Moreover, defendant has set forth evidence which establishes that claimant's continued confinement in SHU after his disciplinary determination was reversed was privileged as a matter of law. Accordingly, claimant's motion for summary judgment is denied in its entirety. Defendant is granted summary judgment dismissing the cause of action for wrongful confinement from December 2, 2016 through December 12, 2016.
November 21, 2017
Binghamton, New York
CATHERINE C. SCHAEWE
Judge of the Court of Claims The following papers were read on claimant's motion: 1) Notice of Motion filed April 28, 2017; Affidavit of Joseph Caraccia, sworn to March 28, 2017; Statement of Material Facts dated March 20, 2017, and attached exhibits. 2) Affirmation in Opposition of Douglas H. Squire, AAG, dated August 31, 2017, and attached exhibits. 3) Supplemental Affirmation of Douglas H. Squire, AAG, dated September 7, 2017, and attached exhibit. Filed Papers: Claim filed on January 31, 2017; Verified Answer filed on March 2, 2017.