Opinion
No. HDSP-154717
August 5, 2010
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS FEES
The defendant, Sandra Martin, brings this timely motion for attorneys fees pursuant to General Statutes § 42-150bb and Practice Book § 11-21, following the plaintiff landlord's withdrawal of a summary process action against her. The landlord did not file a written objection and at the hearing held on the motion opposed neither the defendant's entitlement to an award under the statute by virtue of the lease nor the hourly rate. Rather the plaintiff focused its entire attention on the extent of the legal services provided and the total amount of the fees sought.
Practice Book § 11-21 provides for motions for attorneys fees to be filed within thirty days "following the date on which the final judgment of the trial court was rendered." Final judgment was rendered in this case on March 26, 2010 when the case was withdrawn by the plaintiff. The motion for attorneys fees was filed in the Superior Court Housing Session on March 30, 2010.
The defendant also argued that if the full amount sought was awarded that it will encourage similar motions to be filed by others and that ultimately attorneys fee awards will get passed on to tenants. Because this argument was made without the benefit of evidence or legal authority, the court does not consider it.
Section 42-150bb provides in pertinent part as follows: "Whenever any contract or lease . . . to which a consumer is a party, provides for the attorneys fee of the commercial party to be paid by the consumer, an attorneys fee shall be awarded as a matter of law to the consumer who successfully prosecutes or defends an action . . . [T]he size of the attorneys fee awarded to the consumer shall be based as far as practicable upon the terms governing the size of the fee for the commercial party . . . For the purposes of this section, "commercial party" means the seller, creditor, lessor or assignee of any of them, and "consumer" means the buyer, debtor, lessee or personal representative of any of them." The parties stipulated that attachment 6 to the lease in question contains the following provision: "As the resident, you are responsible to pay the Landlord all costs, including marshal fees and reasonable attorneys fees incurred by the Landlord in any legal proceeding as the result of a default under the terms of this Agreement as may be determined and rendered as a judgment by the Court." (Defendant's Exhibit 1.)
The defendant seeks fees for 12.8 hours of legal work at a rate of $300 per hour for the successful defense of the summary process action amounting to $3,840. The total includes three hours of time spent in court on May 3, 2010, the first day of the hearing on this motion. The plaintiff argues that the defendant should be awarded a maximum of $500 because that is the going rate for attorneys fee awards for landlords in the housing court. However, upon inquiry, the plaintiff conceded that the $500 maximum is for those cases wherein an attorneys fee affidavit is not submitted. In this case, the defendant's legal counsel, Attorney David Pels of Greater Hartford Legal Aid, has submitted a detailed time spent bill accompanied by an affidavit and testified at length at trial on the details of his legal representation of the defendant in connection with the plaintiff's prosecution of the underlying summary process action. At the hearing, Attorney Pels was represented by Attorney Cecil Thomas, another attorney from his office. Despite the time and services obviously expended by Attorney Thomas in prosecuting the motion for attorneys fees, the defendant requests fees only for the work of Attorney Pels.
Attorney Pels testified in detail as to the work performed in defense of this case as reflected in his contemporaneous time records. He was cross examined as to each entry by Attorney William Reckmeyer on behalf of the plaintiff. Other than the three hours claimed for the hearings held by this court on May 3, 2010, the last entry is for March 27, 2010 when the withdrawal of the summary process action was received and reviewed. The court finds that the work performed in connection with each entry contained in Attorney Pels's billing records was well justified.
"It is well established that a trial court calculating a reasonable attorneys fee makes its determination while considering the factors set forth under rule 1.5(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct . . . A court utilizing the factors of rule 1.5(a) considers, inter alia, the time and labor spent by the attorneys, the novelty and complexity of the legal issues, fees customarily charged in the same locality for similar services, the lawyer's experience and ability, relevant time limitations, the magnitude of the case and the results obtained, the nature and length of the lawyer-client relationship, and whether the fee is fixed or contingent." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Schoonmaker v. Lawrence Brunoli, Inc., 265 Conn. 210, 259, 828 A.2d 64 (2003).
Rule 1.5(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct provides "A lawyer's fee shall be reasonable. The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following: (1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (2) The likelihood, if made known to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; (3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; (4) The amount involved and the results obtained; (5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; (6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; (7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and (8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent."
In accordance with his testimony, Attorney Pels has worked for Greater Hartford Legal Aid as an attorney representing low income persons in civil actions since October 1974 specializing in housing matters. He handles approximately 200 cases per year, 95% of which are summary process evictions. In addition, he conducts training in housing matters and is otherwise involved in such matters for the Connecticut Bar Association, various tenant organizations and the Citizens Advisory Council on Housing. He has represented the defendant since February 2, 2009. Because summary process is an expedited proceeding, it is essential that he stay on top of each case. Unlike representing a landlord in summary process matters which are quite routine and often end in default and involve only a single court appearance, when Greater Hartford Legal Assistance represents a tenant, the cases regularly have to be litigated and require multiple court appearances. Having presided over housing matters, the court recognizes that defending housing cases is very specialized yet it is unlikely that a member of the private bar could make a living representing tenants in eviction cases. Therefore, the court must focus on the length and depth of counsel's experience, the difficulty and nature of the legal services performed, the number of hours expended, the result obtained, the time limitations imposed by the expedited nature of summary process proceedings and the reputation and ability of the attorney. Based on all these factors, the court finds that Attorney Pels has earned the entire amount of the legal fees claimed, that the fees are reasonable and well justified under all the circumstances.
Further, the court finds that the plaintiff is also entitled to receive fees for the additional three hours spent litigating this motion. It is within the discretion of the trial court to award supplementary attorneys fees for various posttrial motions. See Stokes v. Norwich Taxi, LLC, 289 Conn. 465, 493-94, 958 A.2d 1195 (2008) (upholding the trial court's award of attorneys fees for both the trial and for various posttrial motions). See also Taylor v. King, 121 Conn.App. 105, 132, 994 A.2d 330 (2010). "[Trial courts] assess the reasonableness of the fees requested using any number of factors, including its general knowledge of the case, sworn affidavits or other testimony, itemized bills, and the like . . . [T]he value [of reasonable attorneys fees] is based upon many considerations." Smith v. Snyder, 267 Conn. 456, 480, 839 A.2d 589 (2004).
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, the motion for attorneys fees is hereby granted in the amount of $3,840.