It is axiomatic that a trial court should not substitute its opinion for that of the jury as to factual questions and that the granting of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or the setting aside of a verdict cannot stand in such a situation. Visoky v. Lavoie, 64 Conn. App. 501, 504, 779 A.2d 1284 (2001); see Caprood v. Atlanta Casualty Co., 80 Conn. App. 338, 340, 835 A.2d 74 (2003). This is not such a case.
(Emphasis in original.) Caprood v. Atlanta Casualty Co., 80 Conn. App. 338, 343, 835 A.2d 338 (2003). An adverse inference may be drawn in a civil action "from another party's failure to call a witness who has been proven to be available to testify."
In my view, a defendant in a motor vehicle negligence action always may dispute whether the negligent conduct in question caused the injuries and damages complained of by a plaintiff, even when liability is not contested.31a See, e.g., General Accident Ins. Co. v. Mortara, 314 Conn. 339, 353, 101 A.3d 942 (2014) (discussing uninsured motorist benefits case in which "the disputed issue did not pertain to insurance coverage, but to damages that would have been recoverable from the tortfeasor"); Bodner v. United Services Automobile Assn., 222 Conn. 480, 488, 610 A.2d 1212 (1992) (defendant uninsured motorist insurance carrier disputed only "the amount of damages" plaintiff sustained); Trujillo v. Chekas, 139 Conn. App. 675, 678, 59 A.3d 245 (2012) (plaintiff in action to recover uninsured motorist benefits "failed to carry his burden of establishing the threshold question of causation, which was contested at trial"); Caprood v. Atlanta Casualty Co., 80 Conn. App. 338, 339, 835 A.2d 74 (2003) ("[t]he defendant [uninsured motorist insurance carrier] denied that the plaintiff had been injured as a result of the negligent conduct of the hit-and-run driver" (emphasis altered)); Garcia v. ITT Hartford Ins. Co., 72 Conn. App. 588, 590, 805 A.2d 779 (2002) (answer filed by defendant uninsured motorist insurance carrier "denied most of the allegations in the complaint"); Daigle v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 60 Conn. App. 465, 467-68, 760 A.2d 117 (2000) ("[t]he defendant [uninsured motorist insurance carrier] admitted that the tortfeasors were negligent, but contested the causal relationship between the accidents and the injuries claimed, as well as their extent"), aff’d, 257 Conn. 359, 777 A.2d 681 (2001). Simply put, liability for a motor vehicle accident is different from liability for injuries allegedly sustained therein.
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Caprood v. Atlanta Casualty Co., 80 Conn. App. 338, 341, 835 A.2d 74 (2003). "Negligence is conduct which creates an undue risk of harm to others."
In analyzing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, the test that we employ is whether, on the basis of the evidence before the jury, a reasonable and properly motivated jury could return the verdict that it did . . ." Caprood v. Atlanta Casualty Co., 80 Conn.App. 338, 340, 835 A.2d 74 (2003). Clearly, this was a case where the issue of damages was far from clear.
The court is also required to draw any inferences which the jury might have drawn if such inferences will allow the verdict to be sustained. Caprood v. Atlanta Casualty Co., 80 Conn.App. 338 (2003). The court finds that the non-economic damages awarded by the jury do require either that the verdict be set aside or that the court's order of remittitur extend to non-economic damages.
It is axiomatic that in deciding to set aside a verdict and remittur the court must determine if the evidence reasonably supports the verdict. Caprood v. Atlanta Casualty, 80 Conn.App 338 (2003). Here the jury heard testimony from the plaintiff that promises were made to him by the defendant for compensation due him for his photo copy deal. It also heard that the plaintiff relied on these promises in the purchase of a home.
The court's determination in reviewing a verdict is whether the evidence reasonably supports the verdict. Caprood v. Atlanta Casualty Co., 80 Conn. App. 338 (2003). The court is satisfied that the jury from the evidence could have reasonably found the defendant's conduct did not constitute common-law recklessness.