Capron v. Douglass

5 Citing cases

  1. People v. Wilkins

    65 N.Y.2d 172 (N.Y. 1985)   Cited 49 times

    There can be no question, therefore, that defendant's statements to Dr. Sharma that the wounds of his wrist and abdomen were self-inflicted, had they been made to a physician, would be privileged within the meaning of CPLR 4504. It has, however, long been the rule that when a patient puts in issue the condition for which he was examined by a physician he waives the privilege to the extent of permitting the physician to testify as to the facts upon which his opinion is based, but not on matters unrelated to the opinion concerning defendant's guilt of a crime ( People v Edney, 39 N.Y.2d 620; People v Al-Kanani, 33 N.Y.2d 260, 264; Matter of Lee v County Ct., 27 N.Y.2d 432, 441; People v Carfora, 25 N.Y.2d 972; People v Finn, 64 A.D.2d 526; see, People v Smith, 59 N.Y.2d 156, 164; Koump v Smith, 25 N.Y.2d 287; Hethier v Johns, 233 N.Y. 370; Capron v Douglass, 193 N.Y. 11).

  2. People v. Edney

    39 N.Y.2d 620 (N.Y. 1976)   Cited 68 times
    In Edney, the New York Court of Appeals held that the attorney-client privilege was waived because State law allowed prosecutors to compel a defendant to submit to an examination by a State-retained psychiatric expert, and therefore the very facts that would be secreted by the privilege necessarily would be disclosed through the compelled examination.

    People v. Carfora, 25 N.Y.2d 972). When the patient first fully discloses the evidence of his affliction, it is he who has given the public the full details of his case, thereby disclosing the secrets which the statute was designed to protect, thus creating a waiver removing it from the operation of the statute (Capron v. Douglass, 193 N.Y. 11; Koump v. Smith, 25 N.Y.2d 287; Davis v. Davis, 1 A.D.2d 675; Waiver of Privilege As Regards One Physician As A Waiver As To Other Physicians, Ann., 5 ALR 3d 1244, 1247-1251); and once the privilege is thus waived, there is nothing left to protect against for once the revelation is made by the patient there is nothing further to disclose `for when a secret is out it is out for all time and cannot be caught again like a bird and put back in its cage. * * * The legislature did not intend to continue the privilege when there was no reason for its continuance and it would simply be an obstruction to public justice' (People v. Bloom 193 N.Y. 1, 10)". Our holding in the case now before us comports with this rationale and is but a logical extension of our determination in Al-Kanani.

  3. People v. Al-Kanani

    33 N.Y.2d 260 (N.Y. 1973)   Cited 61 times   1 Legal Analyses

    We hold that where insanity is asserted as a defense and, as here, the defendant offers evidence tending to show his insanity in support of this plea, a complete waiver is effected, and the prosecution is then permitted to call psychiatric experts to testify regarding his sanity even though they may have treated the defendant (cf. People v. Carfora, 25 N.Y.2d 972). When the patient first fully discloses the evidence of his affliction, it is he who has given the public the full details of his case, thereby disclosing the secrets which the statute was designed to protect, thus creating a waiver removing it from the operation of the statute ( Capron v. Douglass, 193 N.Y. 11; Koump v. Smith, 25 N.Y.2d 287; Davis v. Davis, 1 A.D.2d 675; Waiver of Privilege As Regards One Physician As A Waiver As To Other Physicians, Ann., 5 ALR 3d 1244, 1247-1251); and once the privilege is thus waived, there is nothing left to protect against for once the revelation is made by the patient there is nothing further to disclose "for when a secret is out it is out for all time and cannot be caught again like a bird and put back in its cage.

  4. People v. Wilkins

    101 A.D.2d 957 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984)   Cited 5 times

    The principles under which confidentiality is deemed to be waived are equally applicable to both privileges. The overriding, and here controlling, principle of waiver is that a litigant may not use the privilege as "both a sword and a shield" ( Capron v Douglass, 193 N.Y. 11, 17). By this is meant that "[a] party should not be permitted to assert a * * * physical condition in seeking * * * to absolve himself from liability and at the same time assert the privilege in order to prevent the other party from ascertaining the truth of the claim" ( Koump v Smith, 25 N.Y.2d 287, 294; see, also, People v Al-Kanani, 33 N.Y.2d 260, 264-265, cert den 417 U.S. 916).

  5. People v. Conklin

    72 A.D.2d 607 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979)

    The People in rebuttal offered testimony as to his physical condition by a doctor who examined him at Grasslands Hospital where he went for treatment following the accident. The testimony of defendant's witnesses must be deemed to have been "given with his knowledge and consent" (see Capron v Douglass, 193 N.Y. 11, 17), thus constituting a waiver of the physician-patient privilege (see People v Al-Kanani, 33 N.Y.2d 260, 264). Mollen, P.J., Hopkins, Titone and Mangano, JJ., concur.