Capron v. Douglass

2 Citing cases

  1. Engl v. Ætna Life Ins.

    139 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1943)   Cited 206 times
    Allowing an opposing party to “reserve one's evidence when faced with a motion for summary judgment” would render “useless the very valuable remedy of summary judgment”

    Of course, she, or at least the deceased's "personal representatives," had the undoubted right to waive the privilege. New York Civil Practice Act, § 354, permitting waiver "upon the trial or examination"; Capron v. Douglass, 193 N.Y. 11, 85 N.E. 827, 20 L.R.A., N.S., 1003; Lorde v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 252 App. Div. 646, 300 N.Y.S. 721. But it is a complete non sequitur to say that this federal rule has such an extensive application as to control, and, as we believe, largely to nullify, another federal rule more directly involved, namely, Rule 56, concerning summary judgments. The limitation of Federal Rule 26(b) of the scope of examination before trial to relevant matter not privileged has a quite different objective from that visualized in the plaintiff's argument.

  2. Doe v. Roe

    155 Misc. 2d 392 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992)   Cited 7 times

    Further, it would seem obvious that plaintiff's physical illness and the degree of its stage of advancement may manifest itself by other physical and mental side-effects. One prosecuting a claim such as this may not use his illness as both sword and shield (cf., Capron v Douglass, 193 N.Y. 11, 17).