Opinion
Civil Action 3:17-CV-02413
10-20-2021
FRANK JAMES CAPOZZI, SR., Plaintiff, v. CATERING BY MARLINS, INC., et al., Defendants.
RAMBO, J.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK, Chief United States Magistrate Judge.
This is a pro se prisoner civil rights action initiated upon the filing of a Complaint in this matter on December 29, 2017, by Plaintiff Frank James Capozzi, Sr. (“Capozzi”). (Doc. 1). In his Complaint, Capozzi alleges Catering By Marlins, Inc. (“CMB”), Lackawanna County Prison Officials, Colleen Orzell, and the Scranton City Council's Prison Committee Board violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Doc. 1, at 4). For the reasons provided herein, the undersigned recommends DISMISSAL for failure to prosecute pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41.
I. Background and Procedural History
Capozzi filed the Complaint, along with a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, on December 29, 2017. (Doc. 1, at 3); (Doc. 2). At the time he filed his Complaint, Capozzi was incarcerated at Lackawanna County Prison (“LCP”). (Doc. 1, at 5). Capozzi asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against CBM, various personnel at LCP, and the Scranton City Council's Prison Committee Board. (Doc. 1, at 3). In the Complaint, Capozzi alleges LCP officials violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by failing to accommodate his religiously motivated dietary preferences during the Lenten season. (Doc. 1, at 4). Additionally, in his second cause of action, Capozzi claims Defendant Orzel failed to timely review and respond to his grievances in accordance with times set forth in LCP's grievance handbook. (Doc. 1, at 4). As relief, Capozzi seeks monetary damages from each named Defendant, “an Order to restore the Lenten Meals and the Easter Fest, ” expedited administration of the LCP's internal grievance system, and attorney's fees. (Doc. 1, at 4-5).
The Court granted Capozzi's motion to proceed in forma pauperis on September 21, 2018. (Doc. 11, at 1).
In October 2018, Capozzi was released from custody and filed a Notice for Change of Address with the Court. (Doc. 20).
On November 19, 2018, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Capozzi's second cause of action for failure to state a claim. (Doc. 28). On July 25, 2019, the Court granted the Motion and remanded further proceedings to the undersigned. (Doc. 34). On November 27, 2019, Defendants Tim Betti, Mari Finlon, David Langan, and Colleen Orzel (“LCP Officials”) filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 39). On December 3, 2019, CBM filed a separate Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 42). On September 18, 2020, the Court granted CBM's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 50), but denied LCP Officials' Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 51).
On March 19, 2021, the Court scheduled a telephonic status conference to be held on April 8, 2021, but the Order was returned as “undeliverable.” (Doc. 52); (Doc. 53). On April 8, 2021, Capozzi failed to appear for the Court-ordered status conference and the Court issued an Order directing Capozzi to show cause on or before May 8, 2021, as to why he failed to appear, why he failed to update his address on the docket, and why the Court should not recommend dismissal of the matter for failure to prosecute. (Doc. 55). Capozzi has not responded to the April 8, 2021, Order. This Order was not the first time the Court advised Capozzi of his duty to update his address; he was advised of the same in previous Court Orders issued in this case. (Doc. 18); (Doc. 31).
I. Discussion
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) authorizes the court to dismiss an action “[i]f the plaintiff fails to prosecute.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b). The United States Supreme Court has held that “[t]he authority of a court to dismiss sua sponte for lack of prosecution has generally been considered an ‘inherent power,' governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” Inarrito v. Altizer, NO. 3:17-CV-0489, 2018 WL 4705556, *1 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2018) (quoting Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 631 (1962)). “Such a dismissal is deemed to be an adjudication on the merits, barring any further action between the parties.” Iseley v. Bitner, 216 Fed.Appx. 252, 255 (3d Cir. 2007). Ordinarily, when deciding, sua sponte, to dismiss an action as a sanction, a district court is required to consider and balance six factors enumerated in Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984). “However, when a litigant's conduct makes adjudication of the case impossible, such balancing under Poulis is unnecessary.” SeeMcLaren v. N.J. Dept. ofEduc., 462 Fed.Appx. 148, 149 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Guyer v. Beard, 907 F.2d 1424, 1429-30 (3d Cir. 1990); Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 454-55 (3d Cir. 1994)); see also Doe v. Megless, 654 F.3d 404, 411 (3d Cir. 2011) (the District Court did not clearly err in determining that “[b]ecause Doe's conduct makes adjudication of the case impossible, dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(b) is appropriate, even without consideration of the Poulis factors”).
In Inarrito v. Altizer, the Court dismissed an action initiated by a pro se prisoner-plaintiff when the plaintiff failed to adequately communicate with the Court. 2018 WL 4705556, at *1. After the plaintiff was released from custody on January 5, 2018, he failed to provide the Court with his current address. Inarrito, 2018 WL 4705556, *1. The plaintiff did not communicate with the Court for approximately fifteen months prior to the court issuing its decision, and for the eleven months prior to the decision “all court correspondence addressed to plaintiff [were] returned as undeliverable.” Inarrito, 2018 WL 4705556, *1. The Court noted that “a pro se plaintiff has the affirmative obligation to keep the court informed of his address” pursuant to the Standing Practice Order issued in pro se plaintiff cases, as well as Local Rule 83.18 of the Rules of Court for the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Inarrito, 2018 WL 4705556, *2. Because the plaintiff abandoned his affirmative obligation of updating the court as to his address, the Court dismissed his action pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b) without prejudice. Inarrito, 2018 WL 4705556, *2.
Local Rule 83.18 provides in part: “Whenever a party... is not represented in the action, such party shall maintain on file with the clerk a current address at which all notices and copies of pleadings, motions or papers in the action may be served upon such party.” M.D. Pa. LR 83.18.
See also Srock v. Clark, 2019 WL 294763, *2 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 23, 2019) (dismissing pro se prisoner-plaintiff's action without prejudice for failure to prosecute after plaintiff failed to update his address upon release from prison and citing Rule 83.18 and a desire to avoid “a waste of judicial resources” if the action were allowed to continue).
Capozzi initiated this action on December 29, 2017, as a pro se prisoner-plaintiff. (Doc. 1). Capozzi's last communication with the Court occurred in October 2018, approximately three years ago, when he filed a Notice for Change of Address, evidencing his release from prison custody. (Doc. 20, at 1). Since that time, the Court directed two mailings to Capozzi, both of which were returned as undeliverable. (Doc. 30); (Doc. 52). “If the Court is unable to communicate with plaintiff because he has failed to notify the court of his address, the plaintiff will be deemed to have abandoned the lawsuit.” Inarrito, 2018 WL 4705556, *2. In failing to respond to the various motions filed by Defendants or update his address, Capozzi has failed to demonstrate his desire to prosecute this action. Additionally, Capozzi has failed to comply with two explicit directives of the Court and the Rules of Court for the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. See (Doc. 18); (Doc. 31); (Doc. 55); M.D. Pa. LR 83.18; see alsoInarrito, 2018 WL 4705556, *2; Torres v. Leedom, No. 4:16-CV-44, 2018 WL 1035775, *2 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 2018) (pro se litigants must “comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of the District Court.”). Thus, “[i]t is reasonable to conclude that plaintiff has abandoned this lawsuit.” Inarrito, 2018 WL 4705556, *2.
For these reasons, it is respectfully recommended that this action be DISMISSED, and the Clerk of Court be directed to CLOSE this case.
NOTICE
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned has entered the foregoing Report and Recommendation dated October 20, 2021.
Any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.