Capoun Revocable Trust v. Ansari

14 Citing cases

  1. State v. Fedler

    Appeal Nos. 01-2657, 01-2658 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2002)

    Wis. Stat. § 805.17(2). However, the construction of a statute or its application to the facts as found by the circuit court is a question of law which we review de novo. Capoun Revocable Trust v. Ansari, 2000 WI App. 83, ¶ 6, 234 Wis.2d 335, 610 N.W.2d 129. ¶ 6.

  2. American Eagle Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin Ins. Sec. Fund

    2005 WI App. 177 (Wis. Ct. App. 2005)   Cited 4 times

    However, the Fund contends that we must apply a more deferential standard of review because it is charged with administering Chapter 646 of the Wisconsin Statutes. Reinsurance Corp. responds that because the provisions under review concern the scope of the Fund's power, the Fund's interpretation is not entitled to deference, citing Capoun Revocable Trust v. Ansari, 2000 WI App 83, 234 Wis. 2d 335, 610 N.W.2d 129. ¶ 10.

  3. State v. Stenklyft

    2005 WI 71 (Wis. 2005)   Cited 71 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding that courts should interpret statutes as constitutional whenever possible

    Thus, it is essential that the person claiming the constitutional violation establish that the state deprived him of a constitutionally protected interest in life, liberty, or property before the court may address whether the state employed constitutionally adequate process. Capoun Revocable Trust v. Ansari, 2000 WI App 83, ¶ 15, 234 Wis. 2d 335, 610 N.W.2d 129; Robinson v. McCaughtry, 177 Wis. 2d 293, 300, 501 N.W.2d 896 (Ct.App. 1993). "The procedural guarantees of the due process clause apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and property."

  4. State v. Mascaretti

    2010 WI App. 33 (Wis. Ct. App. 2010)

    When an appellant fails to dispute the respondent's assertions in his reply brief, this court will assume that the appellant implicitly accepts those assertions. Capoun Revocable Trust v. Ansari, 2000 WI App 83, ¶ 4 n. 5, 234 Wis. 2d 335, 610 N.W.2d 129; Charolais Breeding Ranches, Ltd. v. FPC Sec Corp., 90 Wis. 2d 97, 109, 279 N.W.2d 493 (Ct. App. 1979). Although we have upheld the trial court's orders for the reasons discussed in the body of our decision, Mascaretti's failure to refute the State's arguments in his reply brief constitutes an additional ground for upholding the trial court's orders.

  5. Collins v. Heise

    776 N.W.2d 101 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009)

    A person claiming a procedural due process violation must establish state deprivation of a constitutionally protected interest in life, liberty, or property. SeeCapoun Revocable Trust v. Ansari, 2000 WI App 83, ¶ 15, 234 Wis. 2d 335, 610 N.W.2d 129. The same is true of a substantive due process claim. SeeDane County Dep't of HumanServs. v. Ponn P., 2005 WI 32, ¶ 20, 279 Wis. 2d 169, 694 N.W.2d 344.

  6. Dotty Dumpling's Dowry, Ltd. v. Community Development Authority

    2002 WI App. 200 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002)   Cited 7 times
    In Dotty Dumpling's the owner did not argue that the property identified by the condemnor was not a "comparable replacement business" within the meaning of Wis. STAT. § 32.19(2)(c); rather the issue was whether "made available" in Wis.

    In short, Dotty's interpretation would render meaningless the subsections of § 32.19 which place upper limits on relocation assistance payments, and it is thus an interpretation we cannot adopt. SeeCapoun Revocable Trust v. Ansari, 2000 WI App 83, ¶ 13, 234 Wis.2d 335, 610 N.W.2d 129. ¶ 28.

  7. Outagamie Cty. v. McGlone

    644 N.W.2d 293 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002)

    STANDARD OF REVIEW¶ 10. Whether the right to due process has been violated is a constitutional question that we review independently of the circuit court. Capoun Revocable Trust v. Ansari, 2000 WI App 83, ¶ 6, 234 Wis.2d 335, 610 N.W.2d 129. DISCUSSION

  8. MAYER v. STATE DEPT. OF AGRI

    638 N.W.2d 393 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001)

    ¶ 20. While the standard for implied authority is difficult to satisfy, this court has recognized instances where an agency's authority was implied. For example, we recognized that the Department of Natural Resources has jurisdiction to issue after-the-fact permits, as well as those issued before the commencement of construction, even though no statutory section expressly so provides. Capoun Revocable Trust v.Ansari, 2000 WI App 83, ¶ 13, 234 Wis.2d 335, 610 N.W.2d 129. The legislature charged the DNR with administering permits relating to waterways. Id. at ¶ 11. Rather than adopting a narrow construction of the statutes, we read pertinent sections together to determine the overall legislative intent.

  9. Time Warner, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire

    633 N.W.2d 640 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001)   Cited 2 times

    II. DISCUSSION¶ 12. Reviewing a circuit court's grant of summary judgment, we apply the same methodology as that of the circuit court but review its decision de novo. Capoun Revocable Trust v. Ansari, 2000 WI App 83, ¶ 5, 234 Wis.2d 335, 610 N.W.2d 129, review denied, 2000 WI 88, 237 Wis.2d 253, 616 N.W.2d 115. Reviewing the summary judgment in this case, we must consider the circuit court's interpretation of certain contractual indemnity provisions. A circuit court's interpretation of a contract also is subject to our de novo review.

  10. Maple Leaf v. State

    2001 WI App. 170 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001)   Cited 4 times
    In Maple Leaf Farms, Inc. v. State Department of Natural Resources, 247 Wisc.2d 96, 633 N.W.2d 720 (Wisc. Ct. App. 2001), the court rejected the argument that "all permit language must be formally promulgated by rule."

    The de novo standard applies if construction of the statute involves interpreting the scope of an agency's power. CapounRevocable Trust v. Ansari, 2000 WI App 83, ¶ 6, 234 Wis.2d 335, 610 N.W.2d 129. The parties agree that this appeal addresses the scope of the DNR's authority under the WPDES permit program. Therefore, we engage in a de novo analysis of the applicable law.