Of the ones that are not distinguished here, none are controlling with respect to this Court. — The following cases cited in Justice LEVIN'S opinion are distinguishable from this case because they are not employment contract cases: City of Superior v Douglas Co Telephone Co, 141 Wis. 363; 122 N.W. 1023 (1909); Caplis v Monroe, 228 Mich. 586; 200 N.W. 123 (1924); Long Beach Drug Co v United Drug Co, 13 Cal.2d 158; 88 P.2d 698 (1939); Fuchs v United Motor Stage Co, Inc, 135 Ohio St. 509; 21 N.E.2d 669 (1939); Phelps v Shawprint, Inc, 328 Mass. 352; 103 N.E.2d 687 (1952); Big Spring v Texas Bd of Control, 404 S.W.2d 810 (Tex, 1966); State v Orkin Exterminating Co, Inc, 528 So.2d 198 (La App, 1988). — In the following cases, the contract provisions outlining durational terms are clearly and specifically set out in writing so that the parties' intent is more easily discernible. Of course, in the instant case, we must attempt to ascertain the parties' intent from vague oral statements: Fuchs; Long Beach Drug Co; Big Spring, supra; McMullan v Dickinson Co, 60 Minn. 156; 62 N.W. 120 (1895); Kirkley v FH Roberts Co, 268 Mass. 246; 167 N.E. 289 (1929).

An earlier case, Barton v Gray, 57 Mich. 622; 24 N.W. 638 (1885), reached the same result, holding that the statute applies only to those contracts which by their terms are not to be performed within one year from the date of their making. Accord, Caplis v Monroe, 228 Mich. 586; 200 N.W. 123 (1924). At trial, the testimony of the litigants was in agreement that no time of performance was stipulated in the contract terms.

" For our most recent quotation-applications of this rule see Epstean v. Mintz, 226 Mich. 660, 667: Caplis v. Monroe, 228 Mich. 586, 591; Adolph v. Cookware Company of America, 283 Mich. 561, 568. I agree, then, solely on strength of Mr. Fothergill's actual right (as against defendant's motion for directed verdict) to recover for breach of a valid oral contract the parties agreed might be terminated on 6-months' notice, that the judgment of the circuit court should be reversed.

Although the bank was to have at least a year in which to take up the third bond, there was nothing in the agreement to prevent it from taking up the bond at an earlier date if it saw fit. The contract therefore could be fully completed within a year, and is not within the statute of frauds, even though the parties may have intended that it would extend over the period of a year, and although as a matter of fact it did so extend. Smalley v. Mitchell, 110 Mich. 650; Epstean v. Mintz, 226 Mich. 660; Caplis v. Monroe, 228 Mich. 586. The further claim is made that the contract is ultra vires and that the bank had no right to bind itself to repurchase the bonds.

An agreement for a lease, to be executed later, is no demise, and does not create the relation of lessor and lessee. In Caplis v. Monroe, 228 Mich. 586, we quoted from 2 Reed, Statute of Frauds, § 818: " 'It may, however, be stated as generally true that an agreement for a lease will be treated as a present demise when it does not involve the execution of any formal lease, and possession is taken under it.

And therefore the trial judge ought to have directed a verdict for plaintiff. Defendant contends that because of the condition of the lease permitting the lessor to cancel upon six months' notice, performance within a year was possible and therefore the statute does not apply, citing Caplis v. Monroe, 228 Mich. 586. The tenancy was for five years upon condition. Shaw v. Hoffman, 25 Mich. 162. Under 3 Comp. Laws 1915, § 11977 (3 Comp. Laws 1929, § 13413), leases for a longer period than one year are void unless in writing.

' " See, also, Herron v. Raupp, 156 Mich. 162; Caplis v. Monroe, 228 Mich. 586; Wise v. Yunker, 223 Mich. 203; Dykema v Story Clark Piano Co., supra. In the instant case the contract was possible of performance within a year and was not within the statute.