Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:01-CV-1853-N
November 5, 2002
ORDER ON MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON PLEADINGS
Before the Court is Defendants' motion for partial judgment on the pleadings. For the reasons indicated below, that motion is granted in part and denied in part.
Plaintiff Caple is a former employee of the Child Support Division of the Office of the Attorney General of the State of Texas ("OAG"). His employment ended on December 18, 2000. He subsequently filed a pro se complaint against OAG and two supervisors within OAG, Alyssa Newell and Katrina English (the "Individual Defendants"). Caple sought relief for race and color discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), for sex discrimination under Title VII and the ADA, for disability discrimination under the ADA, and for retaliation under Title VII and the ADA. Caple claimed relief for "Defendants' actions" without indicating from which defendant he sought relief on which claim and without specifying whether he sought relief from the Individual Defendants in their individual capacity or their official capacity. Caple sought actual and punitive damages, attorneys' fees and costs, and "other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable."
Defendants moved for partial judgment on the pleadings under Rules 12(c) and 12(b)(1), arguing (1) Caple fails to plead facts showing he has a disability under the ADA, (2) Caple's ADA claims against OAG and the Individual Defendants in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, (3) Caple's Title VII and ADA claims against the Individual Defendants in their individual capacities should be dismissed because they are not employers, and (4) Caple's Title VII claims against the Individual Defendants in their official capacity are improper because they are duplicative of the claims against OAG. Caple, acting now through counsel, replied to the motion, addressing some but not all of the arguments. On April 16, 2002, the Court stayed this action pending resolution of this motion. The Court will address the arguments in turn.
The Court appreciates the fact that Caple's counsel did not reflexively write in Opposition to all arguments raised by Defendants in their motion. Caple through his counsel did not concede the other points, however, so the Court will address them in this Order.
First, Caple's response to the motion, including his affidavit, sets forth in greater detail his position that he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA. In view of the liberal standard applied under Rule 12 at this preliminary stage of the proceedings, and in view of the supplemental information contained in Caple's affidavit, the Court DENIES Defendants' motion to dismiss Caple's ADA claims for failure to plead a disability.
Second, Defendants argue that Caple's ADA claims against OAG and the Individual Defendants in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, citing Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001). Caple does not respond to this argument with respect to the OAG, and OAG's motion for judgment on Caple's ADA claims under the Eleventh Amendment is GRANTED. Caple does argue, however, that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar claims for injuctive relief, pursuant to Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Although there appears to be no Fifth Circuit authority on point, other courts have expressly held that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar claims under the ADA for injunctive relief against individual defendants in their official capacity. Gibson Brown v. Arkansas Dep't of Correction, 265 F.3d 718 (8th Cir. 2001).
The Fifth Circuit stated in dicta, however, that ADA actions against state officials for prospective injunctive relief are permitted. Perez v. Region 20 Educ. Serv. Ctr., No. 01-50591, 2002 WL 31098027, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19633, at *33 n. 7 (5th Cir. Sept.20, 2002).
As mentioned above, Caple does invoke this Court's equitable jurisdiction, although without any specific request for any particular form of equitable relief or injunction. In view of the fact that Caple was pro se at the time he filed his complaint, the Court holds that he has sufficiently requested injunctive relief pursuant to Ex parte Young. Accordingly, the Individual Defendants' motion to dismiss Caple's claims for actual and punitive damages against them in their official capacity is GRANTED, and their motion to dismiss Caple's claim for injunctive relief against them in their official capacity is DENIED.
Third, the Individual Defendants argue that any claims against them in their individual capacity under Title VII and the ADA should be dismissed because they are not "employers" as defined in those acts in their individual capacities. As the Court indicated, Caple's pro se complaint does not indicate whether the claims are asserted against the Individual Defendants in their individual capacity or official capacity. Caple's response through his counsel to this motion does not address this argument, and the Court assumes that he does not intend to assert claims against the Individual Defendants in their individual capacity. In any event, the Court agrees that the Individual Defendants in their individual capacities would not be employers under Title VII or the ADA. Accordingly, to the extent Caple does assert claims against the Individual Defendants in their individual capacities, the motion for judgment on those claims is GRANTED. See Smith v. Amedisys Inc., 298 F.3d 434, 448-49 (5th Cir. 2002).
Finally, the Individual Defendants argue that the Title VII claims against them in their official capacity are duplicative of the claims against OAG, citing Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 262 (5th Cir. 1999)(Jones, J.). The Indest opinion was Judge Jones writing for herself, and thus does not constitute Fifth Circuit precedent, as noted by Judge Weiner in his concurrence. Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 168 F.3d 795, 796 n. 12 (5th Cir. 1999) (Weiner, J., concurring). The Fifth Circuit has recently adopted, however, the rationale of Indest in holding that a plaintiff is not entitled to maintain a Title VII action against both an employer and its agent in an official capacity. Smith, 298 F.3d at 449. Since Caple has brought a Title VII claim against the OAG, his Title VII claims against the Individual Defendants in their official capacities are barred. Therefore, the Individual Defendants' motion for judgment on the Title VII claims against them in their official capacity is GRANTED.
In view of the disposition of this motion, the Court's April 16, 2002 stay of this action is VACATED. The Court will, by separate order, direct the parties to provide a fresh status report and enter a new scheduling order based upon that report.