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Capital Properties v. State

Supreme Court of Rhode Island
Dec 20, 1999
764 A.2d 715 (R.I. 1999)

Opinion

No. 99-324-A

Filed: December 20, 1999.


ORDER

On December 2, 1999, we issued an opinion in this case denying and dismissing the appeals of the state and city, and adopting as our own the opinion of the Superior Court. However, we modified the summary judgment entered in the Superior Court with the addition of the following provisions:

"1. By reason of a waiver entered in open court by counsel for CPI, the state shall not be required to pay its 50 percent share of the award to CPI since CPI acknowledges that it has already received full reimbursement for the state's share by an earlier payment plus the conveyance of parcel No. 9 from the state to CPI. Consequently the state shall, pursuant to the summary judgment entered in the Superior Court, pay to CPI within twenty days from the date of this opinion the 50 percent share of the condemnation award that we held in the Superior Court to be attributable to and ultimately payable by the city.

2. Within twenty days of the date of the payment by the state of the share of the award attributable to the city, the city shall, pursuant to the conditional summary judgment entered in the Superior Court, pay to the state complete reimbursement for the state's payment to CPI of the city's share of the condemnation award." (slip opinion, pp. 2-3)

Counsel for plaintiff Capital Properties, Inc. (CPT), seeks clarification of paragraph 1 of the modifications, contending that CPI's open-court waiver, referred to therein, was not intended to include a waiver of CPI's right to seek damages for the state's breach of the 1987 CPI-State agreement. Counsel requests that our opinion be changed so as to specifically include within the mandate instructions that on remand the hearing justice determine CPI's breach-of-contract claims. Counsel for the state opposes this motion, and moves for confirmation, in light of our opinion, that the litigation concerning CPI's claim to the state's share of the condemnation award is concluded.

The state's motion further seeks a determination from this court that the relevant statutes governing the computation of interest on the condemnation award between the date of final judgment and the date of payment thereof require utilization of the Treasury-Bill rate. CPI responds that the state's assertion of this interest-rate issue now is procedurally inappropriate, that it is barred by the doctrine of res judicata, and that in any event, a proper reading of the statutes makes it clear that the general interest rate of 12% is applicable in the post-judgment period up to the date the judgment is paid.

After careful review of the memoranda submitted by counsel, we hereby direct that the following order shall enter:

1. All contentions of counsel for the parties in respect to CPI's breach-of-contract claim and the state's post-judgment interest claim should be presented for determination in the first instance to the Superior Court hearing justice in this matter. Therefore, the mandate of our opinion is amended to provide that further proceedings in this case on remand shall include a consideration of these issues by Justice Needham. Any party aggrieved by the justice's ruling on these claims may appeal such ruling to this Court.

2. The state shall pay to CPI on or before December 22, 1999 the principal amount of the judgment together with interest at the Treasury Bill rate which the state concedes is due to plaintiff in accordance with our opinion, and the city shall reimburse the state such amount within twenty days of the date of payment, all as provided in the modifications contained at pages 2-3 of our slip opinion. This payment is without prejudice to CPI's right to claim in the Superior Court that additional interest should be due and payable at the standard post-judgment rate provided by G.L. 1956 § 6-26-1.


I dissent from the remand of this case for further proceedings in the Superior Court. Final judgment has entered in this case on more than one occasion and indeed a writ of mandamus was issued from the Superior Court ordering the state to pay the judgment forthwith. The interest calculation that is the subject of this recent flurry of post-judgment activity was part of the mandamus judgment issued in 1998 in the Superior Court. This interest calculation was never raised in any proceeding in the Superior Court at the time of entry or later in this Court on appeal, nor even later before Justice Needham during the last round of post-judgment proceedings and finally, the issue was not raised before this Court during the recent appeal of Justice Needham's comprehensive decision. Enough is enough.

The travel of this case reflects that condemnation damages were awarded and a judgment entered in the Superior Court on May 6, 1997. This Court affirmed that judgment on April 17, 1998, wherein we declined to review the merits of the state's post-judgment arguments relative to the contractual obligations of the parties and of non-parties, noting that "the merits of this issue *** were never properly before the Superior Court."

The state then sought a stay of the execution on the judgment from the Presiding Justice of the Superior Court who not only denied the requested relief, but also noted that to rule otherwise "would be to ignore established principles of res judicata, or even collateral estoppel."

On July 22, 1998, the aforementioned writ of mandamus was issued compelling payment of the final judgment to Capital Properties. That trial justice concluded that CPI had a clear legal right to this payment and the state has but a ministerial legal duty to pay the judgment. The interest rate was set forth in the writ and was never objected to by the state.

On December 3, 1998, a three-judge panel of this Court heard the state's appeal from the judgment of mandamus and ordered that before the judgment was paid, the state's post-judgment defenses be addressed in the Superior Court. However, we directed that all matters be heard and decided and ruled as follows:

"Accordingly, we defer further consideration of this appeal pending resolution of these remaining issues, and we remand this case to Justice Needham with our direction to consolidate, hear, and decide all claims and defenses, including, but not limited to, title to parcel 9, alleged unpaid taxes owed by CPI to the city, and any agreements between the city and the state and Z further unresolved claims between the parties."

In what can be described as a Herculean effort, Justice Needham issued a comprehensive decision and went so far as to pass upon the appropriateness of the judgment of mandamus. During the course of that proceeding, not a word was raised about the previously calculated interest on the judgment. This Court, in near record time, heard and decided the appeals of all parties to these post-judgment "motions" and issued an opinion in which we affirmed Justice Needham in all respects except one, which was suggested by CPI at oral argument. However, neither side was satisfied with our decision, and sought another remand for yet another round of post-judgment hearings. The state is now questioning, for the first time in this prolonged case, the appropriateness of the interest calculation. CPI, on the other hand, is concerned about the viability of its breach of contract claims that were reserved by Justice Needham and are properly the subject of a remand. The state's concerns are another matter.

Simply put, I agree with the Presiding Justice's 1998 pronouncement that these issues are barred by principles of res judicata. This Court has consistently adhered to the doctrine of res judicata as it relates to the preclusive effect of a final judgment between the parties. E.W. Audet Sons, Inc. v. Firemen's Fund Insurance Co.. 635 A.2d 1181 (R.I. 1994); Elgabri v. Lekas, 681 A.2d 271 (R.I. 1996); Garganta v. Mobile Village. Inc. 730 A.2d 1 (R.I. 1999). In any other case, the parties would be precluded from re-litigating all issues that were actually litigated or that could have been litigated in any of the plethora of hearings and appeals in this case. "When resjudicata is invoked, it renders the original judgment conclusive with respect to any issues that Were raised or that could have been raised." E.W. Audet Sons, Inc., 635 A.2d at 1186. (Emphasis added.) The inviolability of that doctrine has been tested by my colleagues in this case not once, but now twice.

Consequently, I dissent.


Summaries of

Capital Properties v. State

Supreme Court of Rhode Island
Dec 20, 1999
764 A.2d 715 (R.I. 1999)
Case details for

Capital Properties v. State

Case Details

Full title:Capital Properties, Inc. v. State of Rhode Island, et al

Court:Supreme Court of Rhode Island

Date published: Dec 20, 1999

Citations

764 A.2d 715 (R.I. 1999)