Capital Films Corp. v. Charles Fries Prods

73 Citing cases

  1. Arkwright-Boston Mfrs. Mut. v. Aries Marine

    932 F.2d 442 (5th Cir. 1991)   Cited 93 times
    Criticizing Capital Films insofar as it held that a district court may never enter summary judgment sua sponte; approving Capital Films insofar as it stated that summary judgment must involve proper notice to the adverse party that the court will be taking the case under advisement as of a certain date, and an opportunity to respond

    An earlier line of cases holds that a district court may never enter summary judgment sua sponte. See, e.g., John Deere Co. v. American Nat'l Bank, 809 F.2d 1190, 1192 (5th Cir. 1987); Clark v. Tarrant County, Texas, 798 F.2d 736, 741 (5th Cir. 1986); Capital Films Corp. v. Charles Fries Productions, Inc., 628 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1980). The Supreme Court's recent decision in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) strongly supports the former proposition.

  2. Resolution Trust Corp. v. Sharif-Munir-Davidson Development Corp.

    992 F.2d 1398 (5th Cir. 1993)   Cited 54 times
    Holding that it is not an abuse of discretion to preclude further discovery and enter summary judgment if it reasonably appears that further discovery would not create a genuine issue of material fact

    Any reasonable doubt about whether the defendants were on notice that summary judgment might be granted for plaintiff prior to August 2, 1991, must be resolved in favor of the defendants. See, e.g., NL Industries, Inc. v. GHR Energy Corp., 940 F.2d 957, 965 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 873, 116 L.Ed.2d 778 (1992). In Capital Films Corp. v. Charles Fries Productions, Inc., 628 F.2d 387, 390-91 (5th Cir. 1980), this court recognized that when a district court's actions induce a party to reasonably believe he has additional time to respond to a motion for summary judgment, the entry of summary judgment prior to the expiration of that additional time is an abuse of discretion. In Capital Films, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment more than a year before the district court granted the motion.

  3. Prudhomme v. Tenneco Oil Co.

    955 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1992)   Cited 28 times
    Holding that the district court abused its discretion when it decided on the morning of trial to allow the plaintiff to pursue a new theory of recovery when the defendant had relied on the court's earlier dismissal of an attempt to add that theory

    Some of our cases have found an abuse of discretion and reversed the district court others have not.See Capital Films Corp. v. Charles Fries Productions, Inc., 628 F.2d 387, 391-92 (5th Cir. 1980); Kibort v. Hampton, 538 F.2d 90, 91 (5th Cir. 1976); and Enochs v. Sisson, 301 F.2d 125, 126 (5th Cir. 1962).See Landry v. Air Line Pilots Assn. Int'l, 901 F.2d 404, 434-36 (5th Cir. 1990); Daniels v. Morris, 746 F.2d 271, 274-76 (5th Cir. 1984); and Hamman v. Southwestern Gas Pipeline, Inc., 721 F.2d 140, 143-44 (5th Cir. 1983).

  4. Powell v. U.S.

    849 F.2d 1576 (5th Cir. 1988)   Cited 37 times
    Holding that even on the morning of trial notice must be given because "preparation for trial is very different from that required to oppose a summary judgment motion"

    We note that in the past we have generally held that a written summary judgment motion by the prevailing party is a prerequisite to a summary judgment. Capital Films Corp. v. Charles Fries Productions, Inc., 628 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1980); Alder v. Hailey (In re Hailey), 621 F.2d 169 (5th Cir. 1980); Hanson v. Polk County Land, Inc., 608 F.2d 129, 131 (5th Cir. 1979). But see Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) (providing for conversion of Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted into a Rule 56 summary judgment motion if the district court considers matters outside the pleadings); Davis v. Howard, 561 F.2d 565, 571-72 (5th Cir. 1977) (no formal motion for summary judgment required in the conversion situation created by Rule 12(b)); see Estate of Smith v. Tarrant County Hospital District, 691 F.2d 207, 208 (5th Cir. 1982) (court must carefully follow Rule 56 notice and hearing requirements when converting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion).

  5. Conley v. Bd. of Trustees of Grenada Cty. Hosp

    707 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1983)   Cited 47 times
    Holding objection to procedural irregularity waived where it "could have [been] corrected immediately" had it been mentioned in a reconsideration motion

    We recognize that the sua sponte grant of summary judgment is a dangerous practice and has resulted in reversal. See Capital Films Corp. v. Charles Fries Productions, 628 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1980). These dangers, however, were not present here.

  6. Estate of Smith v. Tarrant County Hosp. Dist

    691 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1982)   Cited 19 times

    Hickey v. Arkla Indus., Inc., 615 F.2d 239, 240 (5th Cir. 1980); Underwood v. Hunter, 604 F.2d 367, 369 (5th Cir. 1979). These procedural safeguards are equally applicable when a judge sua sponte orders summary judgment, Sharlitt v. Gorinstein, 535 F.2d 282, 283 (5th Cir. 1976), or where a summary judgment motion has been filed but no notice of hearing has been given. Capital Films Corps. v. Charles Fries Prod., 628 F.2d 387, 392 (5th Cir. 1980). On June 27, 1980, the plaintiffs in this case instituted an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against various political subdivisions and public officials in the State of Texas. The defendants responded with motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim.

  7. Langton v. Commissioner of Correction

    34 Mass. App. Ct. 564 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993)   Cited 17 times
    Stating that a court should not sua sponte allow summary judgment where a party would not be on notice that it is required to present its case

    Other courts have held that "[s]o long as the Court is careful to assure that the party against whom the judgment will be entered has sufficient advance notice and an adequate opportunity to demonstrate why summary judgment should not be granted, it is not inappropriate for the Court to act on its own." Capital Films Corp. v. Charles Fries Prod., Inc., 628 F.2d 387, 390 (5th Cir. 1980), citing Kistner v. Califano, 579 F.2d 1004 (6th Cir. 1978); FLLI Moretti Cereali S.P.A. v. Continental Grain Co., 563 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1977); and 10 Wright Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2719, at 454 (1973). See, e.g., Choudhry v. Jenkins, 559 F.2d 1085 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 997, 1088-1089 (1977); Capital Films Corp. v. Charles Fries Prod., Inc., 628 F.2d 387, 390-391 (5th Cir. 1980).

  8. Wreal, LLC v. Amazon.com

    38 F.4th 114 (11th Cir. 2022)   Cited 20 times
    In Wreal, even though the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that reverse confusion is not a standalone claim, the appellate court did not simply allow the plaintiff to pursue a reverse-confusion theory because of a general allegation of a likelihood of confusion in the complaint.

    "[L]ikelihood of confusion occurs when a later user uses a trade-name in a manner which is likely to cause confusion among ordinarily prudent purchasers or prospective purchasers as to the source of the product." Cap. Films Corp. v. Charles Fries Prods., Inc. , 628 F.2d 387, 393 (5th Cir. 1980). In Bonner v. City of Prichard , 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), we adopted as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to October 1, 1981.

  9. Uptown Grill, L.L.C. v. Shwartz

    817 F.3d 251 (5th Cir. 2016)   Cited 22 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Suggesting there is an actual controversy when "the alleged infringer is actively engaged in conduct that could constitute trademark infringement"

    ” However, “[t]he discretion afforded by Rule 54(c) ... assumes that a plaintiff's entitlement to relief not specifically pled has been tested adversarially, tried by consent, or at least developed with meaningful notice to the defendant.” Peterson v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 806 F.3d 335, 340 (5th Cir.2015) (citing 10 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur Miller, & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2662 (4th ed.2014), at 165), reh'g denied, 807 F.3d 650 (5th Cir.2015); see also Capital Films Corp. v. Charles Fries Prods., Inc., 628 F.2d 387, 390 (5th Cir.1980) (court must assure that party against whom judgment is entered has sufficient advance notice and an adequate opportunity to demonstrate why additional relief should not be granted); 10 Wright, Miller, & Kane § 2664 (4th ed.2014), at 180–83 (“The only exception to [Rule 54(c)] is if plaintiff's failure to demand the appropriate relief has prejudiced the defendant.”). Based on the record as a whole, we cannot say that the district court's understanding concerning the scope of the parties' agreements was “tested adversarially, tried by consent, or at least developed with meaningful notice to the defendant.”

  10. Thunderhorse v. Pierce

    232 F. App'x 425 (5th Cir. 2007)   Cited 3 times
    Vacating summary judgment without reaching merits because plaintiff not given notice and opportunity to respond to defendants' motion

    While the filing of a motion for summary judgment normally gives sufficient notice, the magistrate judge's previous order led Thunderhorse to reasonably believe that the case was going to trial without consideration of the summary judgment motions. See Capital Films Corp. v. Charles Fries Prods., Inc., 628 F.2d 387, 391-92 (5th Cir. 1980). Given the circumstances, Thunderhorse did not receive sufficient notice, and the magistrate judge's grant of summary judgment was an abuse of discretion.