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California Parents for Equalization of Educational Materials v. Noonan

United States District Court, E.D. California
May 28, 2008
NO. CIV. S-06-532 FCD KJM (E.D. Cal. May. 28, 2008)

Opinion

NO. CIV. S-06-532 FCD KJM.

May 28, 2008


This matter is before the court on defendants' motion for reconsideration of the court's March 25, 2008 memorandum and order (the "Order") denying defendants' motion for summary judgment on res judicata grounds. (Docket #92.) The court found that plaintiff California Parents for the Equalization of Educational Materials ("CAPEEM") was not in privity with the plaintiffs in the state court action, and thus res judicata principles did not preclude CAPEEM's litigation of this action. (Id. at 3.) In their present motion, defendants fail to demonstrate how the court committed "clear error" or rendered a manifestly unjust decision in declining to find this action precluded by res judicata. Instead, defendants use this motion for reconsideration as a vehicle to resubmit arguments already presented to the court and explicitly addressed in the Order. After review of the parties' extensive submissions on the motion for summary judgment, the court considered and rejected the very arguments raised by defendants again on this motion. Defendants' vigorous opposition to the court's Order, based on rehashed arguments, does not provide grounds for reconsideration. Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b); United States v. Navarro, 972 F. Supp. 1296, 1299 (E.D. Cal. 1997), rev'd on other grounds, 160 F.3d 1254 (9th Cir. 1998) (recognizing that motions to reconsider are "not vehicles permitting the unsuccessful party to `rehash' arguments previously presented").

Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal. L.R. 78-230(h).

Absent "highly unusual circumstances," reconsideration of an order is appropriate only where (1) the court is presented with newly-discovered evidence, (2) the court committed "clear error or the initial decision was manifestly unjust," or (3) there is an intervening change in the controlling law. School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, 5 F.3d at 1263; Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 945 (9th Cir. 2003) (recognizing a motion for reconsideration is an extraordinary remedy that should not be granted absent highly unusual circumstances). Ultimately, a party seeking reconsideration must show "more than a disagreement with the Court's decision, and recapitulation of the cases and arguments considered by the court before rendering its original decision fails to carry the moving party's burden." United States v. Westlands Water Dist., 134 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1131 (E.D. Cal. 2001).

Such is the case here. In moving for reconsideration, defendants simply restate and reargue their position as previously articulated in their motion for summary judgment. Nothing new is stated. Instead, defendants merely contest the propriety of the court's ruling and application of the relevant law. In that regard, defendants argue the court committed two primary errors in denying their motion for summary judgment: (1) the court failed to consider whether CAPEEM and the state court plaintiffs (the "HAF plaintiffs") had a similarity of interests and (2) the court applied federal standards, rather than state law, to the question of privity.

Both arguments are wholly unpersuasive. The court expressly considered the issue of similarity of interests (Order at 15), finding that factual disputes existed between the parties on the issue but those disputes did not need to be resolved as defendants had failed to demonstrate the other requisite element for privity under a theory of "virtual representation." (Order at 15 ["[i]mportant to that inquiry is whether the parties shared the same interests and whether the HAF plaintiffs had a `strong motive' to assert CAPEEM's interests" in the state court action].) Based on the undisputed evidence proffered by CAPEEM, the court found that the HAF plaintiffs did not have a motive to assert CAPEEM's interests in the state court litigation. (Order at 15-16.) As to the applicable law, the court's Order is clear. It sets forth the controlling law as established in California case law and applies that law to the facts here. (Order at 11-17.) The Order references federal law only where it is consistent with state law. (Order at 14.) Indeed, the court expressly justified its application of federal law in certain limited respects. (Order at 14 n. 11 [noting "Headwaters involved application of the federal law on preclusion, not California law. However, on privity principles federal law is closely analogous, and the court finds Headwaters persuasive authority on some of the issues addressed herein.].)

At bottom, defendants' instant motion is based on their disagreement with the court's ruling. As noted, such disagreement is not grounds for reconsideration and does not demonstrate "clear error" by the court:

[Defendants] assert, with great vehemence and a degree of disdain, that they disagree with the court's findings. This is not grounds for the grant of reconsideration. [Defendants] advanced arguments in their motion for reconsideration identical to the arguments they advanced in [moving for] . . . summary judgment. The court found these arguments unpersuasive then and unpersuasive now. In sum, [defendants] simply offer no new evidence or legal support for their contention the court committed clear error.
Hansen v. Schubert, 459 F. Supp. 2d 973, 998 (E.D. Cal. 2006). Thus, the court finds no grounds to reconsider its Order denying summary judgment to defendants on the basis of res judicata, and accordingly, defendants' motion for reconsideration is DENIED.

Defendants request in the alternative, if reconsideration is denied, that the court certify the Order for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and stay this action pending the appeal. For the following reasons, the court finds that defendants have not met their burden to demonstrate the required elements for interlocutory appeal.

The general rule is that an appellate court should not review a district court ruling until after entry of a final judgment.Coopers Lyband v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 474 (1978); In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 673 F.2d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 1982),aff'd sub nom. Arizona v. Ash Grove Cement Co., 459 U.S. 1190 (1983); see 28 U.S.C. § 1291. There is, however, an exception to this general rule:

When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal for the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals . . . may thereupon . . . permit an appeal . . . if application is made to it within ten days. . . .
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The party seeking certification of an interlocutory appeal has the burden to show the presence of those exceptional circumstances. Coopers Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 474-75.

Section 1292 identifies three factors that must be present for the court to certify an appeal. First, the issue to be certified must involve a controlling issue of law. An issue is "controlling" if "resolution of the issue on appeal could materially affect the outcome of litigation in the district court." In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 673 F.2d at 1026 (citingU.S. Rubber Co. v. Wright, 359 F.2d 784, 785 (9th Cir. 1966)). Second, there must be substantial ground for difference of opinion on that issue. A party's strong disagreement with the court's ruling is not sufficient for there to be a "substantial ground for difference;" the proponent of an appeal must make some greater showing. Kern-Tulare Water Dist. v. Bakersfield, 634 F. Supp. 656, 667 (E.D. Cal. 1986), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 828 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1987). Third, an interlocutory appeal must be likely to materially speed the termination of the litigation. This factor is linked to whether an issue of law is "controlling" in that the court should consider the effect of a reversal by the court of appeals on the management of the case. See In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 673 F.2d at 1026.

As the court finds that interlocutory appeal is not permitted, it need not consider the propriety of granting a stay.

As to the first requirement, the court's Order addressed a single question of law; namely, whether CAPEEM's complaint was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. That inquiry was not fact-dependent. See Keystone Tobacco Co., Inc. v. Nat'l Tobacco Co., 217 F.R.D. 235, 238 (D.C. Dist. 2003) (recognizing that an issue is not a "controlling issue of law" where the issue decided by the court is "fact-dependent"). Rather, the court surveyed the relevant law and determined thereunder that privity did not exist between CAPEEM and the HAF plaintiffs, either under traditional notions of privity or the doctrine of virtual representation. (Order at 13-15.) The facts underlying this decision, concerning the relationship between CAPEEM and the HAF plaintiffs, were not disputed by the parties on the motion for summary judgment. Instead, the parties disputed only the legal effect of the facts under the preclusion standards; specifically, whether those facts established a similarity of interests such that the court could find that the HAF plaintiffs had a motive to assert CAPEEM's interests.

That question of law is "controlling" within the meaning of Section 1292(b) because an interlocutory appeal would "materially affect the outcome of [the] litigation in [this court]." In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 673 F.2d at 1026. Indeed, the preclusion issue here would completely dispose of this case if defendants prevail on appeal since defendants advance the defense of res judicata/claim preclusion with respect to all of CAPEEM's claims asserted in the complaint.

For this same reason, defendants have also demonstrated that the appeal will advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. The potential for bringing the litigation to a more expeditious close is related to the "controlling issue of law" factor for certification. The court must consider the effect of a reversal by the court of appeals on the management of the case.Id. Here, a reversal of this court's Order could resolve this case in its entirety, should the Ninth Circuit find the elements for preclusion are met.

However, as to the final requirement for certification, the court cannot find that there is substantial ground for difference of opinion as to whether CAPEEM and the HAF plaintiffs are in privity for purposes of application of the doctrine of res judicata. Clearly, there is no traditional privity between CAPEEM and the HAF plaintiffs; there was no successor-in-interest relationship between them, CAPEEM had no proprietary interest in or control over the HAF action and the HAF plaintiffs were not representatives of CAPEEM (via a class action or otherwise). (Order at 11-12, 13.) As to the broader notion of "virtual representation," while the court acknowledged in the Order that the doctrine has only been recently developed in California case law, the court did not have difficulty applying the doctrine to the facts in this case. The relevant inquiries are evident upon review of the controlling case law: similarity of interests and motive of the party in the prior action to assert the estopped party's interests. Here, the court found that based upon the undisputed evidence proffered by CAPEEM, it could not find that the HAF plaintiffs had a "strong motive" to assert CAPEEM's interests in the state court action, and thus, defendants had not demonstrated one of the essential elements for privity. (Order at 15-16.) The facts underlying this decision were undisputed and there was no conflicting legal authority on point. As such, the court finds that there is not substantial ground for difference of opinion on the issue of privity, and accordingly, it must DENY defendants' alternative request to certify the Order for interlocutory appeal.

Finally, on April 11, 2008, the court granted defendants' ex parte application to stay this action pending the court's decision on the instant motion. (Docket #104.) As the motion is now denied, the court must set dates for the further pretrial scheduling of this case. Therefore, the court orders that the amended status (pretrial scheduling) order of December 27, 2006 (Docket #49), as modified by stipulation of the parties on August 22, 2007 (Docket #52) and by the court in the Order of March 25, 2008, is HEREBY further modified as follows: The parties shall have until August 1, 2008 to complete fact discovery. Expert designations shall be filed and served on or before August 22, 2008; rebuttal designations shall be filed and served on or before September 19, 2008; expert discovery shall close on October 17, 2008. The dispositive motion deadline is reset to December 19, 2008. The final pretrial conference is set for February 13, 2009 at 1:30 p.m. The court trial shall commence on April 21, 2009 at 9:00 a.m. All other provisions of the amended status (pretrial scheduling) order of December 27, 2006 shall remain in effect. The court further orders that CAPEEM may file an amended notice of motion resetting its motion to compel for hearing before the assigned magistrate judge.

The hearing on the motion was previously vacated by the court in the April 11, 2008 order (Docket #104).

IT IS SO ORDERED.


Summaries of

California Parents for Equalization of Educational Materials v. Noonan

United States District Court, E.D. California
May 28, 2008
NO. CIV. S-06-532 FCD KJM (E.D. Cal. May. 28, 2008)
Case details for

California Parents for Equalization of Educational Materials v. Noonan

Case Details

Full title:CALIFORNIA PARENTS FOR THE EQUALIZATION OF EDUCATIONAL MATERIALS…

Court:United States District Court, E.D. California

Date published: May 28, 2008

Citations

NO. CIV. S-06-532 FCD KJM (E.D. Cal. May. 28, 2008)