Opinion
1:22-CV-1286-DII-ML 1:21-CR-48- LY-25
01-09-2024
LEONARD CANTRELL, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES of AMERICA, Respondent.
TO THE HONORABLE ROBERT PITMAN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
MARK LANE, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The Magistrate Court submits this Report and Recommendation to the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 1(e) of the Appendix C of the Local Court Rules of the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, Local Rules for the Assignment of duties to United States Magistrate Judges. Before the court is Petitioner Leonard Cantrell's Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody (Dkt. 1347) and all relevant filings. For the following reasons, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the motion be DENIED.
Page numbers correspond to the page number generated by CMECF in No. 1:21-CR-48-LY-25.
Cantrell did not submit a reply. In April 2023, he requested an extension of time to file his reply. Dkt. 1368. The undersigned granted that request, directing him to file by May 8, 2023. Text Order, Apr. 18, 2023. On July 27, 2023, the undersigned ordered Cantrell to file his reply within 30 days. Dkt. 1411. As of October 17, 2023 Cantrell has not submitted a reply, and the undersigned concludes he does not intend to submit one.
I. Background
A. Procedural History
On March 2, 2021, Leonard Cantrell was named in an indictment that charged him with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of methamphetamine. Dkt. 542 (Indictment) at 1, 3; Dkt. 795 (Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”)) at ¶¶1, 3.
Cantrell pled guilty to the Indictment pursuant to a plea agreement on October 27, 2021. Dkt. 632; PSR ¶5. The court accepted Cantrell's guilty plea on November 19, 2021. Dkt. 694; PSR ¶5.
Ahead of sentencing, a United States Probation Officer prepared a PSR. Dkt. 795. The Probation Officer determined Cantrell's Total Offense Level as 29 and his Criminal History Category as VI. Id. ¶¶76, 90. The Probation Officer determined Cantrell's Guideline range to be 151 to 188 months.
Ahead of sentencing, Cantrell's Trial Counsel objected to the Probation Officer's calculation of Cantrell's criminal history scoring. Dkt. 83 at 30. Eight years earlier, Cantrell was arrested in 2013 for possession of a controlled substance and evading arrest. Id. ¶¶85, 86. He was sentenced for those offenses on different days by different courts-a county court and a state district court. Dkt. 1271 (Sentencing Transcript) at 4:13-18. Cantrell's Trial Counsel argued “only one conviction should score because [Cantrell] pled to each charge just two days apart.” Dkt. 83 at 30. The Sentencing Court overruled Cantrell's Trial Counsel's objection, finding that the Probation Officer's counting the sentences separately was correct. Dkt. 1271 at 4:24-5:5.
On February 1, 2022, the court sentenced Cantrell to a within-Guideline sentence of 151-months imprisonment. Dkt. 846 at 2 (Judgment).
Cantrell did not file a direct appeal, but he timely filed this 2255 petition.
B. Issue Presented
Cantrell presents one ground for relief:
1. Trial Counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to Cantrell's criminal history score calculation.Dkt. 1347 at 2.
II. Standard of Review
Under Section 2255, there are generally four grounds upon which a defendant may move to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence: (1) the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States; (2) the district court was without jurisdiction to impose the sentence; (3) the sentence imposed was in excess of the maximum authorized by law; and (4) the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack. 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The nature of a collateral challenge under section 2255 is extremely limited: “A defendant can challenge his conviction after it is presumed final only on issues of constitutional or jurisdictional magnitude . . . and may not raise an issue for the first time on collateral review without showing both ‘cause' for his procedural default, and ‘actual prejudice' resulting from the error.” U.S. v. Shaid, 937 F.2d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 1991). If the error is not of constitutional or jurisdictional magnitude, the movant must show that the error could not have been raised on direct appeal and would, if condoned, “result in a complete miscarriage of justice.” U.S. v. Smith, 32 F.3d 194, 196 (5th Cir. 1994).
III. Analysis
Cantrell contends his sentence should be vacated, set aside, or corrected because his Trial Counsel provided ineffective legal representation. Specifically, Cantrell complains that his Trial Counsel was ineffective because he did not “argue adequately” that Cantrell's criminal history category was “not reflective of his actual criminal history.” Dkt. 1347 at 2. The Government argues the record refutes Cantrell's claim and that Cantrell failed to demonstrate deficient performance by his attorney or any resulting prejudice. Dkt. 1365 at 4.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a defendant in a criminal case reasonably effective assistance of counsel. U.S. CONST. amend VI; Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980). To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a movant must satisfy the two-part test enunciated in Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). First, he must demonstrate counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. Under this standard, counsel must “research relevant facts and law, or make an informed decision that certain avenues will not be fruitful.” U.S. v. Conley, 349 F.3d 837, 841 (5th Cir. 2003). Second, movant must prove he was prejudiced by counsel's substandard performance. “[T]o prove prejudice, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 841-42. When a movant fails to meet either requirement of the Strickland test, his ineffective assistance of counsel claim is defeated. See Belyeu v. Scott, 67 F.3d 535, 538 (5th Cir. 1995); U.S. v. Gaudet, 81 F.3d 585, 591-92 (5th Cir. 1996). “‘[A] court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.'” U.S. v. Fields, 761 F.3d 443, 453 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689)). Additionally, courts presume that counsel's “challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.” Belyeu, 67 F.3d at 538 (citing Strickland).
Cantrell argues that his Trial Counsel did not effectively argue that Cantrell's 2013 offenses should have been treated as a single criminal episode for criminal history calculation purposes. Dkt. 1347 at 5. Cantrell argues that U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 4A1.2(a)(2) provides that his prior sentences should have been counted together. Id. at 6. He asserts that “the sentences resulted from offenses contained in the same charging instrument.” Id. (quoting U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2)(B)).
The basis of Cantrell's argument is that the offenses giving rise to his 2013 convictions in county court and in state district court were at one time recorded in the same document by the arresting officer(s). Id. at 8 (“. . . as Petitioner was arrested on all of the charges at the same time by the state authorities who made the arrest and filed the initial charging's [sic] complaint, which then later precipitated into multiple sentences in multiple jurisdictions.”). He concludes: “Accordingly, Petitioner's sentences were all born from the one and same ‘charging instrument.'” Id.
The Government notes Cantrell's Trial Counsel in fact objected to the PSR, which treated Cantrell's 2013 convictions as separate criminal episodes. Dkt. 1365 at 4. The Probation Officer, citing U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2), acknowledged that although Cantrell's 2013 convictions were not separated by an intervening arrest, they were imposed on separate dates, and that therefore, the PSR was correct. Id.; Dkt. 838 at 30.
The Government points out that Cantrell's Trial Counsel argued again at sentencing that the 2013 convictions should be treated as a single criminal episode. Dkt. 1365 at 5. The sentencing court overruled Cantrell's Trial Counsel's objection, finding, “Even though the convictions in question were not separated by an intervening arrest, they were sentenced on different days.” Id. (quoting Dkt. 795 (Sentencing Transcript) at 4:24-5:5).
Part A of Chapter Four of the Guidelines governs the determination of a defendant's criminal history score, which in turn determines the defendant's Criminal History Category. Section 4A1.2 of the Guidelines contains rules for assigning criminal history points for prior sentences. USSG § 4A1.2. One rule provides that sometimes multiple prior sentences will be treated as a single sentence for the purpose of calculating criminal history points. Id. at § 4A1.2(a)(2). For this rule to apply, either “(A) the sentences must have resulted from offenses contained in the same charging instrument; or (B) the sentences were imposed on the same day.” Id. Otherwise, “[p]rior sentences always are counted separately if the . . . defendant [was] arrested for the first offense prior to committing the second offense ....” Id.
The sentences Cantrell suggests should be treated as a single criminal episode were contained in separate charging instruments and imposed on separate days. While the offenses at some point may have been recorded in a single document as Cantrell speculates, he was charged by information in county court and by indictment in state district court. See Travis County Case No. C-1-CR-13-201904 and Travis County Case No. D-1-DC-13-200621. Thus, two separate courts-a county court and a state district court-imposed separate sentences on separate days for the offenses, which were not contained in the same charging instrument.
Cantrell does not meet Strickland's ineffective performance prong. Contrary to Cantrell's assertions, the facts clearly show that his Trial Counsel repeatedly requested and advocated for Cantrell's 2013 convictions to be treated as a single episode. Citing U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2), the Sentencing Court made clear a different outcome was not reasonably probable. Further, Cantrell now asserts that the two offenses were, according to him, likely contained in a single document immediately after his arrest. But that argument is meritless. Thus, Cantrell has failed to establish that his Trial Counsel was deficient. Indeed, he presents no evidence that his attorney was ineffective or that he failed to argue Cantrell's criminal history score was calculated improperly.
Finally, with respect to prejudice, Cantrell must allege and prove that but for his Trial Counsel's unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable possibility that he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). “[A]lleging prejudice will not suffice.” Mangum v. Hargett, 67 F.3d 80, 84 (5th Cir. 1995). A petitioner must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances. United States v. Kayode, 777 F.3d 719, 724-25 (5th Cir. 2014).
Cantrell also does not meet Strickland's prejudice prong. In fact, Cantrell barely addresses the prejudice requirement. He says that he “entered a plea of guilty in contingent acknowledgement of the fact his attorney would show that these sentences were properly within the framework of the requisites of the sentencing commission in its formulation of 4A1.2(a)(2).” Dkt. 1347 at 5-6. This assertion does not prove that Cantrell would have pled not guilty and proceeded to trial.
The Sentencing Court asked Cantrell if he pleaded guilty, and Cantrell answered, “Yes, Your Honor.” Dkt. 1271 at 2:8-12. The Sentencing Court asked if Cantrell reaffirmed the statements in his plea agreement; again, Cantrell answered affirmatively. Id. at 2:23-25. Then the Sentencing Court asked Cantrell if he reviewed the PSR with his Trial Counsel's assistance and if he understood the PSR, which treated the 2013 sentences as separate episodes, and possible sentences. Id. at 3:1-24. Cantrell answered, yes. Id. When given the opportunity to speak to the Sentencing Court before sentence was imposed, Cantrell spoke, but did not address the calculation of his criminal history. Indeed, after the Sentencing Court overruled Cantrell's Trial Counsel's objection at the sentencing hearing to the criminal history calculation in the PSR, Cantrell stated: “I'm not saying that I'm not guilty of the charges ....” Id. at 6:9. In light of the record, Cantrell has not proved that but for his Trial Counsel's allegedly deficient actions, he would not have pled guilty and would have proceeded to trial.
Cantrell does not meet the Strickland requirements for ineffective performance or prejudice. Accordingly, the relief Cantrell seeks should be denied and an evidentiary hearing is not necessary.
IV. Recommendation
The claims contained within Cantrell's section 2255 Motion are contradicted by the record. Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Court respectfully RECOMMENDS Petitioner Cantrell's Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence By A Person in Federal Custody (Dkt. 1347) be DENIED.
V. Certificate of Appealability
An appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from a final order in a proceeding under section 2255 “unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings, effective December 1, 2009, the district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.
A certificate of appealability (“COA”) may issue only if a movant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The Supreme Court fully explained the requirement associated with a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right” in Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). In cases where a district court rejected a movant's constitutional claims on the merits, “the petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Id. “When a district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the petitioner's underlying constitutional claim, a COA should issue when the petitioner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Id.
In this case, reasonable jurists could not debate the denial of the movant's section 2255 motion on substantive or procedural grounds, nor find that the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003) (citing Slack, 529 U.S. at 484). Accordingly, it is respectfully recommended that the District Court not issue a certificate of appealability.
VI. Objections
The parties may file objections to this Report and Recommendation. A party filing objections must specifically identify those findings or recommendations to which objections are being made. The District Court need not consider frivolous, conclusive, or general objections. See Battles v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1987).
A party's failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations contained in this Report within fourteen (14) days after the party is served with a copy of the Report shall bar that party from de novo review by the District Court of the proposed findings and recommendations in the Report and, except upon grounds of plain error, shall bar the party from appellate review of unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the District Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150-53 (1985); Douglass v. United Services Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).