Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO.: 1:99CV366-D-D.
February 22, 2001.
OPINION
Before the court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Upon due consideration, the court finds that the motion should be granted in part and denied in part.
Factual Background
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court is not to make credibility determinations, weigh evidence, or draw from the facts legitimate inferences for the movant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Rather, the evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. The court's factual summary is so drafted.
The Plaintiff, Rebecca Cantrell (Cantrell), was employed as a receptionist by the Defendant, Bauhaus, U.S.A., Inc. (Bauhaus), at its Amory facility. Cantrell suffers from asthma and other medical problems such as bronchitis, pneumonia, and allergies, which are greatly aggravated by smoke. In February, 1999, Cantrell was hospitalized for the treatment of pneumonia. She missed four days of work and was released to return to work part-time for approximately two weeks. Upon returning to work, Cantrell was treated differently by Defendant, plant manager, Vince Crocker (Crocker) and repeatedly asked "how long is this part-time?"
Bauhaus' "Standards of Conduct" was posted on bulletin boards and allowed smoking only in designated areas. Cantrell's work area was posted with "no smoking" signs, as were the restrooms and the production area. Employees, however, including Crocker, often smoked in Cantrell's work area. During her employment, Cantrell and other non-smoking employees repeatedly complained about cigarette smoke at the Bauhaus facility.
Cantrell inquired of Bauhaus' purchasing clerk, Melissa Wise (Wise), about purchasing an air freshener to utilize at her desk. Wise thereafter contacted Carolyn Stevenson, who sold the air freshener, and arranged for Ms. Stevenson to bring the air freshener to Bauhaus for Cantrell. The following day, Ms. Stevenson brought the air freshener to the plant. Cantrell examined the freshener and then paid for it out of her personal money. The entire encounter between Cantrell and Stevenson occurred in the lobby of Bauhaus and lasted approximately five to seven minutes. Three days after purchasing the air freshener, Cantrell was informed that she was being terminated because she had violated the Defendants' "No Solicitation" policy.
Bauhaus' "No Solicitation" policy, at the time of Cantrell's termination stated:
Employees are not permitted to engage in solicitation of other employees at any time that they or you are supposed to be working. Employees are not permitted to distribute literature in work areas at any time. Work areas do not include break rooms, lunch rooms, restrooms, and the parking lot. Non-employees are not permitted to engage in solicitation or distribution of materials at any time on company property. Employees should not enter company facilities prior to or remain in the facility after scheduled working hours.
Cantrell filed this action against Bauhaus and Crocker individually to recover actual and punitive damages for her wrongful termination based upon violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), Title VII, and state law claims based upon breach of contract and the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in contracts, along with Mississippi public policy claims. The Defendants have moved for summary judgment. Cantrell, in her reply memorandum, concedes her claims under Title VII and under Mississippi public policy. Also pending is the Defendants' motion to strike exhibits to the Plaintiff's response in opposition to the Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
Summary Judgment Standard
On a motion for summary judgment, the movant has the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265, 275 (1986) ("the burden on the moving party may be discharged by `showing'. . .that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case"). Under Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the burden then shifts to the non-movant to "go beyond the pleadings and by. . .affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d at 274. That burden is not discharged by "mere allegations or denials." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). All legitimate factual inferences must be made in favor of the non-movant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513, 91 L.Ed.2d 202, 216 (1986). Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d at 273. Before finding that no genuine issue for trial exists, the court must first be satisfied that no reasonable trier of fact could find for the non-movant. Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538, 552 (1986).
Discussion
Claims against individual Defendant, Vince Crocker .
Crocker, plant manager of Bauhaus' Amory facility, cannot be held liable in his individual capacity on Cantrell's federal statutory claims because he is not an employer as defined by the FMLA. See Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649, 651 (5th Cir. 1994), cert denied, 513 U.S. 1015, 115 S.Ct. 574, 130 L.Ed.2d 491 (1994) (discussing definition of "employer" under FMLA).
In 29 C.F.R. § 825.104(d), the U.S. Department of Labor has interpreted the FMLA to impose liability on any person who acts, directly or indirectly, in relation to an employee. The court finds that the decision to terminate Cantrell was made by McCreary, Burcham, and Policicchio. Crocker's role was limited to supplying information to the decision makers when asked. Because Crocker did not act, he cannot be held liable for Cantrell's termination which was allegedly in violation of the FMLA. Therefore, as a matter of law, the Defendant, Vince Crocker, shall be dismissed with prejudice as to Cantrell's claims under the FMLA.
Further, Cantrell's state law claims of breach of contract and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing against Crocker shall be dismissed. Ordinarily an agent cannot be held liable for damages resulting from the breach of a contract which was executed by his disclosed principal only. Gardner v. Jones, 464, So.d2d 1144, 1151 (Miss. 1985) (citing Thames Co. v. Eicher, 373 So.2d 1033, 1035 (Miss. 1979)). See also Schoonover v. West American Ins. Co., 665 F. Supp. 511, 516 (S.D.Miss. 1987). Even if Cantrell could establish an enforceable contract of employment, acts of her supervisors, while acting in the scope of their responsibilities, do not constitute tortious interference with that contract. Pinnix v. Babcokd and Wilcox, Inc., 689 F. Supp. 634, 367 (N.D.Miss. 1988) (citing Shaw v. Burchfield, 481 So.2d 247, 255 (Miss. 1985)). The evidence is undisputed that at all times Crocker was acting as an agent for Bauhaus and, as such, he incurs no individual liability.
It is therefore, the opinion of this court that Cantrell's claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied duty of good faith in fair dealing against the Defendant, Vince Crocker, shall be dismissed with prejudice as matter of law.
All remaining claims .
As to the remaining claims, the court finds that Defendants' motion for summary judgment is not well taken and should be denied.
The Defendants have failed to show that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In any event, the court has the discretion, which it exercises here, to allow Plaintiff's claims to proceed to trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ("Neither do we suggest . . . that the trial court may not deny summary judgment in a case where there is reason to believe that the better course would be to proceed to a full trial.").
Conclusion
The Plaintiff's claim against the individual Defendant, Vince Crocker, for violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act shall be dismissed with prejudice. The Plaintiff's claim against the individual Defendant, Vince Crocker, for breach of contract and breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, shall be dismissed with prejudice. Defendants' motion to strike exhibits to Plaintiff's response in opposition to Defendants' motion for summary judgment is denied as moot. Plaintiff's remaining claims shall be allowed to proceed to trial.
A separate order in accordance with this opinion shall issue this day.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Pursuant to an opinion issued this day, it is hereby ORDERED that
• the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (docket entry #25) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART;
• the Plaintiff's claims as to the individual Defendant, Vince Crocker, under the Family and Medical Leave Act are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;
• the Plaintiff's claims as to the individual Defendant, Vince Crocker, under state law breach of contract and breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;
• the Defendants' motion to strike exhibits to Plaintiff's response in opposition to Defendants' motion for summary judgment (docket entry #30) is DENIED AS MOOT; and
• the remainder of Plaintiff's claims will be allowed to proceed to trial.
SO ORDERED.