Opinion
NBSP64574
12-08-2015
Canto, Inc. v. Smith, Jamar et al
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON COMPLAINT FOR SUMMARY PROCESS
Nicola E. Rubinow, J.
This memorandum of decision addresses the summary process complaint brought by the plaintiff Canto, Inc. (Canto) seeking possession of premises occupied by the defendants Jamar Smith (Smith) and Rose Blair (Blair) based on one count as to each defendant for nonpayment of rent due on July 1, 2015 and one count as to each defendant for occupancy after right or privilege has terminated. The memorandum further addresses each of the special defenses filed by Smith, described below.
The matter was tried to the court on October 15 and 16, 2015. Canto was represented by counsel; Smith was self-represented. Although she did not file an appearance, as Rose Blair attended and actively participated in the first day of trial, the court considers her a de facto self-represented litigant who is not susceptible to a finding of default in this matter. Canto called Blair Smith, Bryan Canto and Robert Arsenault as witnesses in its case-in-chief. Canto and Arsenault were cross examined as was Smith, who testified on his own behalf. Three court documents were admitted as evidence.
Blair did not attend the second day of trial, and did not present direct testimony either to rebut the allegations of Canto's complaint or to support Smith's special defenses.
As the plaintiff, Canto bears the burden of proving the allegations of its complaint by a fair preponderance of the evidence; Smith bears like burden as to his special defenses. For the reasons set forth herein, the court concludes that Canto has proved each essential allegation of its complaint and that Smith has not met his burden of proving any of his special defenses. Accordingly, the court enters judgment of possession in favor of the plaintiff Canto.
The standard of proof, a fair preponderance of the evidence, is " properly defined as the better evidence, the evidence having the greater weight, the more convincing force in your mind." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cross v. Huttenlocher, 185 Conn. 390, 394, 440 A.2d 952 (1981). " The general burden of proof in civil actions is on the plaintiff, who must prove all the essential allegations of the complaint." Gulycz v. Stop & Shop Cos., Inc., 29 Conn.App. 519, 523, 615 A.2d 1087, cert. denied, 224 Conn. 923, 618 A.2d 527 (1992). Where the complaint sets forth separate counts presenting " alternative theories of recovery, " the plaintiff may prevail if the burden of proof has been met on one count, alone. See Milford Bank v. Phoenix Contracting Group, Inc., 143 Conn.App. 519, 523 n.2, 72 A.3d 55 (2013). Similarly, if the burden has been met on one of several alternative special defenses, the defendant may be found to have overcome the weight of the plaintiff's proof.
I
FACTUAL FINDINGS
The court has reviewed the pleadings and considered the evidence in its entirety using the applicable principles of law. The facts as found in this decision have been proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence.
" The [factfinding] function is vested in the trial court with its unique opportunity to view the evidence presented in a totality of circumstances, i.e., including its observations of the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses and parties . . ." Cavolick v. DeSimone, 88 Conn.App. 638, 646, 870 A.2d 1147, cert. denied, 274 Conn. 906, 876 A.2d 1198 (2005). " It is well established that in cases tried before courts, trial judges are the sole arbiters of the credibility of witnesses and it is they who determine the weight to be given specific testimony . . . It is the quintessential function of the factfinder to reject or accept certain evidence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Antonio M., 56 Conn.App. 534, 540, 744 A.2d 915 (2000). " [T]he trier is free to juxtapose conflicting versions of events and determine which is more credible . . . It is the trier's exclusive province to weigh the conflicting evidence and determine the credibility of witnesses . . . The trier of fact may accept or reject the testimony of any witness . . . The trier can, as well, decide what-all, none, or some-of a witness' testimony to accept or reject." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Osborn, 41 Conn.App. 287, 291, 676 A.2d 399 (1996). The trial court's function as the factfinder " is to draw whatever inferences from the evidence or facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Christine F., 6 Conn.App. 360, 366, 505 A.2d 734, cert. denied, 199 Conn. 808, 809, 508 A.2d 769, 770 (1986).
Doing business as Canto, Inc., Bryan Canto owns, manages and serves as the landlord for the dwelling unit located on the first floor north of the property known as 161 Wilcox Street in New Britain, CT (the premises). Canto engages a property superintendent named Ruben Rosales to assist in managing 161 Wilcox Street and in dealing with persons who rent or occupy dwelling units including the premises. (Tes. Canto.)
On or before May 1, 2015, seeking a new dwelling unit, Smith and Blair contacted Rosales and asked him to reserve the premises for their use starting in May 2015. Acting as Canto's authorized agent, Rosales entered into an oral month-to-month rental agreement with Smith and Blair, whereby Smith and Blair would have access to, reside at and use the premises in exchange for payment to Canto of $850 on the first day of each month in which use and occupancy occurred, commencing on May 1, 2015, plus a security deposit of $850 to be paid in advance of use or occupancy. (Tes. Canto.) Although Rosales did not extend a written lease, Smith and Blair willingly and voluntarily entered into this oral month-to-month rental agreement, relied upon it and accepted the opportunity to reside at, use and occupy the premises beginning May 1, 2015. Neither Smith nor Blair knew Rosales by name. However, prior to moving into the premises, they paid Rosales $850 as rent for the month of May 2015 plus $850 as a security deposit. Rosales transferred these payments to Canto. (Tes. Canto, Smith.)
The court received no evidence to support the conclusion that the oral lease agreement into which Smith and Blair entered with Rosales, prior to May 1, 2015, was for a definite term. Relevant to the facts of this case General Statutes § 47a-3b provides in part: " Unless the rental agreement fixes a definite term, the tenancy is month to month . . ."
When Smith and Blair moved into the premises on May 11, 2015, they did so without a written lease and in farther reliance on their oral month-to-month rental agreement with Rosales. Neither Smith nor Blair contacted any person or entity in an effort to secure a written lease during May 2015, June 2015 or thereafter, although they continued to use and occupy the premises. From the totality of their conduct, the court infers that Smith and Blair remained in residence at the premises based on the privilege extended through oral month-to-month lease into which they had entered with Rosales, acting on Canto's behalf, prior to May 1, 2015. (Tes. Canto, Smith.)
The court credits Canto's testimony that ordinarily he does not permit tenants to move in prior to execution of a written lease to which he, personally, is a party. In the case of Smith and Blair, however, who were facing an emergency situation and needed housing, Rosales was authorized to enter into the oral month-to-month lease agreement for Canto so Smith and Blair could use and occupy the premises commencing May 1, 2015. (Tes. Canto.)
Neither Smith nor Blair paid the rent as due on June 1, 2015. On June 12, 2015, Canto and Rosales came to the premises to collect the June rent that was due but had not yet been paid by Smith or Blair. Smith attempted to deliver cash to Canto in an amount less than the $850 rent that was due for June. Before accepting the cash, however, Canto counted the amount that Smith had handed to him. Canto recognized that Smith was attempting to give him less than the $850 due for the June rent, returned the cash to Smith, and did not accept the attempted tender of partial payment.
Smith vigorously cross-examined Canto in an effort to prove that when the cash was handed over, the landlord was in the process of preparing a receipt for rent payment. The court finds no basis for concluding that Canto engaged in the preparation of a rent receipt before counting the cash. Even if the court did credit Smith's own testimony that Canto was writing out a receipt while holding the cash tendered, that evidence would be insufficient to establish that the landlord had accepted the partial payment tendered in lieu of the full payment of $850 due according to the terms of the oral month-to-month lease agreement binding the parties. (Tes. Smith, Canto.)
At some point on June 12, 2015, Canto and Smith discussed prorating the rent because Smith and Blair had not moved into the premises until May 11, 2015. However, the evidence in its totality impels the conclusion that neither Canto nor his agent Rosales ever agreed to prorate the rent for May 2015 for any purpose; there was no meeting of the minds on the issue, and thus no modification of the initial terms of the oral rental agreement through which Smith and Blair were allowed to reside at, use and occupy the premises only in compliance with payment of $850 per month as rent for each month in which any use or occupancy occurred. The evidence establishes that the only rental contract in effect between Smith and Blair as tenants, and Canto as the landlord, was the oral month-to-month lease agreement into which the tenants and Rosales, on Canto's behalf, entered before May 1, 2015. Thus, the rent due from Smith and Blair for the entire month of May 2015 was $850, and the rent rate for the entirety of June 2015, July 2015 and subsequent months in which use and occupancy occurred, remained $850, payable on the first day of each month. (Tes. Smith, Canto.)
The court recognizes Smith's fervent inquiries on the subject of proration, and appreciates the self-represented litigant's attempts to cross examine Canto on the issue of proration. The court further understands that both Smith and Blair are of the opinion that they did not owe a full $850 to Canto for their residence at, use and occupancy of the premises in May 2015. Over all, the credible and reliable evidence establishes that the terms of the oral month-to-month lease agreement reached by Smith and/or Blair with Canto's agent on or before May 1, 2015 remained intact, requiring payment of a full $850 as rent for any month, full or partial, in which Smith and/or Blair were tenants and/or occupants under this oral lease. Despite the vigor of Smith's questioning on the subject of proration, in the courts of this state, even when presented on cross examination, " a question is not evidence ; it is the answer, not the question or the assumption made in the question, that is evidence . . ." (Emphasis added.) Civil Jury Instructions § 2.1-3 [Factfinder's] Duty to Decide on the Evidence. (Tes. Smith, Canto.)
When he visited the premises on June 12, 2015, Canto did not have a written lease available for Smith and Blair. After Canto refused to accept the partial rent payment proffered by Smith on June 12, 2015, and after Smith learned that Canto had not brought a written lease to reflect the terms of Smith and Blair's tenancy, Smith declared to Canto that he and Blair would move out of the premises by July 1, 2015. Despite Smith's promise, he and Blair did not leave the premises on July 1, 2015, but remained in residence there. (Tes. Smith, Canto.)
The court fully credits Canto's testimony establishing that even if he had a written lease available on June 12, 2015, he would not then have entered into such a contract with Smith and/or Blair because neither tenant had paid the full $850 due for the June rent. (Tes. Canto.)
At 10:55 p.m. on June 12, 2015, Smith contacted the New Britain Police Department and complained that Rosales had engaged in threatening conduct at 161 Wilcox Street in New Britain, Connecticut. (Ex. A.)
Without specifying that date of the alleged occurrence, the narrative portion of Smith's special defenses asserts: " Landlord failed to provide me with lease, and super of building pulled knife on me in front of my wife and kids. Brian, Landlord tells me I have to leave because he is not firing his employee and then shoved my rent in my chest." (Special Defense, 8/6/15.) As a whole, and despite Smith's questioning of Canto, the evidence is insufficient to allow the court to conclude that the events described in Smith's special defense actually occurred. See footnote 7. Thus, the court cannot reasonably infer that Smith called the police for assistance in response to the acts of " Brian" or the " employee" referenced in this aspect of the special defenses.
The court credits Canto's credible testimony that neither Smith nor Blair ever paid the rent that was due for their residence at and use and occupy the premises in July 2015. (Tes. Canto.) Fully consistent with this evidence, the court fully credits Smith's candid and forthright admission that he did not pay Canto the rent due for July 2015, and his candid and forthright admission, consistent with Canto's testimony, that Smith and Blair have paid Canto only the sum total of $1, 700, represented by the amounts paid to Rosales prior to May 1, 2015, including $850 for the first month's rent, and $850 for the security deposit. (Tes. Smith, Canto.) There is insufficient evidence from which the court could reasonably conclude that Blair paid Canto the rent due for July 2015. Thus, in violation of the oral month-to-month lease agreement authorizing their residence at, use and occupancy of the premises, neither Smith nor Blair paid the July 2015 rent either on July 1, 2015, when that rent was due, or any time thereafter.
The court declines to credit Blair's testimony offered in an effort to prove that she offered rent to Canto in July 2015. See footnote 2. Blair's testimony lacked details and was inconsistent with the far more reliable evidence establishing that the rent due for July 2015, pursuant to the existing oral month-to-month lease agreement, was never paid to Canto. (Tes. Blair; see Tes. Smith, Canto.)
On July 13, 2015, Canto caused a valid Notice to Quit to be duly served upon Smith and Blair as a predicate to bringing a summary process action against them. The Notice to Quit informed Smith and Blair that they were to end possession or occupancy of the premises on or before July 17, 2015 due to " 1. Non Payment of Rent, 2. Once had a right or privilege to occupy and that right or privilege no longer exists." (Ex. 2; see Ex. 2; Tes. Arsenault.) Further emphasizing the need for Smith and Blair to leave the premises, the Notice to Quit further clearly informed them that any payments made after service of the notice would only " be for use and occupancy, court fees and attorneys fees." (Ex. 1, 2; Tes. Arsenault.) Instead of honoring the Notice to Quit, however, Smith and Blair remained at the premises, and have continuously remained in residence, using and occupying the premises ever since. (Tes. Smith, Canto.)
See General Statutes § 47a-15a, which establishes a statutory grace period by providing in relevant part: " If rent is unpaid when due and the tenant fails to pay rent within nine days thereafter . . . the landlord may terminate the rental agreement . . ." " 'Service of a notice to quit possession is typically a landlord's unequivocal act notifying the tenant of the termination of the lease.' (Citations omitted.) Housing Authority v. Hird, 13 Conn.App. 150, 155, 535 A.2d 377, cert. denied, 209 Conn. 825, 552 A.2d 433 (1988).]" Centrix Management Company v. Valencia, 132 Conn.App. 582, 587, 33 A.3d 802 (2011).
See Wilkes v. Thomson, 155 Conn.App. 278, 281-2, 109 A.3d 543 (2015) (approving presentation of alternative grounds in the notice to quit).
On July 24, 2015, Canto caused a Summary Process (Eviction) Writ, Summons and Complaint to be served upon Smith and Blair, accompanied by a copy of the Notice to Quit. Counts 1 and 3 of the complaint raise claims of nonpayment of rent against Smith and against Blair, respectively. Counts 2 and 4 raise, against Smith and against Blair respectively, claims of occupancy without privilege after the time in the Notice to Quite had expired. As relief, Canto claims a judgment for immediate possession of the premises. Those documents were duly served upon Smith and Blair, further establishing the court's jurisdiction. (Ex. 3; Tes. Arsenault.)
Smith contests that the summary process documents were served upon him or Blair, although marshal's returns are present in the court file, and Arsenault's testimony on the issue credibly establishes his service of the documents. Moreover, " [t]here is a presumption of truth afforded to the statements in the marshal's return. Knipple v. Viking Communications, Ltd., 236 Conn. 602, 607 n.9, 674 A.2d 426 (1996)." Donnie Dickerson, Administrator v. Jayne F. Pincus, 154 Conn.App. 146, 153, 105 A.3d 338 (2014).
On August 6, 2015, Smith filed his appearance with the court. He answered the complaint and filed four discernable special defenses: one sounding in offered payment of rent; one sounding in the landlord's failure to provide a safe living environment; one sounding in the landlord's failure to provide him with a lease; and one sounding in retaliation, claiming that the eviction was brought because he had contacted " public officials or agencies to complain about [his] apartment." (Special Defenses, 8/6/15.)
For equitable purposes, the court finds that neither Smith nor Blair paid use and occupancy to Canto following service of the Notice to Quit; they have remained in residence at the premises even though the sum total they have paid to Canto was the $1, 700 accepted by Rosales prior to May 1, 2015. The court further finds that as the result of Smith and Blair's non-payment of rent while the oral month-to-month lease agreement was in effect, Canto has been deprived of the fair rental value for the premises for many months. (Tes. Canto, Smith.)
General Statutes § 47a-3c provides that " In the absence of agreement, the tenant shall pay the fair rental value for the use and occupancy of the dwelling unit."
II
RESOLUTION OF THE SUMMARY PROCESS CLAIMS
" 'Summary process is a statutory remedy which enables a landlord to recover possession of rental premises from the tenant upon termination of a lease . . .' Housing Authority v. Hird, 13 Conn.App. 150, 155, 535 A.2d 377, cert. denied, 209 Conn. 825, 552 A.2d 433 (1988)." Centrix Management Company v. Valencia, 132 Conn.App. 582, 587, 33 A.3d 802 (2011).
Nonpayment of rent is a lawful basis for pursuit of summary process. As Judge Oliver has aptly summarized, " [t]o prevail on a claim for nonpayment of rent, the plaintiff must establish, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, the following essential elements: (1) a rental agreement; (2) that the plaintiff is the lessor or owner of the premises; (3) the address of the subject premises; (4) the amount of rent due to the plaintiff from the defendant; (5) when the rent was due to the plaintiff; (6) the date of nonpayment; (7) the service of the notice to quit, as well as its service date and termination date; and (8) that the defendant is still in possession." Conn. Gen. Stat . § 47a-15a et. seq." Charles v. Lakes, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Housing Session, Docket No. HDSP-163639 (May 21, 2012, Oliver, J.). Having considered facts, the law, and the applicable equities, the court finds that Canto has established all the essential elements of his summary process action as to both Smith and Blair for nonpayment of the rent due July 2015, as alleged.
See General Statutes § 47a-23(a)(1)(D).
In reaching this conclusion, the court acknowledges that in and of itself " nonpayment of rent does not terminate a tenancy, but gives the landlord the option to terminate the lease by some unequivocal act clearly showing the exercise of that option. Mayron's Bake Shops, Inc. v. Arrow Stores, Inc., 149 Conn. 149, 156, 176 A.2d 574 (1961); Chapel-High Corporation v. Cavallaro, 141 Conn. 407, 411, 106 A.2d 720 (1954)." Daddona v. Liberty Mobile Home Sales, Inc., 209 Conn. 243, 253, 550 A.2d 1061, 1066 (1988) (applying corollary statute applicable to summary process actions against occupants of mobile homes). The unequivocal act, in this case, is Canto's causing the Notice to Quit to be served on Smith and Blair on July 13, 2015. " The lease is neither voided nor rescinded until the landlord performs this act and, upon service of a notice to quit possession, a tenancy at will is converted to a tenancy at sufferance . . ." (External citations omitted.) Waterbury Twin, LLC, v. Renal Treatment Centers-Ne., Inc., 292 Conn. 459, 477, 974 A.2d 626, 637 (2009), quoting Housing Authority v. Hird, supra, 13 Conn.App. 150.
Relevant to Counts 1 and 3 of Canto's complaint, as found in Part I, a fair preponderance of the evidence establishes: that Canto is the owner and landlord, as well as the lessor, of the premises known as the dwelling unit located on the first floor north at 161 Wilcox Street in New Britain, CT; that before May 1, 2015, through Canto's agent Rosales, Smith and Blair entered into an oral month-to-month rental lease agreement allowing them to reside at, use, and occupy the premises in exchange for payment to Canto of $850 as a security deposit, and $850 as rent, payable on the first day of each month for each month in which their residence, use and occupancy would occur; that Smith and Blair moved into the premises, using and occupying it as their residence, on May 11, 2015; that neither Smith nor Blair paid Canto the rent that was due on July 1, 2015, under the oral month-to-month lease agreement, for their residence at, use and occupancy of the premises during the month of July 2015; that neither Smith nor Blair paid Canto, before the expiration of the statutory grace period, paid the rent that was due under the lease for their residence at, use and occupancy of the premises during the month of July 2015; that on July 13, 2015, Canto had Smith and Blair duly served with his Notice to Quit, an act through which the landlord both clearly and unequivocally exercised its option to terminate the oral month-to-month lease agreement into which the parties had entered before May 1, 2015, and informed Smith and Blair that they were required to leave the premises before July 17, 2015; and that Smith and Blair have never left the premises, but remain in possession, residing at, using and occupying Canto's property without paying any compensation therefore. Thus, Canto has met his burden of proving, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, the essential allegations of Count 1, sounding in nonpayment of rent against Smith, and the essential allegations of Count 3, sounding in nonpayment of rent against Blair.
In contrast to Canto, which has met its burden of proof on all counts of its summary process complaint, Smith has not proved any of his special defenses by a fair preponderance of the evidence. The first apparent special defense alleges that Smith proffered rent to the landlord on " June 15 or 17." The evidence does not support a finding that rent was tendered on those dates. Even if it was, the complaint alleges nonpayment of rent for July 2015, not June 2015, rendering this special defense of no value to Smith. The court has credited Smith's testimony establishing that he did not pay any rent for July 2015 or for any month thereafter, although he and Blair have remained in residence at the premises; the evidence as a whole supports the inference that no rent for July, or for any month thereafter, was paid by Blair, either. (Tes. Smith, Canto.) Thus, Smith cannot prevail on his first special defense.
The court acknowledges the parties presentation of a significant amount of evidence related to the events occurring in mid-June 2015, even though Count 1 P4 and Count 3 P4 of the summary process complaint alleged nonpayment of the rent due on July 1, 2015.
The second special defense ostensibly sounds in the landlord's failure to provide a safe living environment, apparently based on Smith's allegations that Rosales confronted him with a knife while Blair and their children were present, and because Canto " then shoved my rent into my chest." (Special Defense, 8/6/15.) Considering the evidence in its entirety, notwithstanding Smith's and Blair's obvious distrust toward both the landlord and Rosales, the evidence supports only the conclusion that a verbal argument between these individuals occurred on June 12, 2015, without more. (Ex. A; Tes. Smith, Blair, Canto.) Thus, Smith cannot prevail on his second special defense.
In reaching this conclusion, the court remains aware of, but does not credit Smith's testimony that June 12, 2015, Rosales pulled out a knife and threatened to kill Smith. The court does credit Smith's testimony establishing that prior to the first day of trial, he had no knowledge of Rosales's full name, that he contacted the New Britain police in the very late hours of June 12, 2015 to complain about Rosales. As a whole, however, the evidence is insufficient to support Smith's assertion that any threatening or assaultive behavior by either Canto or Rosales occurred at any time as claimed in the special defense. (Ex. A; Tes. Smith.)
The third special defense alleges that Canto should not prevail in this matter because Smith and Blair were never given a written lease. The court concludes that the oral month-to-month rental agreement described in Part I embodies all the terms and conditions entered into by the parties concerning Smith and Blair's use and occupancy of the premises. The law does not require a landlord to provide a written lease to tenants, as oral lease agreements are valid in this state. The evidence is insufficient to support a finding that Canto, or anyone acting on Canto's behalf, ever promised a written lease agreement to Smith or Blair. On the other hand, as found in Part I, Smith and Blair moved into the premises and established their use and occupancy in reliance on the oral month-to-month lease agreement reached with Rosales prior to May 1, 2015, supporting the inference that they did not expect a written lease, and that a written lease was of no import to them. (Tes. Smith, Blair.) Thus, Smith cannot prevail on his third special defense.
General Statutes § 47a-1(i) provides in pertinent part that in this state: " 'Rental agreement' means all agreements, written or oral . . . embodying the terms and conditions concerning the use and occupancy of a dwelling unit or premises."
The fourth special defense alleges that Canto brought the pending eviction proceedings because Smith had contacted " public officials or agencies to complain about [his] apartment." The evidence fails to disclose any complaint Smith may have made to any public official or agency about his apartment. Other than Exhibit A, reflecting page one of a two-page New Britain Police Case Incident Report, the court received no evidence relating to public officials or agencies; Exhibit A does not support this aspect of Smith's allegations. Accordingly, Smith cannot prevail on his fourth special defense.
As Canto has met its burden of proof on Count 1 and Count 3 of the summary process complaint, and as Smith has failed to meet his burden of proof on any of his special defenses, Canto is entitled to a judgment of possession in its favor against both Smith and Blair.
As alleged in Count 2 against Smith and in Count 4 against Blair, occupancy of premises " when one originally had the right or privilege to occupy such premises but such right or privilege has terminated" also provides a lawful basis for summary process claims.§ 47a-23(a)(3). Although the complaint in this case set forth " alternative theories of recovery, " the court has previously found that Canto has met its burden of proof on Count 1 against Smith and Count 3 against Blair, sounding in nonpayment, entitling the plaintiff to judgments of possession against each defendant, as requested, without resolution of the alternative claims. See Milford Bank v. Phoenix Contracting Group, Inc., 143 Conn.App. 519, 523 n.2, 72 A.3d 55 (2013), citing Union Trust Co. v. Jackson, 42 Conn.App. 413, 416 n.2, 679 A.2d 421 (1996) (concluding that failure to address plaintiff's alternative cause of action for unjust enrichment did not implicate final judgment rule because court resolved breach of contract claim in favor of plaintiff and rendered judgment on complaint).
III
CONCLUSION
As found in Parts I and II, although they entered into a valid oral month-to-month rental agreement requiring them to pay rent to Canto, neither Smith nor Blair paid the rent that was due on July 1, 2015; neither paid the rent due for July 2015 within the statutory grace period. Moreover, as found in Parts I and II, Smith and Blair were duly served on July 13, 2015 with a valid Notice to Quit informing them that they were require to leave the premises before July 17, 2015 and effectively terminating their lease, yet they remained in possession, using and occupying the premises as their residence. Canto filed its summary process action as permitted by law and has proved, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, each of the essential allegations of its complaint against Smith and Blair. Smith and Blair have had use of the premises, without paying therefore, since July 1, 2015, to Canto's detriment. Neither Smith nor Blair has shown a title in himself or herself which accrued after the commencement of their oral month-to-month lease agreement with Canto; neither Smith nor Blair has shown a title in himself or herself existing at the time the notice to quit was served upon them. Smith has not proved any of his special defenses, filed August 6, 2015, by a fair preponderance of the evidence.
WHEREFORE, having found the facts, applied the law, and considered and balanced the equities of the matter, the court finds all issues in favor of the plaintiff, Canto, Inc.
AND WHEREFORE, the court now enters judgment in favor of Canto, Inc. for immediate possession of the premises known as the dwelling unit located on the first floor north at 161 Wilcox Street in New Britain, CT. The stay of execution provided by General Statutes § 47a-35 is final.