Opinion
Nos. 05-07-00097-CR, 05-07-00098-CR
Opinion issued July 31, 2007. DO NOT PUBLISH Tex. R. App. P. 47
On Appeal from the 195th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause Nos. F06-18991-MN, F06-39022-RN.
Before Justices Whittington, Bridges, and Lang-Miers.
OPINION
Rodney Dwain Cansler waived a jury and pleaded guilty to theft of property in an amount of $1500 or more but less than $20,000 and unauthorized use of a vehicle. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. §§ 31.03(a), (e)(4)(A), 31.07 (Vernon 2003 Supp. 2006). The trial court assessed punishment at two years' confinement in a State jail facility and a $2500 fine in each case. In three issues, appellant contends his guilty plea in the theft case violates due process and the convictions in both cases are void under the United States and Texas Constitution. We affirm the trial court's judgments. The record shows the trial court admonished appellant both orally and in writing in both cases. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(a), (c) (Vernon Supp. 2006); Kirk v. State, 949 S.W.2d 769, 771 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1997, pet. ref'd). Appellant's signed judicial confessions and stipulations of evidence that he committed the offenses exactly as stated in the indictments were admitted without objection. A judicial confession admitted into evidence and contained in the clerk's record is sufficient to prove appellant's guilt. See Pitts v. State, 916 S.W.2d 507, 510 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). At a hearing, appellant testified he understood the charges in the indictments and the punishment range for the offenses. Appellant testified he was not operating a "chop shop" when he was arrested for theft. As appellant was removing an engine from a vehicle he thought had been bought at the police impound auction, the police arrived and told him the vehicle was stolen. Appellant testified he was later arrested for driving a stolen van that had obvious signs of being stolen, such as a torn steering column and "punched out" ignition. Appellant testified he had a prior burglary of a habitation conviction, and asked the trial court to place him on probation. In his first issue, appellant argues the trial court violated his due process rights by failing to sua sponte withdraw his guilty plea in the theft case. Appellant asserts his testimony raised an issue of his actual innocence, and that because he did not have the requisite culpable knowledge for the offense, the trial court should have withdrawn his guilty plea. The State responds that the trial court did not violate appellant's due process rights by not withdrawing appellant's guilty plea. Appellant did not complain about the trial court's alleged failure to withdraw his guilty plea during the proceedings or in a motion for new trial. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1). Moreover, when the trial court acts as the fact finder, it is not required to withdraw a defendant's guilty plea sua sponte and enter a plea of not guilty because no purpose would be served by doing so. See Aldrich v. State, 53 S.W.3d 460, 467 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2001), aff'd, 104 S.W.3d 890 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). When a defendant waives his right to a jury trial and enters a guilty plea, the trial court's duty is to consider all the evidence submitted. The trial court may find the defendant guilty as charged, guilty of a lesser-included offense, or not guilty, as the evidence requires. See id. Thus, the trial court had no duty to withdraw appellant's guilty plea and did not abuse its discretion in not doing so. We resolve appellant's first issue against him. In his second and third issues, appellant argues the trial court violated his federal and state due process rights by reviewing a presentence investigation report (PSI) before finding appellant guilty in both cases. See U.S. Const. Amend. V, XIV; Tex. Const. art. 1, § 19. The State responds that the trial court did not violate appellant's constitutional rights because appellant had already entered his guilty pleas. A judge may not inspect a PSI and disclose its contents to any person unless the defendant pleads guilty or nolo contendere or is convicted of the offense. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 9(c) (Vernon 2006). Thus, the trial court was authorized to review the PSI in these cases because appellant entered guilty pleas. We resolve appellant's second and third issues against him. We affirm the trial court's judgment in each case.