. . ."Lively v. State, 262 Ga. 510, 511(1) ( 421 S.E.2d 528) (1992); Cannon v. State, 250 Ga. App. 777, 779(1) ( 552 S.E.2d 922) (2001), disapproved on other grounds, Jackson v. State, 254 Ga. App. 562, 567(4) ( 562 S.E.2d 847) (2002), aff'd, Curtis v. State, 275 gA. 576 ( 571 S.E.2d 376) (2002). Supra, 250 Ga. App. at 260.

Supra, 233 Ga. App. at 220-221 (4). 250 Ga. App. 777, 782 (3) ( 552 S.E.2d 922) (2001). Supra, 190 Ga. App. at 30 (7).

275 Ga. 177, 563 S.E.2d 847 (2002). 250 Ga. App. 777, 552 S.E.2d 922 (2001), overruled in part on other grounds by Willis v. State , 304 Ga. 686, 706 (11) (a) n. 3, 820 S.E.2d 640 (2018).Kim , 275 Ga. at 177, 563 S.E.2d 847.

" 250 Ga. App. 777 ( 552 SE2d 922) (2001), overruled in part on other grounds, Jackson v. State, 254 Ga. App. 562, 567 (4) ( 562 SE2d 847) (2002). 250 Ga. App. at 779 (1).

014) ; Futch v. State, 326 Ga. App. 394, 398 (1) (c), 756 SE2d 629 (2014) ; Carter v. State, 326 Ga. App. 144, 149 (4), 756 S.E.2d 232 (2014) ; Stolte v. Fagan, 322 Ga. App. 775, 775, (746 S.E.2d 255) (2013) ; Bates v. State, 322 Ga. App. 319, 323 (3) n.3, 744 S.E.2d 841 (2013) ; Ham v. State, 303 Ga. App. 232, 240 (2) (a) n.23, 692 S.E.2d 828 (2010) ; Berry v. State, 302 Ga. App. 31, 33 (1) n.2, 690 S.E.2d 428 (2010) ; Underwood v. State, 283 Ga. App. 638, 639 (1) n.9, 642 S.E.2d 324 (2007) ; Souder v. State, 281 Ga. App. 339, 345 (3) n.4, 636 S.E.2d 68 (2006) ; Moses v. State, 265 Ga. App. 203, 207 (2) (a), 593 S.E.2d 372 (2004) ; Kier v. State, 263 Ga. App. 347, 350 (1), 587 S.E.2d 841 (2003) ; Bennett v. Mullally, 263 Ga. App. 215, 217 (1), 587 S.E.2d 385 (2003) ; Park v. State, 260 Ga. App. 879, 882 (1), 581 S.E.2d 393 (2003) ; Foster v. State, 258 Ga. App. 601, 609 (3) n.28, 574 S.E.2d 843 (2002) ; Ivey v. State, 258 Ga. App. 587, 593 (2) & n.15, 594 (2), 574 S.E.2d 663 (2002) ; Cannon v. State, 250 Ga. App. 777, 781 (1) & n.2, 552 S.E.2d 922 (2001) ; Davis v. State, 236 Ga. App. 32, 35 (5), 510 S.E.2d 889 (1999) ; Scruggs v. State, 227 Ga. App. 35, 35 (1) n.1, 488 S.E.2d 110 (1997) ; Thompson v. State, 212 Ga. App. 175, 175 (1), 442 S.E.2d 771 (1994) ; Lowman v. State, 197 Ga. App. 556, 557 (2), 398 S.E.2d 832 (1990) ; Howard v. State, 191 Ga. App. 418, 418-419 (2), 382 S.E.2d 159 (1989) ; Day v. State, 188 Ga. App. 648, 649 (4), 374 S.E.2d 87 (1988) ; Bass v. State, 183 Ga. App. 349, 352-353, 358 S.E.2d 837 (1987) ; Parisie v. State, 178 Ga. App. 857, 859 (2), 344 S.E.2d 727 (1986). Based on all of these considerations, we overrule Harris, 255 Ga. 464, 339 S.E.2d 712, and Fortson, 277 Ga. 164, 587 S.E.2d 39, and we hold that a defendant is not presumptively harmed by a trial court's erroneous failure to excuse a prospective juror for cause simply because the defendant subsequently elected to remove that juror through the use of a peremptory strike.

We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that these three prospective jurors were qualified to serve. Brannan also argues that the trial court improperly "rehabilitated" these prospective jurors by asking them questions designed to ensure that they were qualified. See Walker v. State, 262 Ga. 694 (2) ( 424 S.E.2d 782) (1993); Cannon v. State, 250 Ga. App. 777 (1) ( 552 S.E.2d 922) (2001); Walls v. Kim, 250 Ga. App. 259 ( 549 S.E.2d 797) (2001). The voir dire transcript does not support this argument.

That is because "[a]n accused is entitled to a full panel of qualified jurors (that is, jurors not subject to being excused for cause) to which to direct his peremptory strikes." Cannon v. State, 250 Ga. App. 777, 781 (1) ( 552 S.E.2d 922) (2001). See also OCGA § 15-12-160; Harris v. State, 255 Ga. 464 (2) ( 339 S.E.2d 712) (1986) (failure to exhaust peremptory strikes before the final juror was impaneled does not render harmless the trial court's refusal to strike an unqualified juror).

Park, supra at 881-882 (1). Cannon v. State, 250 Ga. App. 777, 780 (1) ( 552 SE2d 922) (2001). 2.

Neither the trial court nor the prosecutor elicited sufficient information about the juror's relationship with the victim's mother "to allow the court to make an objective evaluation of her partiality.[Cit.]" Cannon v. State, 250 Ga. App. 777, 780 ( 552 S.E.2d 922) (2001), overruled on other grounds, Jackson v. State, 254 Ga. App. 562, 566-567(4) ( 562 S.E.2d 847) (2002). Although trial courts generally have broad discretion in deciding whether to disqualify prospective jurors for cause, Kim, supra at 178, without more thorough questioning by the trial court or the prosecutor in this case, we conclude that the trial court abused this discretion in failing to excuse the juror, particularly when an alternate juror had been selected and stood ready to serve.

where the trial court coercively "rehabilitated" a prospective juror who had expressed well-founded doubts about being able to serve impartially because of a close relationship with one of the parties or because of extrajudicial knowledge of the events at issue. Cf. Cannon v. State, 250 Ga. App. 777, 778-780(1) ( 552 S.E.2d 922) (2001) (conviction reversed where trial court rehabilitated juror who had a personal relationship with the victim and extrajudicial knowledge of the rape); overruled in part on other grounds, Jackson v. State, 254 Ga. App. 562, 566(4) ( 562 S.E.2d 847) (2002)] Walls v. Kim, 250 Ga. App. 259, ( 549 S.E.2d 797) (2001) (wrongful death judgment reversed where trial court rehabilitated juror, a nurse, who had worked with the defendant doctor and stated she would favor the doctor in the litigation). [aff'd, 275 Ga. 177 ( 563 S.E.2d 847) (2002)].