Cannon v. Fargo

30 Citing cases

  1. Franklin v. Southern Pac. Co.

    203 Cal. 680 (Cal. 1928)   Cited 24 times
    In Franklin v. Southern Pacific Railway Co. (203 Cal. 680; 265 P. 936) the plaintiff, about to board the defendant's train, handed her bag to the defendant's porter to carry it into the train.

    This service must be held to have been covered by the fare paid for the transportation. ( Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 591 [61 L.Ed. 511, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 232]; Cannon v. Fargo, 222 N.Y. 321 [ 118 N.E. 796]; Great Western Ry. Co. v. Bunch, 13 App. Cas. 31; 5 Eng. Ruling Cas. 471.) This holding makes inapplicable such cases as Boering v. Chesapeake Beach Ry. Co., 193 U.S. 442 [48 L.Ed. 742, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 515, see, also, Rose's U.S. Notes].

  2. Moss v. Chronicle Publishing Co.

    201 Cal. 610 (Cal. 1927)   Cited 29 times

    (39 Corpus Juris, sec. 668, pp. 557, 558.) The case of Cannon v. Fargo, 222 N.Y. 321, 326 [ 118 N.E. 796], is in point, as follows: "The New York Central Railroad operated trains over a line. . . . The defendant carried on a general express business using for that purpose cars connected with the trains of the railroad company. It may be assumed that . . . it was to the interest of the railroad company to have its trains, as far as possible, adhere to the schedule and arrive and leave on time.

  3. Rice v. Isbell

    188 Misc. 758 (N.Y. Misc. 1947)   Cited 3 times

    Although our own courts have not used that characterization, the reported decisions do indicate that under circumstances such as are herein presented, the person injured may recover damages suffered as a result of the negligence of a defendant's employee, and will not be barred either because he is a volunteer or under the fellow-servant rule. Cannon v. Fargo ( 222 N.Y. 321) seems to be the only other case directly in point. There, a railway gate tender was called upon to assist an employee of the defendant express company in unloading some packages, and was injured through the negligence of such employee.

  4. Marion Steam Shovel Co. v. Bertino

    82 F.2d 541 (8th Cir. 1936)   Cited 7 times

    Where servants of two persons jointly engage in a work of mutual interest to their employers, each employee retains the status of a servant of his own master, and it is immaterial that one servant may take orders as to details of the work from the other. New Orleans-Belize, etc., S.S. Co. v. United States, 239 U.S. 202, 36 S.Ct. 76, 60 L.Ed. 227; Baker Tow Boat Co. v. Langner (C.C.A.5) 37 F.2d 714; Moss v. Chronicle Pub. Co., 201 Cal. 610, 258 P. 88, 55 A.L.R. 1258; Cannon v. Fargo, 222 N.Y. 321, 118 N.E. 796, 798; Mandala v. Wells, 212 App. Div. 370, 209 N.Y.S. 35, 39; 1 Labatt, Master Servant (2d Ed.) ยง 48. On the former appeal we held that "the labor, except the supervision of the erection of the shovel and the installation of the electrical equipment and the actual operation of the equipment, was being done by the Alston Coal Company through its employees under the supervision of Titus."

  5. National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Stanley

    177 F. Supp. 583 (E.D.N.Y. 1959)   Cited 8 times

    9 Wigmore on Evidence ยง 2594a (3d Ed. 1940). Since other evidence (previously detailed) substantiated the verdict, the jury was free to accept such evidence and to reject that upon which the plaintiff relied, even though the latter consisted of the defendant's own testimony. Cf. Cannon v. Fargo, 1918, 222 N.Y. 321, 118 N.E. 796, 797, reversing 1915, 168 App. Div. 921, 152 N.Y.S. 834, affirming 1914, 165 App. Div. 931, 150 N.Y.S. 1079; Cohen v. Barry, Sup. 1908, 111 N.Y.S. 668 (per curiam); The Seeandbee, 6 Cir., 1939, 102 F.2d 577, 581. The record contains evidence of substance upon which reasonable men could have answered the first interrogatory as the jury answered it.

  6. Matter of Schechter v. State Ins. Fund

    6 N.Y.2d 506 (N.Y. 1959)   Cited 69 times
    In Schechter, the claimant was subjected to unusual strain by reason of an increase in his workload, and the medical testimony was sufficient to sustain the Workmen's Compensation Board decision that the increase in workload constituted the unusual strain which in turn caused the heart attack.

    ( Matter of Altschuller v. Bressler, 289 N.Y. 463, 467; see, also, Matter of Sleator v. National City Bank, 309 N.Y. 708, supra; Matter of Riccobono v. Continental Cas. Co., 2 A.D.2d 718, motion for leave to appeal denied 2 N.Y.2d 705.) As we said in Matter of Carpenter v. Sibley, Lindsay Curr Co. ( 302 N.Y. 304) at pages 306 and 307: "it was within the power of the Workmen's Compensation Board to decide whether in point of fact the testimony of the claimant's physician โ€” notwithstanding some shortage of agreement within itself โ€” nevertheless established a causal relationship between the claimant's routine occupation and the harm that happened to her. (Workmen's Compensation Law, ยง 20. See Williams v. Delaware, L. W.R.R. Co., 155 N.Y. 158, 162-163; Cannon v. Fargo, 222 N.Y. 321, 325; Loewinthan v. Le Vine, 299 N.Y. 372, 377-378.)" The evidence presented here was such that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the conclusion reached by the board.

  7. Claim of Carpenter v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co.

    97 N.E.2d 915 (N.Y. 1951)   Cited 14 times

    " ( 277 App. Div. 802.) In that state of the record, the assertion by the employer and carrier of a want of any proof of causal relation between the claimant's employment and the impairment of her eye is of no avail. For it was within the power of the Workmen's Compensation Board to decide whether in point of fact the testimony of the claimant's physician โ€” notwithstanding some shortage of agreement within itself โ€” nevertheless established a causal relationship between the claimant's routine occupation and the harm that happened to her. (Workmen's Compensation Law, ยง 20. See Williams v. Delaware,L. W.R.R. Co., 155 N.Y. 158, 162-163; Cannon v. Fargo, 222 N.Y. 321, 325; Loewinthan v. Le Vine, 299 N.Y. 372, 377-378.)

  8. Matter of Dennison v. Peckham Road Corp.

    68 N.E.2d 440 (N.Y. 1946)   Cited 23 times
    In Dennison v. Peckham Road Corporation, 295 N.Y. 457, 68 N.E.2d 440, Bouley Company, a contractor, engaged in excavating a cellar, leased a power shovel from Peckham and engaged one Roitoro an employee of the lessor, to assist in operating the shovel.

    The fact that Bouley had agreed to carry the decedent on its payroll while the work of excavation was being done did not serve to withdraw the decedent from the general employ of Peckham; nor is that relationship altered by the fact that the decedent may have been subject temporarily to direction by employees of Bouley as to certain details of work at the site of the excavation. Upon the evidence of record before the Industrial Board it cannot be said as a matter of law that while the decedent was performing his duties as an oiler during the time when the Peckham shovel was operated at the site of the excavation, he no longer represented Peckham's will in the ultimate result of his particular work and had passed out of the direction and control of Peckham into the control of Bouley. ( Ramsey v. New York Central R.R. Co., 269 N.Y. 219, 224; Bartolomeo v. Bennett Contracting Co., 245 N.Y. 66, 69-70; Cannon v. Fargo, 222 N.Y. 321, 328, and see Kristiansen v. Wagner's Steel Erectors, Inc., 295 N.Y. 668.) A legislative direction has made conclusive the finding of fact, quoted above, by the Industrial Board. (Workmen's Compensation Law, ยง 20.)

  9. Ramsey v. New York Central R.R. Co.

    269 N.Y. 219 (N.Y. 1935)   Cited 54 times
    In Ramsey v. New York Central Railroad Co., 269 N.Y. 219, 199 N.E. 65, 67, 102 A.L.R. 511, the New York Court of Appeals had before it a somewhat similar regulation.

    This court, in Wyllie v. Palmer ( 137 N.Y. 248, 257), quoted with approval from Shearman and Redfield on The Law of Negligence as follows: "He is to be deemed the master who has the supreme choice, control and direction of the servant, and whose will the servant represents, not merely in the ultimate result of his work but in all its details." (Cf. Cannon v. Fargo, 222 N.Y. 321; McNamara v. Leipzig, 227 N.Y. 291; Bartolomeo v. Bennett Contracting Co., 245 N.Y. 66.) The ad hoc principle has been applied in many cases by this court.

  10. Grulich v. Paine

    132 N.E. 100 (N.Y. 1921)   Cited 10 times

    We think the Appellate Division was in error in holding that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. This court can neither grant a new trial nor remit the case to the Appellate Division for further hearing but must reverse the Appellate Division and reinstate the judgment of the Trial Term. ( Larkin v. N.Y. Telephone Co., supra; Matter of Shonts, 229 N.Y. 374; Cannon v. Fargo, 222 N.Y. 321; Reis Co. v. Zimmerli, 224 N.Y. 351.) The judgment of the Appellate Division should be reversed, and that of the Trial Term affirmed, with costs in this court and in the Appellate Division.