Canel Hale, Ltd. v. Tobin

66 Citing cases

  1. Blondell v. Littlepage

    185 Md. App. 123 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2009)   Cited 27 times
    Finding that the appellant could not prevail in an attorney malpractice action against the appellee because it was co-counsel to, and not a client of, the appellee

    72 (2001) ("The existence of a joint venture is shown by allegations demonstrating (1) a community of interest in the purpose of the joint association, (2) a right of each member to direct and govern the policy and conduct of the other members, and (3) a right to joint control and management of the property used in the enterprise."); Krebs, 727 So.2d at 568 (recognizing a joint venture where attorneys agreed to exert "joint efforts in the preparation and trial of the cases"); Duggins v. Guardianship of Washington, 632 So.2d 420, 427 (Miss. 1993) (recognizing a joint venture where attorneys agreed to joint control); Lapkin v. Garland Bloodworth, Inc., 23 P.3d 958, 963 (Okl.Civ.App. 2000) ("Where the relationship between attorneys `is one of more nearly equal responsibility, authority, and profit sharing, it may fit the legal description of a joint venture . . . permitting joint and several liability.'" (citation omitted)). The Appellate Court of Illinois made this same distinction in Canel Hale, Ltd. v. Tobin, 304 Ill.App.3d 906, 238 Ill.Dec. 64, 710 N.E.2d 861 (1999), where it refused to recognize a joint venture or fiduciary duty between attorneys under circumstances similar to this case. Id.

  2. Petty v. Chrysler Corp.

    343 Ill. App. 3d 815 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003)   Cited 41 times
    Permitting a plaintiff who has established an unlawful invasion of privacy to recover damages for “harm to his interest in privacy,” “mental distress” resulting from the invasion, and “special damage of which the invasion is a legal cause”

    Punitive damages are not favored in the law. Canel and Hale, Ltd. v. Tobin, 304 Ill.App.3d 906, 920, 238 Ill.Dec. 64, 710 N.E.2d 861 (1999). A court may award punitive damages if the defendant's tortious acts are malicious or display reckless disregard for another's rights.

  3. Kameli v. Ghanemzadeh

    22 C 219 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2023)

    In Illinois, “[a]n action for tortious interference with contractual relations is not the proper vehicle for a discharged attorney seeking to recover damages.” Canel and Hale, Ltd. v.Tobin, 304 Ill.App.3d 906, 918 (1999) (citations omitted). But an attorney may claim tortious interference with a prospective contractual relationship.

  4. Donnelli v. Peters Securities Co., L.P.

    No. 02 C 0691 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 28, 2002)   Cited 5 times
    Granting motion to dismiss breach of contract claim where plaintiff failed to allege that contract provided for a specific duration of the contract

    To state a claim for quantum meruit, Donnelli must allege: 1) he performed a service to benefit Peters Securities and the individual defendants; 2) he performed the service non-gratuitously; 3) defendants accepted this service; and, 4) "no contract existed to prescribe payment of this service." Owen Wagener Co., v. U.S. Bank, 697 N.E.2d 902, 908 (Ill.App.Ct. 1998); Canel and Hale, Ltd. v. Tobin, 710 N.E.2d 861, 868 (Ill.App.Ct. 1999). In the general allegations of his complaint, Donnelli alleges that he entered into a contract with defendants and that there were specific payment terms within the contract.

  5. John v. Wheaton Coll.

    2014 Ill. App. 2d 130524 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014)   Cited 3 times

    Accordingly, there can be no question of its legal sufficiency. ¶ 66 As for factual sufficiency, the ultimate facts required to be pleaded for a civil conspiracy include: (1) an agreement between two or more persons; (2) to participate in an unlawful act, or a lawful act in an unlawful manner; (3) an injury caused by an unlawful overt act performed by one of the parties; and (4) the overt act was done pursuant to and in furtherance of the common scheme. Canel and Hale, Ltd. v. Tobin, 304 Ill. App. 3d 906, 920 (1999). A cause of action for the public disclosure of private facts requires a plaintiff to plead that: (1) publicity was given to the disclosure of private facts; (2) the facts were private and not public facts; and (3) the matter made public would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.

  6. Skrzypkowski v. Simmons

    2013 Ill. App. 122340 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013)

    The necessary elements of a civil conspiracy include: (1) an agreement between two or more persons; (2) to participate in an unlawful act, or a lawful act in an unlawful manner; (3) an injury caused by an unlawful overt act performed by one of the parties; and (4) the overt act was done pursuant to and in furtherance of the common scheme. Canel and Hale, Ltd. v. Tobin, 304 Ill. App. 3d 906, 920 (1999). ¶ 23 Conspiracy is not a separate and distinct tort in Illinois.

  7. Safeway Insurance Co. v. Daddono

    334 Ill. App. 3d 215 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002)   Cited 12 times

    Cases in which we have utilized Rule 366 to permit amendment present unique factual scenarios. In Canel Hale, Ltd. v. Tobin, 304 Ill. App. 3d 906, 914 (1999), we allowed plaintiff leave to file a fourth amended complaint under Rule 366 on the theory of quantum meruit. In that case the trial court had dismissed the quantum meruit claim in the third amended complaint because plaintiff had failed to plead sufficient facts to allow the court to determine whether plaintiff could recover.

  8. Romanek v. Connelly

    324 Ill. App. 3d 393 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001)   Cited 54 times
    Dismissing a complaint for failing to plead definite and certain terms where the complaint did not explain the portion of a fee the plaintiff alleged she was entitled to under a fee-sharing agreement

    The mere sharing of fees between attorneys, however, is insufficient, by itself, to establish a joint venture. Canel and Hale, Ltd v. Tobin, 304 Ill. App.3d 906, 916, 710 N.E.2d 861, 870 (1999); but see Karchmar, 302 Ill. App.3d at 956, 707 N.E.2d at 226 (stating "[a]n agreement between two attorneys to share fees creates a joint venture"). "Without more, `the mere fact that attorneys associate on a fee for services basis does not make them joint venturers.'"

  9. Liu v. T H Machine, Inc.

    191 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 1999)   Cited 245 times
    Holding that a party to an underlying contract lacks standing to "attack any problems with the reassignment" of that contract

    It would have been sufficient consideration had Liu alone arranged the Chengdu contract even if Liu wanted his compensation paid in whole or in part to others. See Canel and Hale, Ltd. v. Tobin, 710 N.E.2d 861, 869 (Ill.App.Ct. 1999) ("Generally, any act or promise that is of benefit to one party or disadvantage to the other constitutes sufficient consideration to support a contract."). TH appears to argue that Liu cannot assert the rights of his associates to payment under the contract.

  10. ATC Healthcare Servs., Inc. v. RCM Techs., Inc.

    192 F. Supp. 3d 943 (N.D. Ill. 2016)   Cited 19 times
    Noting that a single "broad, conclusory statement is insufficient to state a claim"

    Under Illinois law, inducing a third party to cancel an at-will contract does not result in a breach of contract. SeeCody , 409 F.3d at 859 ; Canel and Hale, Ltd v. Tobin , 304 Ill.App.3d 906, 238 Ill.Dec. 64, 710 N.E.2d 861, 870–71 (1999).